Pacific Commands

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23747, 19 September 1942, Page 4

Pacific Commands

The military situation in the southwestern Pacific has given rise to an agitation in American and Australian newspapers for some revision of the present system of Allied commands in this area. The case against that system is a strong and an obvious one. From the point of view of Pacific strategy, the battles now in progress in New Guinea and the Solomons are, a part of the wider struggle for control of communications in the central Pacific; yet they are being waged under different commands. Nor can it be doubted that the division involves serious practical disadvantages, even though there is a close liaison between the two headquarters. Foi one thing, General Mac Arthur is obliged to fight an essentially amphibious battle with inadequate naval forces. This, perhaps, is the main reason why the Japanese have been able to make unopposed landings on so many points on the New Guinea coast and why the defenders of New Guinea have so seldom been able to engage in tactical offensives. General Mac Arthur has had to rely almost wholly on the air arm to strike at enemy bases and lines of communication; and his air strength is dispersed over such a wide area that most of the raids have only a nuisance value. A second disadvantage of the division of commands is that the line of demarcation is also the line of Japan’s most probable thrust southwards should she score successes in New Guinea or the Solomons. The New Zealand Government disapproved from the first of the exclusion of New Zealand and her dependent islands from General MacArthur’s command; and it can be said the recent events have justified its attitude. But it is as well to realise that the difficulties in the way of securing unified planning and direction of the Allied war effort in the Pacific are not removed merely by giving someone the title of supreme commander. The fiasco of General Wavell’s Sourabaya command is conclusive evidence on that point. Unless a

man with the qualities necessary in a supreme commander is available, and unless his powers are 'real powers, it is much better to accept a division of authority as inevitable and make the best of it.