STRATEGICAL SITUATION THREATENS NAZI DISASTER

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23811, 3 December 1942, Page 4

STRATEGICAL SITUATION THREATENS NAZI DISASTER

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE

Now that considerably fuller details are available regarding the dl p e^'( ?f l and the dimensions of the Russian drives, a much clearer picture is possible of both the general strategy and the local tactics of the great Soviet offensive in the Stalingrad region. Th events of recent weeks clearly justify the old maxim of Clausewitz that effective defence is preparation for a successful offensive. The results already achieved northwest and south of Stalingrad have lifted the siege of the city. The Sovi defenders are making noticeable gains within the suburbs, and Moscow reports that a further Russian column coming from the north, well within th main advance from Serafimovich, has joined hands with the Stalingrad garrison In view of both the nearer and the more distant threats, the Germans would seem to have no option but to retire from Stalingrad as best they can. In this event, they will have nothing to show for their costly three-months attack on “the Russian Verdun.. They will have lost all chance of taking the only city east of Rostov that could serve as winter quarters; and they will have to give up their hopes of disloeating the vital Volga traffic and separating the central and the southern Soviet armies. The rapidity of the Russian advance and the magnitude of their spmls would justify the observer in hoping that the discomfiture of the Germans before Stalingrad may develop into disasters on a sweeping scale; but a note of caution must be sounded. The offensive is still in its early days, and even the Russians attribute much of the initial success to the surprise that followed speedy night-crossings of the Volga. Past experience has often demonstrated that the consolidation of such vast enveloping movements is most difficult. The perimeter of encirclement even when effected, must be held at all points, and, in this case, a well-equipped army of anything up to 400,000 men could deal very heavy blows in attempting to break out. Much of the outcome will depend upon the local Soviet air power, and upon the capacity to bring up large quantities of heavy artillery in time to consolidate the first sweeping gains. The Germans are past-masters in countering enveloping moves, as last winter’s experience on the Rzhev front demonstrated, and Timoshenko himself showed how an army could be extricated from a seemingly complete trap, by his withdrawal across the Dnieper last year. Multiple Russian Thrusts

Nevertheless, the wider strategical situation is now decidedly against the Germans. It is they who are forced to retreat to avoid encirclement, it is their armies which are in jeopardy. All the tactics they themselves exploited so successfully m the summers of I? 41 a™ l being turned against them, and ther is no reason to believe that the Rus sians will be any less successful n driving home the attack to the full, with equivalent strategical results. The very fact that the general battle picture is in reverse provides the best testimony to the changed situation. The Germans are also hampered by enormous transport difficulties fpr in this region they are now about 450 miles further east than they were last year, and the winter weather will relatively favour the Russians. The Volga is already freezing, and soon all the rivers will be frozen so firmly as to present ice-bridges, and so no longer

[B y the Military Correspondent of the -Sydney Morning Herald.”]

act as natural barriers to a Soviet advance. All the elements, therefore, are present of an extremely dynamic situation Will the Russians be strong enough to consolidate and extend their initial penetrations? Even if not always completely realised, fivei or -g movements may result in transformations of the batttlv fronts; and the evidence at our disposal would lead one to believe that Stalin’* armies are attempting a variety of subsidiary thrusts that may conceivably compel German withdiawals all along the front. The fighting from the Kalmuck Hills south of Stalingrad, is particularly" suggestive. It is not enough to say that this is aimed at preventing the passage of German reinforcements up the main Salsk railway from the south, because the Russians have already cut that line by their advance from Abganerova. The occupation of Aksai must be part of the drive which has brought the Russians two-thirds of the way towards Kotelmkov, and this in turn presages an attempt to move down the left bank of the lower reaches of the Don, thus closing in upon- Rostov and isolating all the German armies on the scattered Caucasus fronts. Ambitious as it is, such a move would be basically sound, because the Germans cannot hold the intervening North Caucasian areq as strongly as they do the actual foothill fronts; and any Russian threat to their rear must result in diverting strength from the front-lines. A Drive Down Übe Don

Assuming that the Russians can hold their present gains, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that their great strategical scheme is to drive south along both banks of the river Don, aiming at the German positions at the mouth. In these circumstances the trapping of the Nazi armies before Stalingrad would be the prelude to a much more ambitious scheme, concerned not only with freeing the line of the Don and mastering the Don elbow but also with disrupting the German military position everywhere in south Russia. At long last, the strategical reserves which Budenny and Voroshilov have been training beyond the lower Volga may be thrown decisively into the struggle, and at a time when the German forces are exhausted by their gruelling summer campaign. The Russians have shown an almost inhuman capacity for withholding reserves for future use, even in such a dire position as that which confronted Stalingrad in September and October. Similar considerations would apply to any southern move from Voronezh. Although the Germans advanced during the summer from Kursk to the confines of Voronezh, they were never able to reduce the city, which has remained a potential threat to their entire advanced . forces. After all, the German armies, east of a line from Voronezh to Rostov, are in a relatively narrow and exposed salient; and it would be entirely in keeping with Russian strategical designs to attempt an. enveloping move outwards from the Voronezh base. This would still further dislocate German because the enemy would how to dispose his reserves if hvv;-ac, /' to ward off attacks at Voronezh; the' Don bend, and perhaps the lower Don reaches at the same time.