ENEMY STRATEGY IN PACIFIC

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23745, 17 September 1942, Page 5

ENEMY STRATEGY IN PACIFIC

Effect of Successes In New Guinea “HANDICAPS STILL WITH ALLIES” A Press Association correspondent at a South Pacific port says that in his opinion the Japanese success in passing the ‘‘impassable’’ Owen Stanley range has appreciably hastened the hour for the launching of a major enemy drive against the south-eastern Solomons, the New Hebrides, and New Caledonia. The attention now held by Port Moresby may overnight be switched right away from New Guinea and Australia. It does not seem that the New Guinea fighting has absorbed more than a small proportion of the . forces the Japanese are believed to have been assembling in the northern Solomons, New Britain, Papua, and the Louisiade area. So militarily easy has been the passage over the Owen Stanley range that the Japanese may well be encouraged to attempt a general advance over the whole south-west and south Pacific perimeter. They have sufficient freedom of movement under cover of their present island' and New Guinea coastal positions to attempt the moving of troops across the sea approaches to the south-eastern Solomons-New Hebrides-New Caledonia chain. If Port Moresby is not captured by Japanese ground troops and can still be used as a bombing base by the Allies, it can expect to be “blitzed” by enemy air forces, which appear to have been held in reserve throughout the whole of the Owen Stanley crossing. Freed of the danger of bombing raids from Port Moresby, the Japanese will have vastly greater confidence'in being able to move large numbers of troops across the southern end of the New Guinea-Solomons parallelogram than they now enjoy. The correspondent says the Japanese must be aware of the change which has been wrought in Southern Pacific strategy by their own successes on the one hand and by those of Vice-Admiral Ghormley’s Americans on the other. The south-eastern Solomons not only present the greatest threat to the Japanese defences in this area, but also constitute the toughest obstacle to the development of their offensive plans. If it is deemed to be necessary, the Intended Japanese reduction of Port Moresby may be followed by attacks, even by amphibious forces, on Darwin w eastern Australia, but at present the reported disposition of enemy attacks and concentrations gives Australia secondary ranking to the Solo-mons-New Hebrides-New Caledonia line. “Has Become a Crete” Concentration on the recapture of Guinea would only delay an offensive, waste time when time is and absorb energy when SiV. v wry ounce of it has to be given to Widening the crack which the SoloA tnons battle has made in the Japanese Perimeter, Port Moresby has become a Crete. Its job is to help delay the development of the greater Japanese plans. Australia’s place in the grand Pacific strategy also appears to be changing. With its control of New Guinea now so greatly shrunk, and so long as the recaptured Solomons and the line behind them remain firmly in American and Allied- possession, Australia, still integral for the defence of the south Pacific, is no longer geographically integral for the hoped-for offensive. Its main task now, says the correspondent, is not to provide a base for an offensive but to help with the sup§ly of men and materials. It is the olomons which hold the Pacific Ocean stage. Enemy capture of the Solomons and the islands leading up to them from the south Pacific would completely eliminate Australia’s importance in the grand . strategy, and end all hope for its security. Thus, attention, apt to have been swung in the last week to New Guinea, should remain riveted on the Solomons and their island support areas, with naval control, which includes the air ■rm component, as still the final answer for the fate of the Pacific. What is now happening, he believes, ■ that each side is racing to widen the