ALLIED TACTICS CRITICISED

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23744, 16 September 1942, Page 5

ALLIED TACTICS CRITICISED

JAPAN’S SUCCESS IN NEW GUINEA CORRESPONDENTS URGE CHANGES (Special Australian Corresp., N.Z.P.A.) (Rec. 9 p.m.) SYDNEY, Sept. 15. “We must overhaul our entire concept of waging war against the Japanese. We must beat the Japanese at his own game—out-scheme him, outinfiltrate him, and always try to get in the first blow,” says the Sydney “Sun,” urging that Japan’s New Guinea success proves that the bitter lessons of Malaya are still unlearned. It says that before the United Nations can have any hopes of solid successes in the South Pacific, every. Allied soldier must be thoroughly trained in commando methods. Every Australian newspaper is expressing similar views. American journalists in their dispatches, to th« United States also emphasise that American soldiers who will oppose tne Japanese should have guerrilla training. Analysing the lessons of the recent fighting in the Owen Stanley range, the war correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" (Mr Osmar White) to-day says: “It is not sufficient even to make men physically tough, to meet the Japanese in the jungle on equal terms. Our men must be trained with almost fanatical thoroughness in (1) personal camouflage and concealment, (2) silent movement in all types of country, both by day and by night, (3) the art of living on and in forest country with complete self-confidence, so that a week or a fortnight in the bush out fighting can be regarded as a rest, (5) close-quarters sniping, involving the greatest patience and ability to keep still for many hours in uncomfortable positions, (5) jungle hygiene and prophylaxis, (6) living on rations of small bulk but adequate nutritive value, such as rice, sugar, and vitamin concentrates.” Other writers urge also that our equipment has been too. heavy, and unsuitable for jungle fighting, retarding speed of movement. More USnt automatic weapons, hand-grenades, and small-calibre mortars should have been carried. Our tactics, too, are said .to have combined a too ready acceptance of withdrawals for fear of bemg cut off, with insufficiently vigorous counter-infiltration measures. ’ Milne Bay Experience The need for cunning and resource to match the Japanese is also generally emphasised. Wounded men just returned from Milne Bay report that the Japanese even feigned death among their own wounded waiting for our troops to pass, when they rose up and shot our men from behind. They spoke. “the clearest Australian," and many Allied soldiers were killed when they revealed themselves to answer the enemy. .. “Until the Allies can deliver a blow at the enemy’s' solar plexus, the tactical problems involved in thwarting his infiltration advances must be our mam preoccupation,” says the* “Sydney Morning Herald” in a, leading article. One correspondent describes the whole war in the Owen Stanley range ■ as "a lethal game of hide-and-seek, and suggests that against the Japanese all formal ideas of attack and defence must be abandoned. It is -felt here that these needs , apply not only in New Guinea, but throughout the south-west Pacific, where the islandhopping offensive to which the United Nations ar > committed must result m land warfare basically of the guerrilla type. This is warfare of a type peculiarly suited to the special talents ot Australian and New Zealand soldiers, and a wide belief is being loudly proclaimed here that in equipment, training, tactics, and strategy., the Allied troops in the South Pacific must be fitted for shock beach landings and close jungle fighting. Divided Command “The Japanese advances in New Guinea are largely due to^the lack.of a unified command in the> south-west. Pacific," says the New York Daily News.?. ..“The Solomons offensive is dfestalbVd as a Navy show, with General MacArthur’s • bomber assistance received none too graciously. The New Guinea affair is an Army show, with General Mac Arthur in charge. He is responsible to the Army Secretary (Mr i H, L. Stimson). Rear-Admiral Ghormley, in charge of the Navy show, is responsible to Admiral Nimitz. who is responsible to the Navy ’Secretary. (Colonel Knox). • ■ ’ ■ , . “When General Mac Arthur rushed to Australia after the brilliant defence of the Bataan Peninsula. Washington saluted him as a great hero and let It be generally known* that he would. have charge in the south-west Pacific. Then the Navy sailed into the picture. “Our enemies are skilled in the. art of taking advantage of our divided counsels. The Japanese, began the war against America with the advantage that the Army general and the Navy admiral .commanding in Hawaii were hardlv speaking to each other, though both were supposed to be defending Pearl Harbour. We cannot win this, war bv divided command and counsels, and by chipping authority away from capable military men.” Colonel Tolchenov. a Soviet military observer, writing in “Red Star,” says: “The Japanese, cannot afford to stop their advance towards Australia. If Japan stops now it will enable the Allies to strengthen their position. Japan, having captured tremendous island ■ territories, cannot hope to. hold them while restricting the activities of her troops to Pacific defence.”