Britain and Egypt

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24983, 18 September 1946, Page 6

Britain and Egypt

The further negotiations to which the Egyptian Government invited Britain last month have begun. On August 21 it announced that the latest British proposals for treaty ( revision were not such as to modify the attitude it took up in the Note of July 31, which proposed that all British personnel should be evacuated within a year of the signature of the new treaty, as against the original British suggestion of five years. Egyptian sovereignty over the united Nile Valley (which of course includes the Sudan) was to be recognised and an undertaking given that the proposed Joint Defence Board should begin to function on a war basis and that British troops should return only if “ bordering countries ” were attacked. The British Government in its counter-proposals left the gap wide. It offered to withdraw within three years, and to respect Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan, without prejudice, however, to the possibility that the Sudanese would prefer independence, and meanwhile to postpone the issue. Nor would the British Government agree that Egypt and the many British imperial interests which lie just beyond could be adequately secured by the arrangement the Egyptians sought; for the British delegation argued that, in the deadly swiftness of modern warfare, there would be no margin left in which to establish proper defences if the Joint Defence Board had to wait in an emergency until either Egypt or her limitrophe countries were attacked. On this difference, nominally at least, the negotiations broke down; and recent cablegrams from London have said that Mr Bevin is not likely to give way on it. Yet, announcing that the negotiations were to be resumed, Sidky Pasha said, as was reported yesterday, that he hoped the talks would be concluded and a new treaty signed within a fortnight. It may have been only a pious hope, as empty as Lord Stansgate’s prediction, three months ago, that the negotiations would swiftly succeed. On the other hand, it is possible to find some foundation for it. The real difficulty, as some observers judge, is not that the British and Egyptian points of view cannot be reconciled on the new arrangements to secure Egypt and the Middle East against aggression. The Egyptian delegation, the “ Economist ” has said, has its eyes more firmly fixed on internal politics than on frontiers or defence. It is this concentration on internal manoeuvre that has probably led to the present breakdown. The Egyptian delegation is disunited and growing more so. Sidky Pasha’s position is unstable, and Makram Ebeid is reported to be making overtures to other groups—even to Nahas Pasha and the Wafd—from whom he parted with such odium a year or two ago. Divided against itself, each delegate uncertain of his neighbour, the delegation can agree only to stall—hence the “unanimous rejection” of the British offer. ♦

Since then Sidky Pasha has sought to bring at least the Saadists into his Cabinet. Whether he has strengthened the Cabinet as he hoped is not clear. The cables have reported neither success nor failure. The latest reference appeared a week ago, in a report that Sidky Pasha was about to leave for Rhodes to meet King Farouk and “ discuss the Cabinet reshuffle ” Nor may it be insignificant that King Farouk was then on his way back from Turkey, a Middle Eastern Power which has watched Egypt’s course in the negotiations with profound anxiety.