U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26221, 19 September 1950, Page 7

U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Swift Success Hangs On Correctness (N.Z.P.A. —Reuter—Copyright) TOKYO, September 18. The chief concern of United Nations staff officers as a result of the Inchon landing is that the Chinese Communist Army might march in from Manchuria. A speedy end to the war depends largely on whether American intelligence has correctly estimated the strength and disposition of the enemy forces in Korea. One officer said: “If our intelligence is correct we can burst this thing wide open, but if it is not —then we are in deep trouble.” In Washington a . Defence Department spokesman said that as far as was known no additional North Korean troops had moved into the area. He added: “There is no evidence of any movement of Chinese Communist troops.” American military spokesmen recently disclosed that Chinese Communist forces were concentrated along the Manchuria-Korea border. Major-General Almond, General MacArthur’s chief-of-staff, said at Inchon to-day that he believed the Communists needed eight days to march their forces back from the south-east-ern defence box to deal with the American invasion. The Americans had made elaborate attempts to deceive the Northerners about the area chosen for the assault. In spite of these precautions, the Communist radio at Pyongyang picked out Inchon two days before the invasion. North Korean prisoners captured in the United Nations drive towards Waegwan said that they had not been told of the Inchon landing but had been urged by their officers to continue pushing on to Taegu.