The Press. FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1895. THE WANT OF CONFIDENCE MOTION.

Press, Volume LII, Issue 9161, 19 July 1895, Page 4

The Press. FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1895. THE WANT OF CONFIDENCE MOTION.

We are glad that the leader of the Opposition has taken the opportunity to enter a further protest against Mr. Ward's statement to the London Chamber of Commerce to the effect that securities to the value of £8,000,000 were unpledged and available for the purpose of raising money to pay interest on the pabiic debt of the colony, whereas the larger portion of the £8,000,000 consisted of. securities belonging to the Post Office Savings Bank, the Government Insurance Office, and the Public Trust Ofiics, then lying in London under three keys as provided in the Public Eevenues Act. We must say that the more we look at Mr. Wakd's statement, the more unfortunate it appears to us to be, and Ministerial defences and explanations ouly seem to make it worse. Wo have already referred to the scandalous impropriety of a Minister of the Crown referring to trust funds of the colony —the savings of t the - -thrifty ia r the Savings Bank, the investments of the provident in the Life Insurance Department and the provision for the widow and orphan in the Public Trust Office—as if they were liable to be seized by the Government of the day and pledged for payment of interest on the public debt. Such was the impression which Mr. Ward's speech undoubtedly conveyed. He now says that his idea was that these securities should be available only in a great emergency, such as a panic, and that he sent most of them Home himself just before the Australian crisis, to be prepared for such a contingency should it arise.

Before we deal with the very grave principle hare laid down, let us glance at another aspect of the question which we have not seen touched upon. We refer to Mr. Ward's coolness of assumption in referring to all these securities as assets of the Government, whereas a large part of them wera actually liabilities. This is clearly the ; case with the Consolidated Stock debentures, 1834, £1,308,100. These are direct liabilities of the colony, apart altogether from the question of trust. The Departments to which those securities belong have invested their cash in debentures of the New Zealand Government—in other words, have lent tho money to the New Zealand Government, receiving debentures —which are really promissory notes under another name—in return. And Mr. Wakd has the impudence—-we can use no other term—to represent these promissory notes of the colony as security for the colony itself. Of what value would these be as security, we should like to know, if a panic arose gravely affecting the credit of j the colony such as Mr. Wakd ' seems to pre-suppose ? Lsfc us take a case ■which seems to. D3 on all fours, ,, and . which everybody will undwrsfcand. ; Mr. Wabd's idea J seems to us very much as if a Bank .should issue its own note 3to a customer in return for his cash, should receive those notes locked up in a cashbox in trust from the customer, and should then calmly propose, in the event of a panic affecting its stability, to offer this same cashbox of its own notes as security to sustain its credit! Put in this way it sserns the height of absurdity, yet it would not be easy to point

out in what essential way it differs from the actual course of procedure mapped out by Mr. Wabd. . Underlying all this, however, is the very grave principle which Mr. Ward lays clown, and which his colleagues apparently approve, that the trust funds of the colony are to be held available first and foremost to satisfy ths ciaini3 of the general creditors of the colony in case of emergency, and that the colonists who entrusted those moneys to the Savings Bank, the Government Insurance Department, and the Public Trust Office, are to have only a second claim to them after the general creditor has been staved off or satisfied. That is the principle which Captain Kttsseix, on going into Supply, has asked the House to express its emphatic dissent from. We regard it as a great misfortune that such a question should have to be decided by a party straggle. The Government, as will be seen from our Parliamentary report, treated it as a wtuit of confidence motion

and -will boimd up their followers with the lash of the party whip to vote against it. Ifc is a serious calamity tljat such a question should bs dealt with in such a way. We venture to say, however, that the gravest responsibility will rest on the shoulders of those members who, whether for party reasons or otherwise, deliberately lay down the doctrine that the Government of the day is justified in seiaing the trust funds of the colony—the property of the thrifty and the provision for the widow and the orphan—to stave off the demands of the outside creditor. If they reject Captain Ecssell's resolution they will tacitly affirm that the Government may themselves do as trustees an act uncommonly like the criminal offence they have laid at the door of a private trustee formerly resident in this city, and whom they are at this moment bringing back to the colony to stand his trial upon the charge. We warn honourable members that the division list on this momentous j question will be jealously scanned and carefully noted by the electors, and we hope they fully realise the importance of the vote they are called upon to give. The question at issue is not merely whether Ml , . WABDdid or did not make a foolish speech in London, or even whether the Seddon Ministry possesses the confidence of the House. Parliament is really called upon to decide whether it will affirm or whether it will condemn the doctrine that there is nothing sacred about the Trust Funds of this colony, that at any moment in case of emergency they may be seized by the Treasurer of the day and hawked about London as security for the colony's obligations to the holders of its bonds. Surely even the most rabid Ministerialist will pause before he commits himself to such a monstrous—such an immoral—proposition as this I