The Press MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1942. Allied Naval Losses

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23588, 16 March 1942, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1942. Allied Naval Losses

The Admiralty communique on Allied losses in the sea battle of Java tells the story of a disaster which may be as far reaching in its consequences as the bombing of Pearl Harbour or the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Disaster is the word which must be used, for the Admiralty account shows that the Allied commander s desperate hazard not only failed in its main purpose, which was to break up the Japanese invasion fleet, but ran his own squadron into a trap from which it could not escape. Thus, the battle of Java not merely gave Japan control of the last Allied stronghold in East Asia but also enabled her to destroy the Allied Asiatic fleet. And this means that, if the Japanese move immediately to an invasion of Australia, they will encounter little or no naval opposition, since the force under ViceAdmiral Leary’s command is needed for the vital task of keeping open sea communications between the United States and Australia and New Zealand. The naval losses in the Java battle come at a time when Allied naval resources are severely strained; the battle of the Atlantic is in one of its bad phases, a naval struggle in the Indian Ocean is impending, the problem of sea communications in the Pacific is becoming serious, and Germany appears to be mustering a battle fleet for service in the North Atlantic. The disaster is probably a consequence of urgent appeals by the Netherlands Indies Government for a more offensive strategy being given greater weight in London and Washington than the conservative opinions of British and American naval experts. The reasons for Vice-Admiral Hart’s relinquishment of his command of the Allied Asiatic squadron can now be surmised, as can the significance of the Netherlands Indies Government’s announcement, after the Java battle, that Vice-Admiral Helfrich had departed “on a special mis- “ sion.” But while it would be foolish to underestimate the seriousness of the defeat in the Java Sea, the losses sustained should be seen against the background of the sea and air warfare which has been going on in these waters since Japan struck her first blows. 0n the balance, the score in this warfare is against the Allies, but not nearly so. heavily against them as it was in the Java engagement. It seems to be the general opinion among American naval experts that naval and air action has sunk or put out of action at least half of Japans total cruiser strength. Moreover, the United States has from the first regarded the maintenance of transpacific communications, and not the hindering of Japanese invasion attempts, as the main task of her Pacific naval forces. And as long as those communications are kept open, Japan’s chances of ultimate success in a drive further 'south are small. ______________