MIDDLE EAST NEW COMMAND SEEN AS GRAND STRATEGY

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23444, 26 September 1941, Page 6

MIDDLE EAST

NEW COMMAND SEEN AS GRAND STRATEGY

[By MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT in the New York "Tribune "J A cable message published in "The Press” on Tuesday stated that aecording *to the Berne Radio, General Sir Archibald Wavell. Comman-der-lnihiet in India, war ready to launch a Ugh attack m order to aid Russia. Powerful British and Imperial forces were reported to be massed in Syria and Iraq in readiness for an eariy move across Iran and the Caucasus. As the text indicates this artkle was written at the time of General Wavell’s transfer to the indian Command, and before the invasion of Iran.

May 3. The transfer of General Sir Archibald P. Wavell from Cairo to Simla has caused considerable speculation as to the reason for the change. Without pretending to any “inside information, ’ the writer suggests that the following series of speculations' may not be without present and future interest. The advance of the German armies into Russia took place after it had become clear to the German Genera cfoff that they did not possess the means for further exploiting their position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The capture of Crete had cost them to heavily in aeroplanes and in the pickea and highly trained air-borne troops to warrant repetition under clrc J}?V stances less favourable to'success. The Iraq affair had shown that the Ge man political position in the Aran world was not a dependable asset. In order to assure the closing of the Dardanelles \o British warships during the struggle with Ru^ a - lt; jl ad been necessary to conclude a n°n S«sion p"t with Turkey which coupled with the withdrawal of Ger man troops from Bulgaria, le k y pretty well freed from immediate German pressure. The impossibility ot reinforcing the army of Africa up to the scale necessary for an offensive agamst Egypt had been fairly well demonstrated. Even when the Crete affair drew off the British surface ships, the sunmarines and the Royal Air Force were still on the job. And there were no more Cretes to serve as further diver British “Arch” Still There Unless British sea power could be driven out of the Eastern Mediterranean, there seemed no chance of ge - ting oil supplies by .this rout f- ”° r any chance of breaking down the socalled strategical arch of the Britisn Empire by the advance of German armies. , , This strategical arch may rcQ'iU’c some explanation. It is- not only the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, as_a line of communication with the r ar. East; the alternate Cape route carries most of the British shipping on this run. The importance of the Middle East in this war is rather concerned with the maintenance of the blockade of Germany within the continent of Europe with holding fast the “steel ring, with cutting off Germany from supplies of oil. rubber, tin, and other products; with keeping German armies out of the Valley of the Nile and with the defence of all the far-flung British possessions round the Indian Ocean, including India itself. ... The Middle East position is, indeed, the third sea-gate of Europe—the other two being Gibraltar and the British Isles—the retention of whith by Britain is essential to control of _ Europe s sea communications, depriving Germany of the use of the sea and retaining that use for British military and commercial purposes. , This third seagate further serves the purpose of dividing Germany and Italy from their Axis partner, Japan, the only one of the trio which possesses any considerable sea power other than submarines. Indirect Assault Tried Direct assault upon this sea-gate having failed, the Germans are now constrained to try indirect assault —by way of Russia. Indeed, there is much reason to believe the army has always wanted to use this method, and that the direct approach was tried only on the promise, of Goering that his air force could make good the African and intrainsular lines of communication, which it proved quite unable to do. There were doubtless other considerations of wider scope entering into the decision to attack Russia, but we are here concerned only with the attempt to break down the British grip on the Middle East, and to obtain access to adequate supplies of oil—both very important German objects. The attack on Russia opens up a whole new set of strategical possibilities. Let us suppose the Germans do no more than succeed in driving the main Russian armies back behind the Volga. They may then proceed into the Caucasian region by direct approach, though with lengthening and more precarious lines of communication. A mighty barrier rises in their path—the Caucasus Mountains. There are but two or three practicable passes. These, if stoutly defended by the Russians, might hold the Germans up for months, certainly until spring.

But the Russians will need supplies, munitions, aeroplanes, perhaps the services of a military mission well versed , in German methods. They cannot de-. pend on Turkey, for the Germans can bring direct pressure to bear on Turkey and we have already seen with what result. They cannot depend on Iran, for Iran is a weak State. But suppose Iran were to become, as it might be, a military outpost of India? Suppose, as we hear from Ankara sources, that in effect the north-west frontier of India were to be moved from its present location to north-west Iran, Suppose, to put it plainly, that strong British support were to be provided for the defence of the Caucasian passes, to deny Russian oil to the Germans, to protect the British hold on the Middle East, to snatch from Hitler’s grasp the chief fruit of his Russian campaign and leave him with only another vast territory to-police, another long weary line of communications, another distant war of attrition upon which to waste his substance? He must then try another outflanking movement; he must force the Volga and send his panzer divisions around the' north of the Caspian sea into the trans-Caspian steppes, and so down against the north-east frontier of Iran, against perhaps Afghanistan and India. A long journey, and one whose logistics would be a nightmare even to a German staff, and one in which the enemy to be encountered would be the magnificently equipped army of India, plus the Russian Turkestan divisions—always distinguished in Russian military annals. This is a far-flung strategical conception, but if we assume the possibility of a German attack on the Caucasian region, as we jnust, we must also assume a British attempt to defend that region, whose defence is the defence of the Middle East and of India, as well as, in the larger view, the denial to Germany of oil supplies and the maintenance of the chief British weapon, the blockade. Such a plan, as we have seen, would cover the whole long front from the Himalayas to the frontier of Libya. It would include the close co-ordination of military and political forces, of the governments of Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq as more or less willing allies of Great Britain, of fluctuating relations with Turkey, and of Anglo-Russian co-operation. It would include the co-operation in the military field of air forces based in areas as far apart as Mersa Matruh and Quetta, of fleets on the Mediterranean* Black and Caspian Seas, bf armies on three or four fronts, perhaps simultaneously active.’ And it would'| necessarily be based ip and directed * from India, as the principal source of; \ its immediate strength, and as the cen- S tral area from which strategic, reserves v could be sent forward to meet any ' threat coming down from the north, ■ whether directed east or west of the ; Caspian. ’ Wavell Man ’for Job If there is any soldier in the British i Army who has demonstrated his ab|l- ? ity to deal with a situation of, this | complexity, it is Sir Archibald Wavell > If the German threat to the Caucasus i and perhaps to India’ is real, now is f none too early to begin the prejpara- -■ tions to meet it. This is a situation I that the Prime Minister is said t6 : KIW’ Jt * foreseen, and Mr Churchill is one who provides against that which he foresees, as well as his means allow. When, under the existing conditions,' Mr Churchill sends to India ahj of Sir Archibald’s unique qualification* (which include service in the Caucasus; during the last war as chief of ’a’*' British, military mission and a wide knowledge of the Russian army, people, and language) we,may well hesitate'' before assuming the transfer to be * ‘ demotion. This is especially So as'hie success©* in the Middle East is an offl- r cer considerably junior in rank, who ; could well be intended to serve in a capacity subordinate to Sir Archibald’* ' supreme direction of Imperial grand strategy in this whole area. - Indeed, if we once conceive . this • grand front, we can see great advan- - tages from having in the Middle East an officer like Sir .Claude Auchinleck, who, has served with distinction in, ; Egypt and Iraq, but is by training and experience an officer of the Indian ' Amy. Sir Archibald Wavell brings to;, the high command in India not only, his intimate knowledge of the Middle East and his invaluable experience in > dealing with half a dozen small wars 4 at once, but also his knowledge of Russia.