WILL THE HUN NAVY COME OUT?

Press, Volume LIII, Issue 15919, 5 June 1917, Page 5

WILL THE HUN NAVY COME OUT?

THE PROBABILITY OF AN EARLY BA.TTLE AT SEA.

(By the ;Xaval Correspondent of the London "Weekly Despatch.") Those -with an inside knowledge of how things are trending incline strongly towards the belief that recent events havo increased the probability of a naval battle at an early dato. Without entering minutely into the reasons for this inference, one may say thafc the pundits who asking "When will the German fleet come out?" have grasped tho wrong end of the stick. The determining question is no longer "When will the German Fleet come out?" but "How much longer will the German Fleet be able to stay in.? : ' One may arguo that there is no difference in substance between theso queries. But ijicre is— and a very wide one.

Hitherto it has rested with the Germans to say when a sea battle should bo fought or whether one should be fought at nil. In so far as this important decision was involved our Fleet has been at the enemy's disposal, ag,it w< ; re * circumstances are gradually depriving tfco ■Germans of this strong advantage. Whether willingly or otherwise, the High Seas Fleet may soon be obliged to leave its "dug-outs'' and accept the fight that is waiting for it. , .^P 6 ,°f factors in putting this bind of pressure on the reluctant Ilun is the failure of his U-boat operations. Itignt from tho beginning of Iho war Germany has regarded her submarines as a blockade-breaking weapon. And their first failure in this capacity did not destroy her faith, in their ability eventually to do what she wanted of

them. Tho Hun is tenacious. Once all idea gets into his head it sticks there. Finding that his earlier U-boats wero tin equal to tho task of loosening our grip upon tho North Sea, ho set about equipping himself with underwater craft of a much moro efficient typo. These he'built in considerable numbers and on a standardised system of construction, which enables tho supply to be kept up. Possibly it may not fpi' long prove equal to replacing tho wastage. GERMAN" BOATS. It certainly will pot if tho profit and loss account continues to work out as at present. With these new U-boats and plenty of them, Germany expected she would bo q,blo to make tho narrow seas so unsafe for oar battleships and cruisers that thoy would* bo afraid to move far from their bases, as tho risk of serious losses would bo too gravo for us to farce. With a groat part ot' our fleet thus penned in and a paralysing attack in progress upon our seaborne trado Germany believed sho would bo able to> make a gap in our blockade sufficiently wido to enablo somo of her own merchant vessels, or other vc6scls carrying goods for her, to slip through, especially if they had ft. protective screen of U-boats around, them. All the world knows that in neither of these respects has her plans succeeded.

Having thus failed in her purpose by one means Germany must either. try to accomplish it by another or give- it up altogether—ana this, sho cannot aflord to do without at least making tho attempt, as such action on. her part would ho equivalent to a declaration of ■unconditional surrender. Public opinion may not count for much, in tho fatherland, but it is not such, o: ne&li- : giblo quantity thnre ,ihat tlioiJEar Lords can ignore it altogether, arid'tho German people .have in~tho_ past Been, told so many boastful " tliings about what their floot would do to tho hated English when it got tho chanco that there will bo big trouble made for tho Kaiser and his entourage if tho fleet ends up by doing nothing, not even getting itself smashed «p Again Already the German populace" aro beginning to ask witli increasing emphasis' when the vaunting promises made foi the navy, .that has cost them so much good money are going to bo justified bJ

HINDEiYBURG'S POWER. And - Hindenburg ranks with the malcontents. . It is no secret, that for « long time past he has been expressing himself strongly about tho ineptitudo the High Seas Fleet. At first sigfct it may not ax>pear that Hindenburg has any control of naval policy. But-lio is tho Power (and that with, a very ,l>ig P) at. the moment in Germany, and whenever Hindenburg decides that tho situation demands naval action this will-have to bo taken.

. Any day .that Hindenborg says tlio fleet must* go out and fight (and ho may say this:any day), out it will havo' to go. Evory set-back to Germany's arms on land also "brings nearer tno timo , when she can no longer avoid making a definite move on sea. As. she is forced back on the Western front and elsewhere tho effect will bo to cause a "bulge" in another direction, arid there exists only ono ill which it can occur. Tho cumulative effect of theso various factors must bo to forco that . naval action for which _ Germany has been assiduously preparing. That she lias Aeen, and even now continues, preparing with all-her mightto make tho strongest possible showing at sea when slio becomes obliged to hazard her last throw thero admits of no . doubt. • Oiio cannot say to what'extent her fleet has been strengthened sinco Jutland. But her shipbuilding resources are much greater tlfan tlio majority of British peoplo realise, and ono must not underrate her energy by assuming that she has not uiado full use of them. NEW GERMAN SHIPS. Germany possesses approximately - thirty largo shipbuilding establishments, besides many smaller, ones, and quite jv host of factories in which contributory ' work can bo done. Wo know tho systematic principle upon which sho has , organised Jier plants for turning out submarines in quantities. If sho has . in the same manner co-ordinated her other resources to "speed up", larger construction there is no reason why sho should not havo had somewhere about twenty-five battleships or cruisers building at tho ono time. About twelve of her yards are so well equipped that they can build large warships complete. Others are capable of turning out smaller craft quickly. The Schicau Yard at Elbing specialises in destroyers, being able to construct some fifty of theso complete in a year. Under war pressure tho yard may havo done even better than this. Wliilo it remains uncertain what additions in capital ships Germany has made to her fleet, it is known that she has placed a, . number of new small fast cruisers in it. One may fairly assume also that when the German Fleet does venture out there will bo in it new ships of largo displacement, carrying heavy gnns and possessing high speed. f And. tho probabilities are thai no groat timo will elapse before we nehr of the reorganise/ German Fleet in action. '