THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

Press, Volume LVIII, Issue 17629, 5 December 1922, Page 7

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

SIR lAN HAMILTON ON THE EVACUATION. (fkom our own correspondent.) lA).\IX)X, October 2-1. Sir lan Hamilton referred to tho Gallipoli campaign at- a dinner given by the OKI CVmr.uU s' Association of tho I? oval Marines. Tl'.o evacuation bo described as a "weii-engineered pieoo of lolly.'' But l:o had some severe comment to make on tbo-e people "'ho imagine the nation* «ui maintain the freedom oi the Strait* without having control of what is now known as tho neutral zone.

T want to speak tonight, to those old comrades who sewed with the gallant do Kolvck. Hoger Keyes,. and myself iti the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force." he said. "T'i:o IMatines were the heart and soul of that business. It. was their job. They introduced t-iw Navy and At my to <mo another, and \\ere able to whisper to either great i>ervi;v of the land or sea that- tlicv others were not otiito such fools as tl.oy might seem to be. ".My strong feeling." he continued, "is that we want- more of this sort of liaisnn to leaven the whole of our luiliti'.r.v system, for it prevents jxu'tieularisni, swagger, and tho tree zing-up of branches of the S.'rvieo belt liging to sea, land, and air into exclusive ei'.vittes with language and codes ol conduct' oi their own. The Marines light magnificently on -sea or land, and where rett and land come close together and are mixed up together as at the Dardanelles, Ui'.to they lind themselves right in the middle of tho picture. Therefine. they are specially well qualified to understand the inwardness of that phtas.\ 'The Freedom of the Straits,' over -which our Press are apt to get a bit mixed.

Lesson of Gallipoli. "One paper said tho other day that the problem was quite 'implo. Wo wanted the water; the Turks wanted the laud. Why not give the Turks their land and we take the water? Is it not exuv.orrfinary bow littlo wo havo learned t'rom all we have beon through? "What is the use of the water it anyone. ea:i bring down howitzers and fir© from concealed positions on the passing ships, or sneak n torpedo-tubo down- to the shore at night, or float a few mine.* down tho Narrows on an eight-knob current?

"It is not as a politician, but only as a philosopher, that 1 draw your attention to tho fact that Mr Lloyd George and the late Lord Northcliffe were, according to a published speech of Lord Xorthcliffc's, very specially responsible for the the evacuation of the Dardanelles, whilst now Mr Lloyd George, rightly or wrongly (I express no opinion), is the man who is all for holding on. Supposing lie is right; whet a misfortune for us, what a, misfortune for himself, lie did not let us hold on in 191-5 and finish with tho Turks once for all!

Ex-Enemy's Admission. "That we ought to havo done so is now at last revealed beyond all reason:',hie doubt. You have heard of tho Western front attrition theory: tho 'Kill German' theory of tho way to end the war. Unfortunately, as practised, we usually killed more British than Germans; at Passchcndaole, according to Ludendortf (who is consideied truthful even by the French historians), two British, to every German wove killed, and so tho result of pursuing this method waa still left doubtful. Bub quite lately we have been vouchsafed a glimpse, right into the heart of the attrition theory as it worked out in practice at the Dardanelles. "General Liman yon Sanders, Commander of the Turkish Army of GnlliPfvli and the Dardanelles in i 915, says: 'Mr\Lloyd George has said Gallipol; fa sacre'tl ground because it holds more than 000 graves of British warriors, but I Ray it al-:o holds the graves or 60,000 Turks who fell in defence of their own country against invasion.' So there we have it—final and beyond all denial. The Anzaes, the Naval Divisions, the others often said it; but now the actual enemy commander on tho spjt owns up to it. Three Turks for every British soldier. Wo only had to go on, <md arithmetic can suggest but one ending! Instead, aa you know, in September, 1915, two divisions and many munitions were withdrawn frorni the Peninsula, whilst the troops who were left were forbidden to attack or undertake any operation. Thus, presumably, it was hoped tho country would get sick enough of what is now called sacred ground to permit that I well-engineered' piece of folly—tho evacuation."