DANGEROUS DOUBTS OVERHANG FUTURE

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26120, 24 May 1950, Page 6

DANGEROUS DOUBTS OVERHANG FUTURE

THE MIDDLE EAST

IBv

LORD ALTRINCHAM,

F, Minister -Resident in the Middle East, 1944-43]

(Reprinted, by Arrangement with the “Sunday Times”)

It is high time that statesmanship t both here and in the Middle East made | some fresh and determined effort to I end the perilous uncertainty whicli* overhangs the future of the Middle Eastern world. Only five years ago it was reasonable to hope that the i Palestine problem might be solved, ■ security reorganised and economic | progress stimulated throughout lhat j area by international action under the i aegis i>f Lake Success, those hopes have proveu dupes; but the task 01 ! rebuilding bota military and social 1 security must be resumed. The question is where to begin. 1 in a highly compiex situation, be- I devilled both by oid leuds and by new, mere is good reason to believe that a fresh endeavour by Britain and Egypt to resolve their mutual differences may constitute the most promising line of advance. The key to Middle Eastern security lies now, as always, in the Suez isthmus, lhat is the indispensable base for any sound organisation of Middle Eastern defence; and if Britain and Egypt could reach a new agreement upon the Treaty of 1936, wnich establishes Bri- ( tish rights in the Suez Canal Zone j but terminates six years hence, there would be firmer ground for conn- i dence in the maintenance of external i and internal peace in the whole of the Middle East. A Grudge Egyptian feeling on that treaty is 1

easy to understand. It, is true enough that Egypt was indispensable as a war base to the United Nations long after 1 the threat to Egypt herself had been ‘ banished by our victory at Alamein ■ and the historic sweep of the Eighth Army across North Africa; but we were not uniformly tactful in the use which we made of our treaty rights. No country likes its capital to be under military occupation by a foreign Power, and Cairo continued to enjoy that privilege for more than three years after Alamein. The preoccupations of a life-and-death struggle stretching right across the world were some excuse while war was still being waged; but Cairo and Alexandria should have been evacuated as rapidly as possible after hostilities had ceased, especially as certain war-time incidents had seriously aggravated the strain of our war-time demands on Egypt. If we admit all this, and acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable co-operation accorded us in many difl erent ways. Egypt on her side has | little reason to feel that implementation of the treaty was not of ser- | vice to her as well. However disagreeable may have been some fea- 1 lures of our conduct in the war, our 1 presence by treaty right upon her soil, albeit for our own ends, saved I her from a ruthless invasion by hordes ; such as those which terrorised France, Belgium and Holland and earned , (though not unwelcome on their first arrival) the undying hatred of the Ukraine.

It saved her also from the scars of liberation which, in other less j fortunate countries, five years of peace have not as yet effaced. In trade and employment, moreover, the Egyptian people did well. A fine institution in England commemorates Egypt’s gratitude for the victory of Alamein: and I am certain that only a small, though vocal minority of Egyptians has ever approved the rabid diatribes against England which issue

in moments of irritation from inflammatory speakers and some organs of the press. Opinion is moreover changing, and the main question now is how to mould the better understanding which both countries des. re into practical shape. The future of the Suez Canal Zone, is, for the world, the most important of the issues to be faced, and it needs to be tackled with objective common sense. After hard experience tne West has ceased to regard the necessities of joint organisation for security as inconsistent with national sovereignty and pride. If the American Air Force and its installations can be made free of English i soil, if the Royal Air Force and otner I British troops can count on equal I facilities in France and the Low I Countries, is it reasonable that Egypt should regard as an affront some comparable arrangement for the vital area between Suez and Port Said? Security, alter all, is never cheap. None of the signatories of the North Atlantic Pact— not Britain nor France , nor Canada nor even the United . States —can afford its cost alone, and Egypt is surely in the same case. In ail countries the claims of defence I have to be reconciled with those of I social and economic progress; and no 1 balance can be struck between I the two unless nations with vital in- ! terests in common combine to help i each other in striking it. Is not this | a field in which Egyptian statesmani ship may revise its former standards 1 of national self-sufficiency, like the rest of us?

Egypt’s Needs | Even more than France and Britain, l Egypt needs every pound she can de- , vote to the bettering of life in the overcrowded valley of the Nile. There is, in response to this need, an urge for social work and progress in Egyjit with some achievement to its credit which no country can outshine; educated women no less than men are devoting themselves to social work of all kinds with eager zest. The effort towards social reform cannot rise to the measure of Egypt’s needs if the costs of maintenance and efficiency in the Suez Canal area (and all such costs are growing rapidly) are to fall on Egypt alone; but she can achieve security in the field both of social reform and of defence if she will pursue it, as other nations are doing, in co-oper-ation with proved friends and allies. One must assume that the Security Pact adopted at the recent meeting of the Arab League allows for such an . understanding between a Middle Eastern and a Western Power. The Sudan problem also must be resolved. Britain cannot default on her undertakings to the Sudan, nor j would it be to Egypt’s advantage that she should do so, since Egypt’s main | preoccupation—security regarding the waters of the Nile—might well be . • aggravated rather than lightened ; thereby. There seems to be no reason. , however, why all three countries, and i j possibly Abyssinia as well, should not reach a comprehensive agreement on • the future of the Nile Valley which • would secure their different interests

and provide for an appeal to an independent tribunal under international auspices if any serious misunderstanding arose. Whatever the difficulties to be surmounted. there is no doubt that both in Britain and in Egypt the good will necessary for surmounting them is warm and strong; and there is no question that the whole free world would be iho safer if agreement could be I attained.