The French Fleet

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23536, 14 January 1942, Page 4

The French Fleet

At no time since the capitulation of France has the possibility of Germany’s obtaining control of the French fleet been more serious than it is now. Faced in the Pacific with war against a first-class naval power and having suffered severe initial naval losses, the Allies most urgently need to re-establish their naval strength on this new front. This they can do only by diverting* part of their fleets from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean. The strength and disposition of the German and Italian fleets are known; but if Vichy’s “ collaboration ” is extended to handing over the French fleet, they may at any time be considerably reinforced. Recent French moves have not been reassuring. The Vichy Government has made its collaboration with Germany increasingly obvious. German pressure on Vichy for the transfer of the fleet has probably been constant, and just as probably Vichy’s resistance has come chiefly from Marshal Petain. But with the increasing dominance of Vichy affairs by Admiral Darlan, resistance to all German demands has weakened. Now that Allied naval difficulties have given the French fleet a tremendously increased value, German efforts to obtain control of it are likely to be redoubled. In spite of the great damage inflicted by the British attack on the French fleet at Oran and Mers el Kebir on July 3, 1940, it is still strong, particularly so in cruisers, which would be most useful to the Axis at the present stage of the war. Of the original eight battleships in commission, three can be counted as total losses, three more are idle under British control, and two, damaged at Mers el Kebir, have probably been made ready again for service. These two are the Dunkerque and the Strasbourg, of 20,500 tons. The new 35.000 ton Jean Bart was incomplete, lacking her turrets and main armament, at the capitulation, and was towed to Casablanca. It is gen-

erally held that she has not been completed. Her sister ship, the Richelieu, lies immobilised in shallow water at Dakar. France’s only aircraft carrier, the Bearn, is at Martinique. Of the 18 cruisers four are in British hands at Alexandria and 14 are still under Vichy control, one of them being a training cruiser now in the West Indies at Guadeloupe. Most of these are modern, heavily armed ships. Between 40 and 50 destroyers are probably still controlled by Vichy, losses in the early stages of the war and at Dakar and Mers el Kebir having accounted for 15. A few are in Free French hands. Submarine strength is probably about 50 vessels. Transfer of the French fleet to Axis control would heavily affect relative naval strengths in the Mediterranean, where the latest information places two French battleships, eight or nine cruisers, and an uncertain number of destroyers. Added to what remains of the Italian fleet, these ships would give the Axis in these waters a total of seven battleships, 21 or 22 cruisers, and up to 70 destroyers. These figures appear formidable: but the frequently demonstrated lack of fighting quality in the Italian navy has to be taken into account. In the Atlantic the French aircraft carrier and cruiser at Martinique and the training cruiser at Guadeloupe would probably fall into United States hands, leaving three or four cruisers and indeterminate numbers of destroyers and submarines to operate from West African and French Atlantic bases. Although German control of the French fleet would greatly complicate the Allied naval problem, it has to be remembered that, without full United States naval aid, Britain was able to hold her own in the Battle of the Atlantic and to command the Mediterranean. Now that the United States is fully engaged, such redistribution of forces should still be possible as will counter the worst possibilities in the Mediterranean and allow the balance in the Pacific to be restored by calculated stages. ___________