WHAT WILL RUSSIA DO WHEN HUNS ARE BEATEN?

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIV, Issue 228, 25 September 1943, Page 4

WHAT WILL RUSSIA DO WHEN HUNS ARE BEATEN?

XXpiEN Joseph Stalin declined to participate, even by proxy, in the Roosevelt-Churchill conferences in Africa, there was a widespread sense of disappointment in the United States, and many Americans expressed the uneasy thought that Russia is an impenetrable enigma. Actually, however, there is no mystery to-day about Soviet Russia. Stalin did not need to go to Casablanca, since he had already told President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill how Russia proposes to fight this war, and also what kind of peace Russia wants (says Demaree Bess, one of the most experienced political observers in the "U.S., in an article published in the Daily Mail). These war and peace plans of our Soviet Ally are not military secrets, and there is no reason why they should not be openly discussed by us to-day. To understand just where Russia stands in relationship to our own policies, it is necessary to go back to that summer before Pearl Harbour and to recall that the United States became a non-belligerent ally of Russia then—several months before Japan's attack precipitated the U.S. actively into the war. Greatest Gamble The planes and the tanks which we Americans sent to the Russians before Pearl Harbour were a factor in their successful resistance, and when they repulsed the German attack on Moscow in December, 1941, it became apparent that the Russians fully deserved the confidence in their fighting qualities which American and British statesmen had displayed. It was this confidence in Russia, more than any other factor, which induced President Roosevelt and some of his advisers to risk heavy stakes upon our greatest gamble of the war.

What was that gamble? It was the decision to restrict ourselves to a holding war in the Pacific while we concentrated our principal war effort in Europe. It was the decision, taken jointly with Great Britain, to continue fortifying Russia with armaments, even after both English-speaking Powers were formally at war against Japan as well as Germany—even after most of our fleet had been destroyed at Pearl Harbour. This great gamble required great courage, and the results have fully justified it. The Russian armies made the best possible use of our tanks and planes; they did everything which was expected of them, and more. If this was all the return we had calculated upon from our Russian investment, we should be completely satisfied. # Dangerous Assumptions But many Americans expect still other returns from Russia. For one thing, they assume Russia will help us fight Japan after Germany is defeated. For another, some Americans assume Russia will wholeheartedly accept American blueprints for the post-war world. These assumptions are dangerous, because there is little in the known facts to justify them. What are these facts? The prime fact is that the Soviet Government to-day is the most completely independent Government in the world.

The Russians have made no specific commitments to anyone which might hamper their freedom of action, either in the war in Asia or in post-war Europe. Their adherence to the vague and generalised provisions of the Atlantic Charter was a gracious gesture, not a pledge.

.Even when their military position was blackest, Russian leaders refused to bind themselves in any respect in return for the help they accepted from the United States. On the contrary, the Russians asked for concessions from Great Britain soon after Hitler invaded their country. They requested an acknowledgment of their claims to the three Baltic States and to portions- of Finland and Rumania. They insisted that the frontiers of Poland be left open for future settlement. In other words, they sought from Great Britain very much the same concessions which they had exacted from Hitler in 1939.

Territorial Claims Since they have made their desires so clear, in negotiations first with the Germans and later Avith the British, nobody has any right to be surprised if the Russians move again into all the territories which they occupied in 1939 and 1940, and incorporate them into the Soviet Union. From the Russian standpoint, these territorial claims are modest. They merely restore the strategic frontiers of the Czarist empire in Europe, eliminating the buffer States which the Treaty of "Versailles erected between Russia and the rest of Europe. When Hitler invaded Russia, he tried to win support in other countries by. raising the spectre of Bolshevism, over Europe. But the Germans themselves, and such reluctant allies as the Hungarians and Rumanians, were not so much afraid of Bolshevism as they were of Pan-Slavism. The rivalry between the Slavs and the Germans has been for centuries one of the profoundest conflicts in Europe.

In this war Hitler tried to solve the Slav problem "for ever" by turning most of the Slavs into slaves. While the Nazis have tried to placate the conquered peoples of Western Europe, they have not even pretended to placate most Slavs. The result of this contempt which the Nazis have shown for Slavs, and the brutality which they have practised in Slav countries, is that the Slavs to-day are closer together than ever before, and are looking to Russia for deliverance. During a tour of the Balkans in the spring of 1941 I saw how widely Russia was arousing sympathy among the conquered Slavs in Czecho-Slovakia, in Yugoslavia and even in antiRussian Poland, and in Germany's ally Bulgaria. As victor in this war it is therefore inevitable that Russia will exert more influence in all these countries than the Anglo-American combination can hope to wield. Contrast With 1918 This, then, is a prospect for postwar Europe which Anglo-American peace banners often naively ignore. The assumption that the AngloAmerican combination, in consultation with all the little Governments-in-exile in London, can decide in advance what will happen in Europe is quite unjustified by the facts. The Russians had-no voice whatever in the peace which ended the war of 1914-18.

Consider how vast are the differences this time. France and Italy have ceased to be Great Powers. The French have lost their fleet, and years under German rule have dissipated much of their spirit. Italy not only is being defeated but wrecked. The Pacific War And victory in Europe this time will not mean the end of battle for Americans and Britons, for they will then have to turn in earnest to their war against Japan. And it is almost certain that unless Japan deliberately invades Russia's Pacific provinces, Russia will be at peace while the United States and Great Britain are still at war.

Russia's position is almost perfect in this Pacific war. If she can continue to hold off the Japanese, she need not get into that war at all. If the Japanese attack her first, she can rely upon all the help we can possibly give her, knowing that we have the same selfish reasons to help her against Japan that we had to help her against Germany. Russia need not worry about the possibility of Anglo-American appeasement of Japan at her expense, as she did have to worr.y about Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler at her expense in the years before 1939. The Russians can depend upon us to fight out the Pacific war to a decisive conclusion, whether or not we get any help from Russia.

And if the Russians should decide that it is advisable to round out their strategic frontiers in the Far East, as they have already arranged to do in Europe, then they can come into the war in Asia whenever they like, and take over whatever territories they desire as their share of the spoils.

Greatest Power in Asia

What does this indicate for postwar Asia? It suggests that the Russians are free to consolidate their outposts in Mongolia and in Chinese Turkestan and, if they choose to extend their outposts into Manchuria and Korea. _ It means that Russian influence in China, exercised through the cninese Communists, is more likely to increase than to decrease, it seems to prove that, until China can be orgnised into a modern industrial State, Soviet Russia will become the greatest Power in postwar Asia. p It is evident, then, what a powerful and independent position Russia occupies in relation to the wars raging now in Europe and Asia and likewise in relation to the whole post-war world. Only by complete appreciation of Russia s hard-won strength can we Americans now accurately plot our own course. The Russians are ready to do business with us in peace just as they have worked with us in war, but they have made it clear that all arrangements must be made on Russia's own terms. These terms are now quite sharply denned: ' First, Russia refuses to pledge in advance that it will violate in any way its non-aggression pact with Japan. Second, Russia demands a free hand in post-war settlements in all territories which adjoin Russian frontiers. Third, Russia expects, and is in a position to enforce, full equality of partnership with Americans and Britons in schemes for world security. This does not mean support for any form of Anglo-American imper.ura, in whatayer guise it may be presented. Against the prospects of such an imperium the Russians are methodically constructing an imperium of their own, thus fortifying themselves to play the old game of balance of power, if that game continues into the post-war world. When we examine all the evidsnce it becomes apparent that the future of the world is not going to be determined primarily by American public opinion, as some of us fondly hope.

It is also not only futile but downright pernicious to imagine the United Nations as one big happy family, fighting precisely the same wars for precisely the same objectives. The Russians have made it very clear that they are fighting not only for Russia but also for the Soviet system, which is not— as some Americans try to make us belieye— just another version of American democracy and. the free-enterprise system. The Soviet system is a one-party system which brooks no opposition; it depends upon police to suppress political opposition. The Soviet system is State ownership and operation of everything; every Soviet citizens works for the State. That system has proyed itself in war, and there is no evidence whatever that Soviet leaders intend to modify its fundamental principles now or later, or to join in any schemes to restore free enterprise on a world scale. Moreover, whether we like it or not, we are compelled to recognise that a victorious Russia will possess the geographical position, the military power, and the political influence to do very much as she pleases over a very large section of the earth. And the Russians naturally will be more sympathetic to the idea of extending their own system rather than ours.

Basis for a Compromise The best that we Americans can sensibly anticipate, therefore, is that we can arrange a compromise with Russia —as well as with our other Allies—which will result in a practical scheme for the enforcement of world peace. Fortunately, a solid basis does exist for a compromise in which Russians, Americans, Britons, Chinese, and others of our war Allies, can sincerely co-operate. All these peoples share a profound yearning for peace, which they urgently require in order to establish in their own natural spheres the economic and social schemes to which they are devoted. Accordingly, all these nations are disposed to accept obligations to enforce peace, both in Europe and in Asia.