JUTLAND.

Press, Volume LXII, Issue 18634, 8 March 1926, Page 11

JUTLAND.

JELLICOE UPHELD. VIEWS OF ADMIRAL TIRPITZ BRITISH ADMIRALS' REPLIES. (FSOil OCB OWE COEaESPOKDi^T-) LONDON, January "■ As an indication of its usual enterprise, the ''Daily Express' has i u dured Admiral von Tirpitz to write a long article on tlie> German na>a policy during the war with special re ference to the Battlo of Jutland. It is a sober and ieasoned expression ot opinion, but several statements ' n regard to the British Navy have given liso to further comment, as no doubt they weio intended to do. "Though the German Fleet," writes Admiral von Tirpitz, "was numerically far inferior- to the British 111 1914-15, the German ships, taken singly, were superior, and the training of individual crews and the flee" as a whole was, perhaps, better, lhis view does not detract from my high estimation of the British naval officer, whom 1 have had many opportunities of meeting. During the battle of Jutland this superiority of ours pioved so effective that the British Admiralty were forced to effect a number of alterations to their ships in order to prevent losses, such as, for instance, the blowing up of the Queen Mary. "When the German Fleet came out on May 31st, 1916, the main object was. not to bring about a battle —it had another purpose. The same may he said of the British Fleet. The meeting of the two fleets in battle was caused by chance and was a surprise for Ijoth sides. As the German vanfuard was too far ahead and had to ght- with far superior forces, the . admiral in command, Scheer, pressed forward with his fastest ships to relieve the German battle cruisers. As he had no news of the position of the British Grand Fleet, he struck it in rather an unfavourable formation. At the same time Admiral Jellicoe was not correctly informed by the admiral commanding his Battle cruisers. Considnrable time would hjure been lost if he had attempted to alter the formation of his ships. "As chances would have it. the tactical position of the German Fleet was, because of .its fan It j' formation, so unfavourable that alteration was I unavoidable. This .alteration was carried out under the fire of the British line 'of battle, without a hitch, by turning every single ship under cover of an. attack by several flotillas of destroyers. Jellicoe Acted Correctly. I _ "In. considering the plans representing this phase of the battle, it may seem rather surprising that the enormous British Fleet turned away when the German destroyers attacked, and thus lost sight of the German High Sea Fleet. In my opinion, Admiral Jellicoe acted correctly, if he had turned into the torpedo attack he would have lost several battleships, and undoubtedly several more would have been severely damaged. When Admiral Scheer renewed his attack against the British Fleet darkness end- ™ the action. At this time the British Fleet was south of the German and barred the way back to its harbours, so Scheer was forced to alter this situation, especially as he did not know ■whether his line of retreat would not be cut off by mines. He therefore broke through towards the south and. expected the enemy at dawn north of Horn's Reef. But Admiral Jellicoe had passed the German Fleet, steering west. He intended to avoid battle, as he had reason to fear the superiority of tho German Fleet, in a night engagement. _ So it happened that the German 'ships on their way south passed the British rearguard. That it was only the rearguard was not realised by the German command' on account of the darkness. When day broke nothing was to be seen of the British Fleet. Early Decisive Battle. "A decisive naval Battle in the first two years of the war would have created the possibility of a peace of conciliation before the nations of Europe had been bled white and the hatred of the masses, fostered by the unheardof sacrifices and ruthless propaganda, had reached_ such bitterness that the statesmen, in the exuberance of victory, forgot any regard for the interests of life on the Continent, and at the? same time neglected the interests of their own people. This tragedy would have been prevented by a naval battle in the first year of the war." Demand for Enquiry. Following upon Admiral von Tirpitz's article, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Lambert, K.C.8., who was Fourth Sea Lord at the time of the Jutland Battle, makes a demand for a naval enquiry. In reviewing the German Admiral's stateaent, he savs: "The lack of success at Jutland was due mainly to the fact that, ship for ship, gun for gun, engine for engine, there was a higher standard of efficiency in the German Fleet than any which the British Fleet could claim. The great asset on which the British Admiral could rely was the incomparable personnel of his ships; otherwise it vyas indeed a melancholy experience to find at the outbreak of war that all the public money which had been expended by Parliament on the assurance that they were getting the best that "money and science could provide had produced such meagre results. "If we look for the cause it is probable that the explanation would be found in the obsession for secrecy by those expert departments which deal with the highly technical details of ships and armaments. Whatever tlie cause, it was certainly proved that the 1 German artillery and torpedo fire was of a higher standard than any with which we could reply to them. Our guns lacked range; our torpedoes lacked accuracy of fire and efficiency in detonation. Wireless had to be revolutionised after war was declared, and errors in ship construction remedied amid all the haste and expense inseparable from a war in progress. Cards on the Table. "So much for the past. Von Tirpitz's article will not have been written in vain if it prompts the public | to insist on a clear assurance that these errors have been made good, not merely by a departmental assertion of j a Minister in Parliament, but by some I form of practical tests to be. judged by a competent authority. "We know, as has been pointed out recently by a magazine writer, that the Admiralty can only send to sea five efficient cruisers after the expenditure of more than five hundred million pounds on the Navy since the termination of hostilities. It is believed that such practical tests as the Fleet have been able to make since that time have not provided the assurance which is necessary. It is time that the cards were put on the table. Admiral Bacon's Bejoinden. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, K.C.8., K C V O who commanded the Dover Patrols from 1915 to 1918, then proceeds vigorously to contest the view that German ships, guns, and engines

; ""ere more efficient than the British, and asks the public to trust the Admiralty. i "The only ships of any size, lost by us at Jutland," he writes, "were battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. Had all our battle cruisers been lost, the result would not have affected the outcome of the battle fleet action at all. It was on the outcome of the battle fleet action alone that the naval power of the two countries was staked. The speed of our best Dreadnought was slightly superior to that of the best German Dreadnought. The speed of our oldest Dreadnought was about one f? r* k llo * B greater than that of the German pre-Dreadnought ships. Therefore, as regards speed, our Fleet, ship for ship, was faster than the ships of the German Fleet. Engines and Speed. "Why, then, did we not eatch them up and beat them? Because the German Fleet were sighted only at 6 p.m., and only three hours of daylight were left in which to give chase. The German Fleet were strung out with their good ships just in visible distance of our Fleet and their old ships between eleven and thirteen thousand vards further off. "When, therefore, they turned and ran, had Lord Jellicoe been mad enough to have chased them the stronger ships would still have been barely visible, and' the weaker ships would have been three to six thousand yards outside of visible distance when darkness came. "No possible excess in speed—that is speed which could have been given practically to our Dreadnoughts except at suicidal loss of other fighting, efficiency would have enabled Admiral Jellicoe to chase, catch up, and sink the German Fleet in the short time of three hours which was available. This disposes of the statement that any inferiority in engines and speed accounted for the escape of the German Fleet. Guns and lire Control. "Now for guns! We had ten battleships each mounting eight 15in. guns and fourteen battleships each mounting eight 13jin. guns. Germans had. nine ships mounting ten 12in. guns, four older ships mounting twelve 12in. guns, and four mounting twelve llin. guns. The efficiency of a shell mav be taken approximately to be in proportion to the cube of its diameter. Hence the efficiency of a fifteen-inch shell may roughly be taken as one and a half times that of a twelve-inch shell. "Our guns were as accurate as, if not more accurate than, the German guns. Our system of fire control was admittedly far superior. 'Why, then, did we not sink the German Fleet? Because only twicp did any portion of their battlo fleet come under the fire of our niain battleships. Once, between 6.15 and 6.30, for a quarter of an hour only, the van of the German Fleet was under fire from a portion of our main fleet. As soon as Admiral Scheer. had a taste of our gunnery he; turned all his ships together, and ran away from our fleet for twenty minutes. The second time he steered past the stern of. our battle fleet, but he then came under fire for about ten to twelve minutes. • He ran again, but this time, in order to save his fleet, made a flamboyant signal to his cruisers to 'charge the euemv regardless of consequences.' His leading ships were badly mauled, and again he ran aw&y like a hare. This hardly looks a_s if our. gunnery was inefficient. Again it was shortage of daylight which robbed us of a victory. 'The above are facts quoted from official papers."