THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD.

Bush Advocate, Volume XXIII, Issue 308, 11 January 1912, Page 6

THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD.

German minds are pondering over the size of a modern battlefield, stimulated thereto by the work of a German military authority, recently published. The subject is an interesting one, and to those who have never civen the subject a thought some of the figures are rather startling. "When Frederick the Great fought his battles in the eighteenth century, four miles would cover the extent of the operations. The battlefield on which France and Germany might very easily liavo been engaged some months ago would have occupied, perhaps, as much as 150,000 square, niiies. That is if both nations had been able to mobilise all their forces, some three million men apiece. Naturally the question arises, will the generals of the present day be able to control such huge armies spread over such a vast territory. One man will have to have supreme control, and he will be able to call, to his aid all the contrivances that human ingenuity has devised—flying machines, motor cars, dirigibles, balloons, bicycles, wireless telegraphy, and field telephones., besides signalling apparatus. To effectively handle three millions, of. men, large numbers of whom would be indifferently trained, no matter how perfect the means of communication, is a problem ■'that would tax the ingenuity of the greatest strategist of any age. Indeed, it is the opinion of men competent to judge, that the innumerable legions of the groat powers are inefficient, because they are of opinion that they are too big and unwieldiy to be handled with facility, and because no human brain can surmount the difficulties of directing their movements with precision. Outside the problem of generalship there is another, equally important—how to feed a huge modern army. Something like three thousand field batteries would be required. There would be tens of thousands of horses to feed, and enormous quantities of petrol would be required for the various motor ears, aeroplanes, and similar auxiliary services. It is perhaps the thought of the vast complications that would arise in such a ease that is leading German authorities to predict an abandonment of very great armies and recourse to smaller ones.