IONIAN BATTLE IS MODEL FOR TACTICS

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23301, 10 April 1941, Page 6

IONIAN BATTLE IS MODEL FOR TACTICS

CAPE MATAPAN

[By the Military Correspondent

SYDNEY, April 1. Now that more details are available it is clear that the Battle of the lonian Sea marked an interesting development in naval tactics. It has been truly stated that, while the basic principles of strategy are permanent and immutable, the art of tactics lies in constant adaptation, and victory goes to the leader who first perceives the .opportunity for new tactical combinations. . , « - Naval strategy has been defined as the denial of the use of the sea to the enemy by a concentration of effort which conserves energy and economises force. Naval tactics, on the contrary, deal with the employment of forces in actual battle, and here changes of weapons and mobility come 10 The clearest deduction from Friday’s battle was the vindication of what is called “psychological strategy." Even Napoleon, who believed in the geometrical idea of “force multiplied by velocity” as the basis of warfare, stressed the point that “the moral is to the physical as three to one.” Admiral Cunningham clearly played upon the unwillingness of the Italian fleet to give battle. He knew that the deliberate pursuit of a policy ,of scuttle during nine consecutive months must have told on the morale of Italian officers and men, and so he followed the Clausewitzian advice "to damage the independent will-power of the opponent.” The Italians, discouraged by smashing blows on land, sea, and air, would be in no mood for dashing tactics. and this factor largely neutralised the many advantages their vessels had. * Italian Advantages Besides the advantage of numbers, the Italian ships were' speedier than the British vessels, and they certainly had the fire-power if they had used it effectively. The battle must notjbe regarded as a mere slaughter of B*inch and 6-inch gunned vessels by 15-inch gun battleships, because, at the beginning, the Italians had the services of at least three battleships. The Littorio class battleships vie with anything afloat in so far as speed, armour-plat-ing, and guns are concerned. Despite this, the battleships, apparently in accordance with Mussolini’s policy of conserving his big ships, concerned themselves, with their own safety and left the cruisers and destroyers to meet the brunt of the British attack. The commanders of these battleships might well recall the classic statement of Commandant Colin that “an impulse never comes from the rear”; but probably they were echoing the statement of the aide of the Duke of York, who said of the wretched campaign of 1794 that “no mobbed fox was ever more put to it to make his escape than we were.” Or, to quote‘an example which occurred in those self-same ' waters nearly 2000 years ago, the battleship comrpander, like the recreant Antony af the battle of Actium, seeing the end of the fight in advance, “claps on his seawing, and (like a doting mallard)'’ leaving the fight in heighth, flies.” Use of Air Power The most interesting operational detail was the use o'f air power in bringing the enemy to battle and in counteracting his greater speed at sea. . It is in this connexion that the lonian battle will probably derive its permanent importance in the study of naval tactics. It had frequently been emphasised in theory that “the advent of air power introduced a third dimension of movement to the strategical field,” but it remained for Sir Andrew Cunningham to demonstrate how it could compel enemy, squadrons to slow down and thus to throw away their advantages of speed.

of the "Sydney Morning Herald.’’] Aeroplanes largely took the place of the speedy cruisers in rounding up the enemy fleet so that the slower battle- ‘ - ships could bring their shattering gun. fire to bear. The Admiralty com* ' munique specifically states that “the loss of speed resulting frdm these air'' attacks enabled our hea/ltr ships to ' gain contact with the e My." After, this experience, aerial Jibing and ■ .torpedo attacks must dt,Jffitely be as* ' signed a leading place in any future naval battle, both in limiting the ' movements of enemy ships and in in* ’ flicting material damage upon them, • ’ The air definitely brings a new mobility " to naval combat. Friday’s battle was thus a striking vindication of the theories of those naval writers who, like Captain Altham 12 years ago. pre* ,■ dieted that aerial observation “may ! be the means of effecting a junction be* 1 - tween rival fleets” and of allowing an admiral “to attain an overwhelming' • tactical advantage over a less well served adversary,” especially if the enemy should be evasive. Range Favours Italians Once the battle was actually joined- ’■ last Friday evening, darkness naturally introduced much confusion; but it wa* the Italians, not the British, who fired on one another, and it- was the Ital« - ians who failed to derive advantagefrom' the fact that battleships were . well within the range of their cruis--ers. Usually, a battleship with 15-inch - guns strives to blast an 8-inch cruiser ■ out; of the water from a great dis* ■ tarice, without coming into the range > of retaliatory fire itself. A 16-inch' naval gun has a range of 52,800 yards,' and an 8-inch gun one of 20,000 yards. But, in this case, the range was only two miles when the British battleshipi t. launched their salvoes. It was thus easily within the capacity of the 8-inch - and even the 6-inch Italian guns, yet' not a single enemy shell from any of the numerous cruisers hit a BrHisft battleship. Once the 15-inch guns open* ed fire, of course, the position of the : Italians was hopeless; but, in the preliminary manoeuvring period, the detached observer might have expected hits from some, at least, of the Italian cruisers.

Either their will-to-fight or their • gunnery must have been hopeless; and there is certainly no vestige of excuse for the three Italian battleships ■ in this regard, especially the Littorio class, with their nine 15-inch guns of a modern type. The battle was thus as ignominious for the Italians as it was brilliant for the British.-For an adversary who puts up a fight commensurate with his resources, one can have only admiration, but such' consid- ' Stations do not seem to apply in this, case. Capital Ship Vindicated The struggle valgo provided further , vindication of the capital ship, if such " were necessary after the experience of the last 18 months. Even at night, and against much speedier vessels, the British battleships proved their worth, i It is axiomatic that there is no answer to 15-inch guns if they can once be brought to bear on their target,-and ■Friday’s experience proved that they " can be so brought to bear, even under • ■ disadvantageous conditions. ' . In this, the first night battle since Jutland, the Royal Navy triumphed over low visibility conditions,' anff pro- -, vided an almost classic'example, of-co-. ■ ordination between aircraft, roundinguji cruisers, heavy-fire battleships, and;, speedy destroyers finishing ofl the task,, of destruction. Naval history rarely ie- ’• cords such a complete victory, and -■ certainly none at such trifling cost." \i‘