JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23058, 28 June 1940, Page 6

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Philippine High Commissioner’s Discussions IMPROVED RELATIONS SOUGHT IBy H. G. W.' WOODHEAD. Far Eastern correspondent o£ “The Press."] Cable messages indicate that because of the deterioration of the situation in Europe efforts are being made by the United States to improve her relations with Japan. Since this article was written there have been reports that at least a portion of the American fleet has left Hawaii for Panama.

May 26. Mr Suma’s (Japanese Foreign Office Spokesman’s) description of the visit of Mr Francis B. Sayre (American High Commissioner to the Philippines) as “a splendid success” invests it with considerable political significance, and has, moreover, led to considerable speculation in the Japanese press regarding the topics that came under discussion with the Japanese Minister lor Foreign Affairs. Wnen passing througn Shanghai, Mr Sayre told interviewers that ne intended to confer with Mr Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador m Tokyo, “on general matters relating to the Far East.” He denied that nis visit had anything to do with the problem of the Netherlands East Indies, adding that it had been planned before Mr Cordell Hull' had made his statement on American policy in regard to the Dutch possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans. It must be assumed that if Mr Sayre’s visit was “a splendid success ” and his conversations with Mr Arita had been “helpful” in clarifying certain .aspects of Japanese-American relations, they did not confine their discussions to the weather, or say the future of Japanese art. One may also assume that the status of the Netherlands East Indies would hardly come within the , sphere of the American High Commissioner, but would rather be left to the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office to handle. But it would not be to suppose that the present and future of the Philippines were touched upon. Philippine Independence. In Shanghai Mr Sayre had stated that under the Tydings-Duffy Act the United States was morally obliged to carry out the programme of granting independence to the Philippines in 1946 “unless the people of the Philippines requested a change.” Even then a reconsideration of the grant, of independence would require majority votes in both Houses of Congress. It is unlikely, therefore, that Mr Sayre was authorised, as reported in the “Kokumin Shimbun,” to inform Mr Arita that the United States would withhold Philippine independence as long as Japan continued her present policies. Mr Suma denied that the question of Philippine independence was touched uoon, and it seems more likely that the main topic of discussion was the passage by the Philippine Legislature of the act restricting Jap-

anese (and other alien) immigrants to 500 a year. Though Mr Sayre’s visit may have been “a splendid success” there is not the slightest justification for assuming that it resulted in any modification of United States’ policy in the Far East. He had. indeed, scarcely left Tokyo when it was announced that the United States Navy Department had decided to retain the main American fleet at Hawaii indefinitely. The reason given—that the recent manoeuvres in the vicinity of Hawaii had not proved entirely satisfactory—is unlikely to prove convincing in any quarter, especially in Japan, where the naval spokesman has already described it- as “another manifestation of antiJapanese demonstration.” Both in Europe and America the Navy Department’s decision is regarded as a warning to Japan against becoming instrumental in spreading the war to the Far East, or taking advantage of the Netherlands’ or Britain’s difficulties to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies. A Warning The transfer of the United States main battle fleet to the Pacific at a few days’ notice some months ago could only be interpreted as an intimation that the American Government did not intend to allow the pre-occupation of Great Britain in Europe to be exploited to disturb the status quo in the Paci- ■ fic. The decision to hold The annual manoeuvres off Hawaii was a further warning to the same effect. Short of arranging a visit of all or a portion of the American fleet to Cavite or Singapore, the United States Government could give no more emphatic evidence of its determination to have a decisive voice in events in the Pacific than its decision to retain the fleet indefinitely in Hawaiian waters. There are climatic as well as other ’objections to keeping a large fleet in such tropical areas as Cavite or Singapore. *The trade winds give Hawaii an equable climate, the average temperature at Honolulu being under 78 degrees throughout the year. There can, - however, be little doubt that the British Government would gladly afford ' the American Navy all possible facilities at Hong Kong or Singapore if political or naval strategy _ made such a concession desirable. Nor is there any reason to suppose that in certain circumstances the American Government would refrain from asking or accepting the hospitality of Britain’s Far Eastern naval bases.