O. F. NELSON'S APPEAL

Press, Volume LXX, Issue 21147, 24 April 1934, Page 9

O. F. NELSON'S APPEAL

♦ HEARING BY THE FULL COURT

CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF

U'aBSS ASSOCIATION TEI.EORAIi.) WELLINGTON, April 23. The Full Court resumed the hearing of the appeal of Olaf Frederick Nelson from the convictions imposed upon him on March 3 by the High i Court of Western Samoa. On the I bench were the Chief Justice (the Rt. I Hon. Sir Michael Myers), Mr Justice Herdman, Mr Justice Reed, and Mr Justice Blair. Mr P. B. Cooke, with Mr W. P. Shorland, appeared for the appellant. Mr A. H. Johnstone, K.C., with Mr A. E. Currie, appeared for the Crown. Mr Cooke, in outlining the facts, stated that Nelson had been convicted on three charges under Regulation 3 of the Samoa Seditious Organisations Regulations, 1930. These charges were one of aiding and abetting the Mau and two of addressing Mau meetings, and Nelson was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment and 10 years' exile from Samoa on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently. Mr Cooke's first main submission on law was that the regulations were ultra vires, because they purported to delegate to the Administrator power to declare the Mau or other organisations seditious. Under the Mandate from the League of Nations the New Zealand Government had, inter alia, full power of administration and legislation over the territory of Samoa, subject to the terms of the Mandate. This power was exercised by the Samoa Act, Section 45, of which gave the Governor-General-in-Counci! power to make regulations for the peace, order, and good government of Samoa. "A Delegated Power" Counsel submitted that in making the regulations under the Act the Oovernor-Gencral-in-Council was exercising a delegated power, and in the absence of express authority to do so the power could not be subdelegated to any other person or body. It was a general principle of law I hat a person to whom powers had been delegated could not sub-delegate those powers to another person. The Governor-General-in-Council could have made regulations, but could fiot sub-delegate his power to the Administrator. This point had not been considered by the Court when dealing with a similar case of O. F. Nelson and Company v. the Police in 1932. When the Legislature intended to authorise sub-delegation it had been very careful to say so, as could be seen from consideration of both the Samoa Act and other Statutes. Counsel then dealt with legal authorities affecting his submission. Other Contentions . Proceeding to his second main contention, Mr Cooke submitted that the regulations were ultra vires, because they purported to authorise the imposition of imprisonment as punishment for offences created by them. Imprisonment did not fall within the matters specified in Section 45 of the Statute, and was deliberately excluded. Counsel then discussed in detail the relevant sections of the Samoa Act, which he contended supported his submission. He submitted that the appellant was entitled to have a strict construction placed upon the statute, it being penal in operation. Counsel's third main submission was that Section 45 of the Samoa Act, 1921, was ultra vires of the New Zealand legislature, because the latter had no power to delegate a general power to make regulations. Even if the New Zealand legislature was a plenary one as regards Samoa, it could not delegate a general power as distinct from a particular power, but the New Zealand legislature was not plenary as regards Samoa, because its powers were limited by the terms of the mandate. The court adjourned until to-mor- j row.