ATTACK ON MR LIE

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26121, 25 May 1950, Page 5

ATTACK ON MR LIE

“Partisan of Soviet Position” CHARGE BY U.S. SENATOR (Rec. 10 p.m.) WASHINGTON, May 23. Senator William Knowland ’Republican) has accused the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations (Air Trygve Lie) of attempting to “appease” the Soviet Union. Senator Knowland’.? charge was contained >n a statement prepared for delivery in the Senate, the text of which Senator Knowland released to-day. He said: “Now is the time for this Government to speak out in clear, unmistakable language that we will have no part in any such deal.” Senator Knowland described Mr Lie. who is on a tour of foreign capitals. as “a partisan of the Soviet Union’s oosition.” i He said that the indications were that Mr Lie was “busily engaged in selling his 1950 brand of appeasement. Mr Lie's proposal has been to en:ice the Soviet Union back into the United Nations which it voluntarily left because other members did not yield to the pressure tactics of the Soviet Union ‘walkout’ technique-' A London message says that Mr Lie arrived in London from Paris on a, two-day visit. Before leaving for New York he will have talks with Mr Att'ee and the Foreign Secretary (Mr Ernest Bevin). Mr Lie told newspaper correspondents on his arrival that he had no new statement to make on his talks with Mr Stalin and other Soviet leaders in Moscow. He was accompanied by Mr M. C. Zinchenke. the Russian Assistant Secretary-General to the Security Council, who was with him in Moscow. Diplomatic quarters in Britain are buzzing with speculation about the 10-point plan for ending the cold war, which Mr Lie is said to have proposed to the leaders of the Governments he has talked with on his European tour. They thought that the British Government would want a clear indication of Russian reactions to the plan before taking a decision. Observers emphasised that the Western Powers would not agree to buying a relaxation of the cold war! bv a series of one-sided concessions I from the West. Above all. the West j required, at least, agreement on the i future of Germany, and on the con- ; trol of atomic weapons. They did not regard these conclusions as having in any way closed the door to understanding, provided there was genuine evidence of Russia's willingness to co-operate.