The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1944. German Offensive

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24446, 21 December 1944, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1944. German Offensive

While the security silence hangs over the front on which von Rundstedt is staging his counter-offen-sive, it is impossible to use the map or other means of estimating with any precision its power, development, and chances. But the imposition of this silence itself signifies that the enemy has struck with great force, that he has not been brought to a halt, and that his progress carries serious threats. As much is indicated by the few broad facts that appear to be established. For example, von Rundstedt’s concentration of men, armour, and artillery is enough to have set a front of 70 miles in motion, at least one of its salients penetrating more than 20 miles into or through the Allied positions; the Luftwaffe has emerged in aggressive strength, being engaged not merely in cooperation with the German spearheads but over the Allied positions on the Roer. But the situation can in general terms be more safely appraised. First, it is clear that von Rundstedt has placed his drive advantageously. Though one semiofficial message suggests that the area was lightly held because the terrain in front of the line and behind it was “not considered very “important”, the Germans in 1940 showed that .they had studied—and solved—the problem of using it offensively; and it is inconceivable that this had been forgotten. More plausibly, it may be suggested that it' was lightly held—lightly, in a relative sense—because the Allied front as a whole has resolved itself into three separate sectors of converging offensive and invasion—the Rhineland, the Saar, and the High Rhine, near Strasbourg. To prosecute these three offensives, which, though their strategic effects are inseparable, are tactically independent, makes a huge demand on Allied resources—all the heavier because, in wintry conditions, frontline units must be more frequently relieved. The strength in which the link sectors can be held is conditioned accordingly and by those difficulties of supply which are still only, in a fair way to being overcome. Second, von Rundstedt has placed his blow at a point where he may hope to ease and perhaps to break the pressure against the Rhineland and the Saar. On both these sectors the Allied. armies require rather than are able to spare reinforcements, if they are to keep up their pressure. Even if they are not compelled to detach reserves to relieve General Hodges, their right and left flanks, respectively, will have to be secured; and reinforcements they would have received will be switched to the danger points. Bad would become worse if, as is possible, von Rundstedt drove so deep that he could repeat the manoeuvres of 1940 and strike across the Allies’ communications. Again, he has not only placed but timed his stroke well. North and south of his offensive theatre, he has just drawn his' forces into sound defensive positions behind the Roer, which is an outlier of the Siegfried Line, and into the Siegfried Line itself before the 3rd Army fronting the Saar. His problems of defence are, momentarily at least, simplified; the Allies have begun to grapple with those of reorganising for a new phase of the attack. Other factors in the timing of the assault are more difficult to assess, but have certainly or probably entered into it. For example, there is the technical one. In known and still “ secret ” weapons the Germans have achieved a momentary advantage, which, slight and precarious as it may be, they cannot afford to delay using. Again, the Allies are suffering a passing and partial shortage of certain munitions. Most important of all, in this respect, the threat of the Allies to the two German nerve centres of the Ruhr and the Saar has now progressed to the point at which it must be checked, at least, and dispersed, if possible. This raises the question, of course, of von Rundstedt’s strategic object. It may be, as is suggested in some reports, that one purpose is to stiffen the German people’s morale for the ordeal of the next few months, even at the risk of a failure which would depress it or finally break it; but that cannot be the substantive purpose. Von Rundstedt’s aim may be the limited one already, suggested, from which, and from the delay won with it, larger ones might be developed; for instance, a peace of exhaustion and compromise. It may, also, be that of a last bid for decisive •, victory in the west. Against this aim, if von Rundstedt entertains hopes of it, every consideration, material and moral, is weighted. Against the lesser one, I they are weighted also: delay cannot save the Germans, it can only defer defeat and make it more costly to inflict and to suffer. But the desperate aim of winning this delay, on the face of it, is not beyond the Germans’ reach.