The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1942. Stalingrad and After

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23747, 19 September 1942, Page 4

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1942. Stalingrad and After

The battle for Stalingrad appears to have reached its final stages. The Russians now admit German penetration of the main defences of Stalingrad, although there is as yet no confirmation of German claims to have captured the main railway station in the heart of the city, or to have cut right through it to the Volga. Fighting is as fierce as ever, and the Russian resistance is still determined. But more ominous for the fate of Stalingrad than the meagre and confused reports of German progress is the insistence in the latest statements from Moscow on the “ sheer exhaustion ” of the defenders and on the overwhelming numbers against them. Emphasis on these factors at such a time can be intended only to prepare world opinion for the ultimate collapse of the Russian defence and for the fall of Stalingrad. The consequences of the fall of the city, giving the Germans control of the vital Volga communications system, and making possible the extension of German conquest in the Caucasus to the whole of the area north of the mountains and fronting the Caspian Sea, so blocking oil traffic northwards from Baku, have been abundantly emphasised. The effect on Russian ability to continue effective resistance, and on Russian morale, must be considerable. The Russian position has worsened not only at Stalingrad, but on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, and in the Mozdok area in the south-east. The fall of Novorossiisk deprived the Russian Black Sea fleet of its last major base, and the Germans are now thrusting along the coast and across the mountains towards the port of Tuapse. After Tuapse there will remain only the oil ports of Batum and Poti, south of the mountains. By establishing themselves in strength beyond the Terek river, in the Mozdok area, the Germans now present a major threat to the Groznyi oilfields—the next stage in their advance toward the Caspian down the northern flank of the mountains. These advances have been expected, but possibly more ominous is the report of renewed enemy attacks at Voronezh, the hinge upon which the Germans swung their advance down the Don to Stalingrad. A large-scale offensive here would at least hold large Russian forces which might otherwise be withdrawn to reinforce Stalingrad, but if it is undertaken it is far more likely to be as part of a German plan to widen the Volga front above Stalingrad. Such a thrust from Voronezh, directed probably towards the Volga at Saratov, would immeasurably weaken the whole of the Russian central front, including the Moscow defence system, by widely exposing its southern flank. With two full months of good campaigning weather still ahead of them, and in spite of the heavy losses suffered in the battle for Stalingrad, the Germans seem more likely to undertake some such flanking move than to Begin a frontal assault on Moscow, although the possibility of a direct attack cannot be discounted. The recent Russian campaign on the central front was probably intended mainly to provide diversionary aid to Stalingrad, but its failure to achieve its main objective—the capture of Rzhev—is an indication of German strength on this front, which may yet be turned to an offensive against Moscow. It is a tribute to the Russians that in spite of the inevitable losses involved in long-continued retreats they have been able so stoutly to resist the Germans at Stalingrad, and at the same time hold the Voronezh line, undertake a major diversion at Rzhev, and seek to improve the defence of Leningrad by the recent attacks in the Sinyavino sector. Stalingrad has not yet fallen, but if it falls tHe Germans will have paid dearly for it.