BRITISH FORCES’ EXPENDITURE

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25290, 16 September 1947, Page 7

BRITISH FORCES’ EXPENDITURE

Cut of 22 Per Cent. Expected

EFFECT ON ARMY AND NAVY (Rec. 8.30 p.m.) LONDON, September 15. “The demands for retrenchment in the forces have upset forecasts and plans which in some (Ases were drawn up with every appearance of finality only a few months ago,” says the military correspondent of “The Times.” “Problem after problem has gone back to the melting pot. The effect has been to create uncertainty about elements of British policy hitherto considered fundamental. This uncertainty is increased because the defence planning organisation, good on paper,is not functioning satisfactorily. “It is believed that a financial cut in expenditure on the forces of about 22 per cent, is contemplated. “For the Army there will certainly be a reduction in the number of regular divisions which were considered an essential minimum. This brings its first-line strength to a figure trifling by comparison with that of a number of secondary States. “Yet in some respects the Army and the Royal Air Force may be able to economise by spreading their butter thinner with less damaging effects than the Navy. The Army cap, for example, save something on its training establishments, which have been probably the best in the world, but possibly somewhat luxurious. It can postpone the output of modern equipment while maintaining a trickle Of the best in the interests of experience and continuity of production. It can—and has already decided to—still further increase its reliance upon the Territorial Army to provide the main land forces of the nation in the event of war. “There exists an obvious risk in this policy, because whereas the regular divisions are expected to be ready for action immediately on mobilisation, divisions of the Territorial Army type cannot be, not even when it has been possible to provide some formation training for them in peace time. They need more and time is unlikely to be given as generously as in 1914 end 1339. But the policy is sound in present circumstances. “For the Navy sharp cute must commonly be more serious. Something big has to be shut down altogether; It may be a dockyard or a foreign station, or. again, a reduction in the number of serviceable ships which can be kept in commission. “In the long run the effects of economies in all the services must be similar. but where cuts are excessive the unfavourable effects are likely to be seen more quickly in the naval forces than in those of the land and the air, and they may be less easy to remedy afterwards. If equipments allowed to grow obsolete and key stations are garrisoned inadequately or not at all, if resources are so far reduced that nothing can be made of what is left, then military policy ceases to exist. There is no form of expenditure that cannot be cut, but it is important that the consequences should be clearly understood.’*