DUTCH DISAPPOINTED AT “REINFORCEMENTS”

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23586, 13 March 1942, Page 4

DUTCH DISAPPOINTED AT “REINFORCEMENTS”

battle for java

(By the “Sydney Morning Wai

SYDNEY, March 6. Although the Dutch are now fighting what seems to be an almost hope:less battle to hold Java, w H go on fighting to the very end. That must oe the view of anyone who has been m the Netherlands East Indies since the war began in the Pacific. In spite of terrific knocks it has re ceived, Dutch .fighting spirit is high, and the brave native nn the creator part of the Netherlands East Indies Army, have already P rov ®<| at Tarakan, Palembang, in Borneo, and other places, that they have courage is not now the remotest possibility of any great aggressive move against the Japanese bemg launched from Java That P ° ® s * faded out while English and l Amer can leaders tried to make up their minds whether any real effort should be made to hold the island. T „ - I visualise the battle for , Jav i ?. r |„ ing like the campaign in the Philippines with the battered remnants of the Dutch army waging a P r ° t .^ l ' te „ guerrilla warfare in the high mils on the southern wast of the island. In that warfare, the Dutch will fight alone but that is a thing to which they should be accustomed by now. It is little wonder that the nign cordiality which existed between the Allies when war broke out in tne Pacific has not been maintained Tne Dutch feel they have been let down bv Britain and America, and this viewpoint is shared by correspondents from Britain, America, and Australia, who had a first-hand view of events. Dutch Gave All From the day Japan made the first aggressive moves in the Pacific, .‘h® Dutch threw everything they had into the fray. They sent their a6l*oP(Sfit!S and their submarines 19 Malaya and hit out at the enemy with everything they had wherever and whenever they could find him. Alone among the Allied nations, the Dutch sought to meet aggression with aggression. They scored some spectacular triumphs, but they paid heavily for them. Of the 80 or so aeroplanes they sent to Malaya they got about 14 back, and of their four submarines only one returhed when the fight for Dutch possessions began. Convinced however, that the more powerful Allied countries would reciprocate by giving them full aid to defend their territories, the Dutch did not regret their ‘‘a 11 : 01 ? 1 tactics during the early part of tne Even when the bloody tragedy of Malaya with all its bunglings became revealed, the Dutch did not lose heart. Their confidence in Britain and America still was high. They were certain that promises of assistance would be fulfilled; that aeroplanes long paid for would be delivered; that equipped soldiers, sailors, and airmen from the Allied countries would come in their thousands to fight for the common cause in Java. The Dutch, however, were not prepared for Singapore’s final surrender. That was a shock to them. They were bewildered when the towel was flung in while thousands of equipped soldiers remained on the island. Their disappointment grew as a grim dreary procession of ships brought what the Dutch had hoped would be reinforcements, but which turned out to be “Service evacuees” from Singapore to Java. For days before and after Singapore’s fall, ships crrwded with warweary English soldiers _ and Royal Air Force ground staffs arrived at Tanjong Priok, the port of Batavia on the Java Sea. These were the “reinforcements” for which the Netherlands East Indies had waited. Dutch authorities gleefully told correspondents that aid had come. At Tanjong Priok I watched these “reinforcements” come off the bombbattered ships. Some of the men had uniforms. A lesser some had rifles. One ship brought a few armoured cars (plready proved useless in Malaya). Others brought well-worn motor-trucks—one of the few war needs which the Dutch possessed in abundance. A Liability Arrangements the Dutch had made for the arrival of the “reinforcements” functioned perfectly. From the wharves the troops marched to waiting motortrucks, and were driven off to prepared camps. As they had throughout the war, the Dutch again carried out their side of the bargain. Within' a few days, however, it was realised that the “reinforcements” were a liability. If the troops, who were given most liberal leave, lacked the tools with which to fight a war, they did not lack the money to buy food and drink —mostly the latter—in the scores of nightclubs which dot Batavia. Any remaining morale was washed away by alcohol. There were fights every night. British and American officers who had preceded the mere fighting men to Java had evolved a most comfortable way of going to war. They lived at the best hotels in Batavia and Bandoeng, and seemed to spend most of their time “at home." The Dutch were bewildered by the army of liaison and “intelligence” officers which descended upon them as soon as things began to become “difficult” in Malaya. Press relations officers. officers .who liaisoned between every conceivable form of behind-the-lines organisation, army censors, and others, all replete with gold braid and

ir Correspondent. Who Has Just Returns i Java.)

the inevitable bolstered revolver h*. cended upon them in droves. ' These ridiculous optimists believe for some inexplicable reason that th*, were to resume in Java the weluS jobs they had done so badly in Mifc? With their previously well-contrd*i tempers rising rapidly, the Dutch rI. minded their visitors that Java stills! Dutch territory. ■”* Air Aid a Trickle Undeterred by the developing cW growing up about them, the', plugged on with the job of or£ : to meet the attack they knew waSrit evitable. In Washington and Canbem their Lieutenant-Governor-General. IV van Mook, begged for aeroplanes his plea was echoed by every Dutch man in authority in the N.E.I.

Air reinforcements began to trickle an. A few well-worn Hurricanes from the Middle East buoyed up Dutch hotiM of more to follow. American yuS: Fortresses and big Liberator bomW flying over Dutch cities helped nwnde But real effective help never arrived' and a week or so before the first Jim nese landed in Java, the Dutch facing the fact that they were to the brunt of trying to fight off the vader.

And while all these things were w pening the Allied High “functioned behind the exteSS barbed-wire entanglements which com pletely surrounded the great hills hoSi at Lembang, a dozen or so miles from Bandoeng, where, again carrying om their part of the bargain, the Dutch had prepared a perfect headqmrw for the Command.

A little farther along the road out of Bandoeng was another well-pm. tected hotel, where for a few .weeks high officers of the A.I.F. prepared W the day when Australian troops woi arrive to help in the battle for Java Like other things (including three divisions of American troops) promised the Dutch, the Australian help new* materialised. Few Australian Troops There were very few Australian troops in the Netherlands East Indies when I left about a fortnight ago. Like the English troops, those there were for the most part Singapore evacuees. One English artillery unit is on Java but these are the only Allied troops who were expressly sent there.

There are some American artillerymen now in action on the Island. But their original destination was the Philippines. A few Australians on their way to Singapore also were put ;og their ship at Tanjong Priok when’lt was decided that the rest of the sea journey to Singapore was unsafe. ' Nevertheless, although they knew that the High Command was not functioning as it had been hoped, and that they were getting little help in p«t paring Java for war, it was not until the fiasco at Palembang that the Dutch realised how hopeless their situation was. ;

I wanted to go to Palembang. More than a month ago I sought facllitiß, to go there from the Dutch. Iwo referred to the High Command. Th» answer to my request was. that th* plans of the High- Command for Palernbang’s defence were so novel and fwreaching that it was desirable that they should be kept secret even from war correspondents. . A couple of days later, hair,a dozen Japanese bombers, escorted % soue Zero fighters, came over Pal«mbtt| while its air defenders were jhavin| lunch and destroyed a large, of precious Hurricanes dozen bombers while they VerffV the ground. After that, Palemblljglr fate was sealed and any remaining Dutch confidence in the High Opmand dissipated. A week later to .the day—a Sunday • and again about lunch time, the Japanese came over Palembang again; this time with transport aeroplanes fiill d parachute troops, and fighters. Seaborne troops followed.' In three days Palembang was in Japan Bts hands. ,No one has been told yet wheft the ‘‘hoyel” Allied plan failed or evt# what it was!

Australian fighter and bomber pilots I met directly they arrived' jn Batavii after the Palembang show could tel me nothing of the plan. They did tell me, however, that they had completely lost faith in the British officers who commanded them, and who had cleared off to the comparative safety of Java as soon as the Japanese attack got under way.

They tpld the truth, because I met some of these Englishmen while they had their breakfast at the luxurious Hotel des Indes in Batavia on the Mon* day morning after the attack. They told a grand story of brave Indonesian troops who had blown up bridges after the car taking them to the Java ferry had crossed. , With Palembang gone the chances of holding Java were remftte. TO gong had sounded for yet another Allied evacuation. Dutch authorities told correspondents •if they wanted to get out of Java they should waste no time in leaving. .. _,. I stood on the deck of a big Dutcfl liner that came out of Tanjong rtm a week or so ago to come to Australis. With me whs a Czechoslovakian. -As we got out to sea he looked behinfl at the Java coastline. “I’m sorry wJ the Dutch,” he said, “I feel they and my people have a great deal m common.”