The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1943. Success in Moscow

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24095, 3 November 1943, Page 2

The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1943. Success in Moscow

An outstanding reason for Mr Roosevelt’s announcement that the Moscow conference had produced a “ tremendous success ” appears in the issue of the four Powers’ declaration— a reason perhaps even more conspicuous than appears in the series of three-Power declarations, far-reaching and promising though these are. The unconditional surrender of the enemy, “ rapid and orderly ” progress from war to peace, an international system of peace and security, so organised as to require minimum armament—affirming these general aims, the representatives of Britain, the United States, Russia, and China declared their agreement, on the means necessary to attain them. Their countries, for example, must collaborate in organising and maintaining peace and security; they must act together in closing hostilities and disarming a common enemy; until “ a system of general “ security,” to embrace all “ peaceloving States,” is established, they must consult “ with a view to joint “ action on behalf of the com“munity"; and “within the terri- “ tories of other States,” after the war, they must employ their military forces only “ for the purposes “ envisaged in this declaration and “ after joint consultation.” These points are all of great significance, especially as they touch, or approach, the problems of dealing with the defeated enemy, of restoring order and the rule of law, and of transferring the responsibility for them, “at the earliest possible “ date,” to “ the community of “ nations.” It will be noted, however, that while one of. the most precise of these conditions is intended to guard against independent military action by any of the four Powers in furtherance of its own war aims, or peace aims, it is not a hard-and-fast condition. Such action is rejected, “ except ” for purposes sanctioned by the declaration and “after joint consultation,” but not necessarily joint consent. In other words, the old problem of sovereign rights and a nation’s claim to judge, finally, what they demand and what they warrant is raised in the very formula that is intended to solve it. It by no means follows that the formula is useless, or the agreement expressed in it a mere agreement to evade the issue. To have reached it is a real achievement. The sincerity of the declarants is not to be questioned; and if that holds, as new situations arise, the condition will hold. Nevertheless, the form of the declaration on this point is a warning: the unqualified doctrine of sovereign rights and a “ general “system of security," guaranteeing freedom and justice, are inconsistent. What qualifications are necessary to reconcile sovereignty and security, it may be the heaviest task of the peace-makers to decide and to introduce—a heavier task, perhaps, than any involved in those first measures of collaboration'’ which will prepare for it. The value of the declaration as a whole is much more simply and shortly stated: it aligns the four Powers in accepting them, for objects plainly avowed and supremely encouraging to every nation free or seeking freedom. The three-Power declarations, if they have been fully reported, are rather more elaborate on such subjects as the punishment of war criminals, the present discipline and future liberation of Italy, and the independence of Austria than upon subjects of wider importance. The British Official Wireless, for instance, says that the “foundations “ were laid ” for the “ closest mili“tary co-operation from now on.” The text of the declarations, however, does not directly bear on the matter. The statement is probably based on the reasonable assumption that the success of the Foreign Ministers’ conference, as a preliminary to the meeting of Mr Churchill, Mr Roosevelt, and Mr Stalin, will make it easier for them to concentrate on the co-ordinated direction of the war. Whether they will find it necessary or possible to bring the Russian high command into co-operation with the AngloAmerican chiefs-of-staffs committee remains to be seen. But all, or almost all, difficulties that have prevented the full unity of Allied strategy have been traceable to political causes, general or specific; arr 1 one declaration gives an impressive assurance that these will be removed. The establishment of the European Advisory Commission, sitting continuously in London, will provide the “machinery of practi- “ cal collaboration,” so far not achieved by ordinary and extraordinary inter-governmental exchanges. A more widely representative advisory council on Italy has been set up at the same time, to sit ir the Mediterranean area, where it will probably take the place of the Mediterranean Commission. Though this appears to limit the functions of the European Advisory Commission, there can be no doubt that the primary object is, by delegating this particular function to a special and specially placed body, to give the commission the utmost chance to concert the Allies’ policy in general, at the centre and at the top. The issues of politics are inseparable from those of economics and of war; and it is not headlong optimism to regard the commission as the instrument of united Allied leadership, which can achieve through it not merely speedier victory but a durable peace.