MUSSOLINI CHOSE HARD MASTERS AND DESTINY

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25732, 18 February 1949, Page 6

MUSSOLINI CHOSE HARD MASTERS AND DESTINY

CHURCHILL MEMOIRSi

BOOK ll

[By the Rt. Hon.. WINSTON SPENCBR CHURCHILL, M.P.]

XII

It was only common prudence for Mussolini to see how the war would go, before committing himself and his country irrevocably. The process of waiting was by no means unprofitable. Italy was courted by both sides, and gained much consideration for her in'terests, many profitable contracts, and time to improve her armaments. Thus the twilight months had passed. It is an interesting speculation what the Italian fortunes would have been if this policy had been maintained. The United States with its large Italian vote might well have made it clear to Hitler that «n attempt to rally Italy to his side by force of arms would raise the gravest issues. Peace, prosperity, and growing power would have been the prize of a persistent neutrality. Once Hitler was embroiled with Russia this happy state might have been almost indefinitely prolonged with ever-growing benefits, and Mussolini might have stood forth in the peace or in the closing year of the war as the wisest statesman the sunny peninsula and its industrious and prolific people had known. This was a more agreeable situation than that which in fact awaited him. A VAIN APPEAL At the time when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer under Mr Baldwin in the years after 1924 I did what I could to preserve the traditional friendship between Italy and Britain. I made a debt settlement with Count Volpi which contrasted very favourably with the arrangements made with France. I received the warmest expressions of gratitude from the Duce. and with difficulty escaped the highest decoration. Moreover in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevism there was no doubt where my sympathies and convictions lay. On the two occasions in 1927 when I met Mussolini our personal relations had been intimate and easy. In the crisis we had now reached of the disastrous Battle of France it was clearly my duty as Prime Minister to do my utmost to keep Italy out of the ccnflict. and though I did not indulge in vain hopes. I at once used what resources and influence I might possess. Six days after becoming head of the Government I wrote at the Cabinet’s desire the appeal to Mussolini which, together with his answer, was published two years later in very different circumstances. The response was hard.

From this moment we could have no doubt of Mussolini’s intention to enter the war at his most favourable moment. His resolve had in fact been made as soon as the defeat of the French armies was obvious. On May 26. while the fate of the Northern Armies hung in the balance and no one could be sure that any would escape Reynaud flew over to England to have a talk with us about this topic, which had not been absent from cur minds. The Italian declaration of war must be expected at any moment. Thus France would burn upon another front, and a new toe would march hungrily upon her in the south. Could anything be done to buy off Mussolini? That was the question posed. I did not think .there was the slightest chance, and every fact that the French Premier used as an argument for trying only made me surer there was no hope. However, Reynaud was under strong pressure at home, and we on our side wished to give full consideration to our Ally, whose cne vital weapon, her Army, was breaking-in her hand. FRENCH OFFERS - We had already on MSrch 25 at the instance of the French Government made a joint request to President Roosevelt to intervene. ’ln this message Britain and France authorised him to state that we understood Italy had territorial grievances against them in the Mediterranean, that we were disposed to consider at once any reasonable claims, that the Allies would admit Italy io the Peace Conference with a status equal to that of any belligerent, and that we would invite the President to see that any agreement reached now would be carried out. The President acted accordingly; but his addresses were repulsed by the Italian dictator in the most abrupt manner. At our meeting with Reynaud we had already this answer before us. The French Premier now suggested more precise proposals. Obviously, if these were to remedy Italy’s “state of servitude -in her own sea,” they must affect the status both of Gibraltar and Suez. France was prepared to make similar concessions about Tunis. We were not able to show any favour to these ideas. My own feeling was that at the pitch in which our affairs lay we had nothing to offer which could not take for himself or be given by Hitler if we were defeated. This did not prevent the French Government from making a few days

later a direct offer of their own to Italy of territorial concessions, which Mussolini treated with disdain. “ONCE IN 5000 YEARS” In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States, of which Mr Hull has given an impressive account in his memoirs, nothing could turn Mussolini from his course. Our preparations to meet the new assault and complication were well advanced when the moment came. On June 10 at 4.45 p.m. the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador that Italy would consider herself at war with the United Kingdom from 1 p.m. the next day. A similar communication was made to the French Government. When Ciano delivered his Note to the French Ambassador, M. Francois-Poncet remarked as he reached the door: “You. too, will find the Germans are hard masters.” The British Ambassador. Sir Percy Loraine. received the announcement with perfect composure and apparent indifference. He asked only one question: Was Ciano’s statement early news or was it in fact the declaration of war? Ciano replied it was the latter. Lorraine then made a formal bow and left the room without another word. From his balcony in Rome Mussolini announced to well-organised crowds that Italy was at war with France and Britain. It was. as Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked later on, “A chance which comes only once in five thousand years.” Such chances, though rare, are not necessarily good.’ Forthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on the Aloine front, and Great Britain recipitocally declared war* on Italy. Five Italian ships detained at Gibraltar were seized, and orders were given to the Navy to intercept and bring into controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea. On the night of the 12th our bomber squadrons. after a long flight from England, which meant light loads, dropped their first bombs upon Turin and Milan. We looked forward, however, to a much heavier delivery as soon as we could use the French airfields at Marseilles, CIANO’S FATE My account of this Italian tragedy may fittingly be closed here by the letter which the unlucky Ciano wrote me shortly before his execution at the orders of his father-in-law: Verona, December 23, 1943. Signor Churchill,— You will not be surprised that as i approach the hour of my death I should turn to you whom I profoundly admire as the champion of a crusade, though you did at one time make an unjust statement against me. I was never Mussolini’s accomplice in that crime against our country and humanity, that of fighting side by side with the Germans Indeed the opposite is the truth, and if last August I vanished from Rome it was because the Germans had convinced me that my children were in imminent danger. ‘After they had pledged themselves to take me to Spain, they deported me and my family, against my will, to Bavaria. Now. I have been nearly three months in the prisons of Verqna. abandoned to the barbarous treatment of the SS. My end is near, and I have been told that in a few days my death will be decided, which to me will be no more nor less (than) a release from this daily martyrdom. And J prefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparable damage of an Italy which hat been under Hun domination. * The crime which I am now about to expiate is that of having witnessed and been disgusted ’by the cold, cruel and cynical preparation for this war by Hitler ‘and the Germans. I was the only foreigner to see at close quarters this loathsome clique of bandits preparing to plunge the world into a bloody war. Now, in accordance with gangster rule, they are planning to suppress a dangerous witness. But they nave miscalculated, for already 7 a long time ago I put a diary 0! mine and various documents in a safe place, which will prove, more than I myself could, the crimes committed by those people with whom later that tragic and vile puppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanity and disregard Of moral values.

I have made arrangements that as soon as possible after my death these documents, of the existence of which Sir Percy Loraine was aware at the time of his Mission in Rome, should be put at the disposal of the Allied Press. Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little, but that and my lile are all I can offer to the cause of liberty and justice, in the triumph of which I fanatically believe. This testimony of mine should DD brought to light so that the world may know, may hate end may remember, ana that those who will have to judge the future should not be ignorant of the fact that the misfortune of Italy was not tne fault of her people, but due to the shameful behaviour of one man. Yours sincerely. g ciano (To be Continued.) Copvright 1949 in U.S.A. by The New York Times Company and Time, Inc. (publisher of Tima and Life); in the British, Empire by the Daily Telegraph Ltd.; disc where by International Cooperation Press Service, Inc. W<yj rights reserved. Reproduction m full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.