AN INDUSTRIAL AWARD.

Press, Volume LXIX, Issue 20898, 4 July 1933, Page 7

AN INDUSTRIAL AWARD.

CASE BEFORE COURT OF APPEAL. POSITION OF DISSENTING PARTIES. (PREJ3 ASSOCIATION TET.33R, \il.) WELLINGTON, July 3. The Court of Appeal is hearing argument on a case stated for opinion by the judge of the Arbitration Court, pursuant to Section 105 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1.925. The facts are that the plaintiff, an inspector of awards, instituted proceedings in the Court of Arbitration at Auckland for the recovery of a penalty for an alleged breach by Messrs R. and W. Hellaby, Ltd., of Auckland, butchers, of an industrial agreement made by the Conciliation Council on May 3 of this year. The breach alleged was that the defendants employed a roundsman and failed to pay him not less than the minimum rate of wages fixed by the agreement.

The defendants admitted the act complained of, but contended that no offence had been committed, on the ground that the agreement was not valid, and that no settlement of the industrial dispute which gave rise to the agreement had. in fact, Deen made; that, moreover, the agreement was void in that it contained terms which were ultra vires, being in excess of the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Council. The defendants relied oa the fact that before the agreement was made a dispute had arisen in the Conciliation Council as to the appointment of assessors, and defendant company, along with certain other master butchers who were cited as parties, withdrew upon giving notice. The questions for the consideration of the court turn on whether the Conciliation Council had a right to hear the original dispute and make a settlement binding on parties who did not agree thereto. Mr Stevenson, for the defendants, said the main question was whether an industrial agreement purporting to settle a dispute must be agreed to by all parties, or whether the Council of Conciliation could make an agreement binding on the dissenting parties. His clients had not been party to the agreement, and had not consented to its being made. Mr Stevenson referred to the provisions under the principal act of 1925, whereby an industrial agreement was binding only on the parties subscribing to it, and said it was an absurdity that a Conciliation Council acting under the 1932 amendment, should purport to make an agreement binding on the dissenting parties. The court adjourned.