GERMANY DEPENDS ON INLAND PORTS

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24093, 1 November 1943, Page 4

GERMANY DEPENDS ON INLAND PORTS

SUPPLY

[By PAXIL. WOHL. In the [Published b;

Allied airmen are hastening the collapse of the already badly overstrained German railway system by bombing the Reich’s inland ports. This may seem paradoxical, but it is nonetheless true. By making the inland waterways terminals unusable, the Allied flyers will, perforce, compel the Germans to divert a large portion of their water-borne traffic to the railroads. And the railroads in their present state simply cannot carry the added burden. Obstruction of the three canal systems of northern Germany—the Dort-mund-Ems Canal which connects the Ruhr with the North Sea; the three east-west canals between the Ruhr and the Rhine: the Lippe Canal, the RhineHerne Canal, and the Rhine-Ruhr Canal, and the Ems-Weser Canal, which links the central Germany industrial area with the Mittelland Canal system and the great rivers of the east—would be equivalent, to .the immobilisation -of approximately 100.000 freight cars and many thousands of locomotives. This is much more than the Allies could hope to demolish by direct attacks on railway installations. Commercial Traffic Hit

In the winter of 1941 and 1942, when ice closed most of Germany’s waterways, the Nazis got a foretaste of the effect of the present Allied aerial strategy. The repercussions were so great that Hitler’s Minister of Communications had to decree the complete stoppage of all commercial traffic and the immediate unloading of all available freight cars. For the time being Axis inland navigation still functions. The Allies have not yet been able to block permanently any one of the principal canals. The bombing Of port installations, however, must have slowed down water transportation. Barges spend considerable time in port. Before the war, for instance, coal transport by water from the port of Wanne, in the Ruhr, to the great liquefaction factories in Hanover took 19 days, of which only eight represented the voyage proper. The remaining 11 days were spent in port waiting, loading. or discharging. The Wanne-Han-over route, moreover, is especially easy to negotiate. There are no sluices on Its eastern end between Muenster and Hanover, whereas the Dortmund-Ems as well as the Rhine-Herne Canal have several dozen locks where every barge train has to wait for at least one hour. Long Task

Obstruction cf Axis inland navigation is necessarily a long and complicated task. Some of the most important ports in the Ruhr district are still unscathed. The Belgian Canal system which taps the important coal mines round Liege and which was greatly strengthened through the completion of the Albert Canal six months after the German occupation, seems to be virtually intact. . The present raids, however, are only a beginning. Nevertheless, coal shipments from the Ruhr and Belgium to southern Germany and Italy which in the last three years were carried to a large extent in motor barges up the Rhine to Ludwigshaven arid Mannheim and even as far as Karlsruhe and Basle, already have been diverted al-

"Christian Science Monitor.”] Arrangement.]

most entirely to rail. It takes 33* standard freight cars to carry the load of four 1500-ton standard barges. Ever* barge which the German railroad* must replace increases their traffic bur. den.

• Months of systematic bombing oftb Rhineland-Westphalia region and the whole of north-western Europe already; has done much damage to the heart W German inland navigation. ‘ -T The city of Duisburg-RuhrotA Europe’s greatest inland port, has beei/ pounded severely. Dusseldorf, Essen. ' Mulheim, Oberhausen, Dortmund, anl Bochum are other ports that have been targets of some of the heaviest Allied raids. Emden. at the mouth of the river Ems, which is not only a U-boat station, but also the northern terminal of the Dortmund-Ems Canal, has been bombed repeatedly. These are traffic centres which com. pare with America’s greatest inland ports. In 1937, Duisburg-Ruhrorfi water traffic was more than 28,000,000 V: tons. Emden’s canal traffic alone- re-’, presented round 7,000,000 tons before ;i the war. More than half of inland navigation is concentrated on the Rhine and on the north-western canals, which together in 1937 carried more than 100,000,000 tons of traffic” about one-quarter of the total traffic the German railroads. Rhine Escapes Attacks "

Of the 17,881 inland ships, with* total carrying capacity of about 6 500 000 tons, listed by the Nazi Minister of Communications on January 1939 more than two-thirds were con*!’ centrated in north-western In 1936, more than 10,000 barges with |‘- total carrying capacity of 4,800.000 toni ‘ were recorded on the Dortmund-Esy Canal. . The deep Rhine river itself, Gir&H many’s greatest waterway, is immune from aerial bombing, blit itf,' value is diminished by constant pound.'* ing of its ports. Most of the mofltttf . Rhine barges, with a carrying capacity , of 1800 to 2000 tons, are too large fo#. diverted to other waterways. • , In 1037—the last year for which coat*’ ‘ prehensive statistics are available*;?76.000. tons of coal were transjfortwT-V on inland waterways—mostly in nottK; western Germany—as against 195,000,W f tons carried by rail. ThMptf? 195.000. tons were the greatest traffic item of the German railfoMl 1 the total traffic of which amounted ft r :v 482.000. tons. The coal and ore required more than 200,W-M of Germany’s less than 600,000'freight---cars.

The war has increased the traffle; 1 burden of inland navigation. In drSt’i to relieve their railroads, the Natit ■ < from the beginning of the war diverted '’' as much traffic as possible to intend waterways. Even for short hauls shipments between cities served by rIV6H Tor Cartals have to travel by water, Not " only bulk commodities, even \ carload freight is shipped in barges; In " 1941 one-third of Germany’s total coal " traffic and 70 per cent, of the Ruhr’s ore ' Supply were carried by water. ;; Before the war the tonnage Irans- - ported on Gternian inland waterways ' ■ (approximately 135,000,000 tons in 1938)represented about 34 per cent, of the , total tonnage of the railroads. At present it is reported to be close to 38 Pel' cent. ,