“Without Regard To Persons..."

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23740, 11 September 1942, Page 4

“Without Regard To Persons..."

After describing the changes he made in the Middle Eastern command Mr Churchill used a sentence which many of his friends would like to be able to read in a wider context. It is always painful making such changes [he said] but in war time individual feelings cannot be spared and whatever is thought to be the best arrangement must be made without regard to persons and made quickly. There is a justifiable impression that Mr Churchill’s achievements as a war leader fall short of his capacities and opportunities because he too seldom applies, in politics and the industrial field, the principle here enunciated. In spite of its many reconstructions, his Ministry still has avoidable weaknesses of personnel because of his loyalty to old colleague?. And although Britain has mobilised a higher percentage of her manpower and capital for war purposes than any other belligerent, her war effort remains unsatisfactory on the side of organisation because the susceptibilities and interests of persons at times come before the national interest. If ever there was a situation which required that “the best arrange- “ ment ... be made without regard •“ to persons and made quickly ” it was the situation in the British coal industry at the middle of last year, when the House of Commons was told that war factories were held up for lack of fuel and that stocks were equal to only three weeks’ consumption. The Government knew then that only drastic measures could avert a serious and growing coal shortage in vital industries. But because such measures would have set powerful political and industrial interests at variance with one another and with the .Government, a compromise was preferred. Householders were asked to economise fuel and miners to increase their output; and the Government proclaimed that its objective was the addition of 20,000,000 tons to stocks before the end of the winter. The result was a coal shortage in the winter of 1941 and the prospect of an even more serious shortage in the winter of 1942. Sir William Beveridge, the Govern-

ment’s official adviser on the coal * industry, thereupon recommended two measures which every unbiased person in possession of the facts knew to be necessary: fuel rationing and the reorganisation of an industry which had for the 20 years before 1940 based its production methods on the assumption of an over-supplied market. The Beveridge plan was adopted by the Government, then discarded in the face of bitter Parliamentary opposition, and finally enforced in an emasculated form. A rationing scheme was prepared but held in reserve against the possibility (which amounted to a certainty) that renewed appeals for voluntary economies would fail, though it was obvious enough that rationing would not avert a shortage in the winter of 1942 if its enforcement was delayed till the autumn. At the same time the industry was “ reorganised ” by superimposing an elaborate structure of State controls upon the existing structure of private ownership—an arrangement which seems to combine the worst features of socialism with the worst features of private ownership. The result is that, for the second winter in succession, British industry and British householders face an avoidable coal shortage. The South Wales miners’ leader did not exag-* gerate • when he told the Trades Union Congress the other day that “the coal position is more desperate “ than ever since the outbreak of “war” and that “nothing will “remove the danger of a critical “ supply position in the coming “ winter.” In this instance, as in others, Britain is paying a heavy price for ignoring the principle that in war “ whatever is thought to be “ the best arrangement must be “ made without regard to persons, “ and made quickly.”