THE ADVANCE.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 15648, 21 July 1916, Page 9

THE ADVANCE.

FORETOLD BY COL. MAUDE

"BEGINNING OF END

~\W are very surely nearing the point where tho enemy, for want of men, will no longer be able to hold hig immensely extended fronts : then his overstrained system will collapse under the heavy blows our armies are ready to rain upon it (wrote Colonel F. N. Maude, the. well-known military expert, in the June number of the Royal Magazine).

An illustration as follows will precisely indicate the position. Take the map of Europe, in any tispenny school atlas, and stretch an ordinary indiarubber band round the German and Austrian boundary lines as they existed before tho war; pin it down with drawing pins, and then stretch it to include successively all the territory overrun by the enemy forcos. Then imagine ineects capable of eating rubber, if such creatures exist, steadily gnawing it —in France, all across Russia, in the Balkans, and so forth —always keeping pac© one with the other, so that tho band shall snap as nearly as possible simultaneously on every front, and picture how the broken pieces will roll up on their several centres—tho drawingpins. Something very liko this must happen to the German armies before very many months are over, and tho more simultaneously the ruptures occur at tho different points of attack, the more catastrophic will be the final destruction . The groundwork of this plan was laid at the French General Headquarters at a. meeting which took place shortly after tho failure of the Germans to break our lines at Ypres. Before the war began it was obviously impossible to do more than outline general principles for mutual guidance and support in cs-so of active trouble arising TESTING THEIR .METTLE. Wc could only hastify draw up measures of action, because until we had gained actual experience in war, not only of the many new weapons and devices which all nations were then trying for the first time, but also of our armies themselves, wo could do little else. The latter bad undergone piofound modifications since last tiicy were tested under fire, and it was not until the end of last December that each army had discovered what its men could Do counted upon to endure. By that time Russians, French, Belgians, and British knew that as individual fighters they possessed a marked superiority over any men which the Central' Powers could put up against them, tho one great difficulty being the Allied want of munitions and equipment ar.ci of mobilised numbers. It wan for this reason that w c sent an expedition to the Dardanelles to help tho Russians by giving them time to collect, consolidate, and equip their stupendous resources of men.

Those soldiers of our Colonial 3>ominions and of tho United Kingdom who gave their lives at Gallipoii were not wasted, inasmuch as they stood in the gap so to speak, through which the enemy would hare poured to tho premature destruction of Russia, and by their heroism and deaths have made it possible for the Allies to conquer the menace of Germany to the peace of the whole world.

When the pick of the Gorman armies fnilacl altogether to break and roll up the Allied lines cither in France or in Poland, it was decided that it was reasonable to assume they would bo equally i.nsuccessful in any future efforts and that where their best had been kept at hay their second-bcst •would be of even less avail. ORGANISING OUR RESOURCES. The Allies therefore determined it would be perfectly safe to make tho French Army (the most numerous and best equipped) their chief bulwark against the enemy, and under cover of its protection they proceeded to organise and deyelop all their resources of men and material until at length tho Allied armies should stand ready for action in irresistible numbers to meet and overthrow any possible assault. A BLOW AIMED AT BRITAIN. By tho end of August, 1915, however, the Germans in this sector had "shot their bolt," as Lord Kitchener told us, and having completely failed to bring about any revolutionary demonstrations in Russia, were compelled to attempt their Balkan adventure in tho hope that by threatening British interests in particular they might succeed in c.etaching Franco, Russia, and Italy from tho Alliance, and so leave Great Britain to face the continuation of the war single-handed. No sooner were the, Central Powers well committed to this now attempt than both French and British struck sharply in Champagne and at Loos: the Russians began to press hard at Bessarabia, and in consequencc tho whole scheme of redistribution of all the German armies had to be profoundly modified to meet the threats of tho situation thus created. There was literally no other move left on the military chessboard but to attack ua in the west before our armies wero completed, and before the end of tho "roadlees period" in Russia (which always follows the spring thaw) allowed the Russian armies to Login their big offensive, and obviously Verdun was the only place for them to strike at. On this point, therefore, they concentrated everything that could pos-sibly-be spared from other areas, and in doing so have played into our hands. In no other way could they have jproved to us that the quality of their troops has sunk so low that in reason their numbers no longer matter. Where the German lino will first break depends at this moment chiefly on the weather. A dry spring in Russia may givo the Tsar's armies their first chance in the north. Meanwhile, and in proportion to the numbers the Germans are forced to send against the Russians, the great offensive of the Western amies will bogin, exactly at what point no one would be allowed to state. But tho essence of the whole question really lies in this—that our present position contains so many strategic possibilities. all of therr good enough'for our purpose, that it is a jiinthematieal ■probability 0 f about 80 toil against the. Germaii Staff making rN-r-r.rrect guess as to which particular line we shall eventually take. THE GREAT ADVANCE. "When we do advance, it will be because the demoralisation of the enemy has been so completely established by •observation at the front that the whole scries of combined movements will go forward with an irresistible rush.

Modern weapons, with all their mechanical perfection and potential power, still depend on the nerves of the men who serve them, and the troops least broken by previous punishment can bo certain that £o them -will fall the eventual victory. It is quite possible, though—it always is on ~nv battlefield —that sudden local Allied successes may break the enemy's line with such completeness that the hour and direction of our adTanco may be hastened. Once the break-up of an army through gradual demoralisation begins, no one can say how rapidly events may crowa one on the other.

In the nature of things there ie no reason why a beaten German Army should not bo driven back on the "Rhine within six weeks: the distance^ thither has often been covered in similar circumstances in tho same time, and ilio passage of the great river itself pre-

sent-s no more formidable difficulties to ms than did tlint of the Danube to the Russians at Rustchuk in 1877, or the crossing of tho Vistula to the Germans last spring. THE FINAL STAND. How far wc may have to fight our Miay beyend tho Rbine into the middle of Germany v.il'. depend principally on the progress made bv the Russians and Italians towards tho meeting of tho Allies. My own idea has always been that the Germans -will attempt a final itand between Muiden-Paderborn and Hanau, their extreme left resting on tho Tiiuringian Forest, -where a great French army moving down the right bank of the Rhine from Basle will work round their flank, -while the rest of tho Allied forces from the AY est will press forward on a broad front bv all possible joatk and river crossings. Once the Allies have reached Berlin and .ioincd hands, will follow a period of negotiations during which, as the Germans did before Paris in 1870 for the French, wc shall give tho enemy facilities to elect a new Government with which we can treat.

Exactly how lone this final stage may t-ako 110 ono can tell with certainty, hut from the experience of many former campaigns six months to a year should sec the end of the reckoning -with "that bitter and luu.tv nation,'' wlio, like the Chaldeans of old. "marched through the breadth of the land to possess tho dwel-ling-placcs that are not theirs."'