"ALLIES WILL WIN."

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 262, 6 November 1939, Page 3

"ALLIES WILL WIN."

MR. HOOVER'S VIEW.

CONTROL OF THE SEAS.

WILL STARVE OUT NAZIS

NEW YORK, October 7.

England and France cannot be defeated, in the opinion of former President Herbert Hoover. This opinion and an analysis of conditions supporting it were expressed by the former President in answer to a belief voiced by Koy W. Howard, of the "Sail Francisco News," on October 3, that a dangerous emotionalism is diluting American reasoning; thai, the idea is spreading rapidly in certain sections of this country that France and Kngland are facing defeat and that in order to avoid catastrophe to civilisation and to save ourselves the I'nited States must isooner or later enter the European war. "Jt is true," said Alr. Hoover, "there is the utmost danger in war times of emotions overwhelming common sense. The most regrettable tiling that could hap|»eii to lis would be the building up of a war party in the I'nite-.l States. Hut the premise of the ideas you mention is wrong. "The war is only a month old. But the major factors are already emerging. The British and French can. and will, control the seven seas, <ltespite submarines and aeroplanes, and can sit there until their enemies are exhausted. Hy their sea power the Allies can protect England and all the outlying jwssessions of both empires from invasion. Their manpower can defend France unless they blunder into taking wild adventures in military offensives and exhaust their manpower. Aerial warfare may be destructive, but that works both ways and, so far as all experience goes, is not conclusive of any war. Defeat Impossible. "Tf one surveys the whole front—sea, land, air and economic resources—l am | convinced the Allies. can defend their empires. The end may be victory for them. At worst it might be stalemate. 1 do not see any possibility that it can be defeat. "On the sea the British and French have naval strength of about "J.'iOd.OOt tons against Germany's approximate .">00,(tOO tons," Air. Hoover *uid. "I'ussia even if she comes in, which is improbable. has a negligible navy. Italy ha.about (>OO,OOO tons, German shipping b already driven off the seven seas in .'?( days. Italy would have the same fatt if she joined in. which at the present time appears also improbable. I an confident that our naval experts wil confirm that this dominance of sc;i [lower may be damaged, but cannot l>< destroyed by aircraft. The submarim may be troublesome, but there has beei great progress in methods of detecti:i; submarines since the last war, and thi■ type of warfare is less dangerous thai formerly. Even in the last war it hai no major effect u|miii na\al command o the seas. Shipping Losses Less. "The looses of merchant shipping ii the tirst month are much less than ii the first month after the intensive sub marine attack began in the last war The enemy, whether it be Germany, o 1 even Italy or even Russia, must cro< the se«vs to invade with troops eithe England or the British or French posses sions in Africa, India, Australia or th Western Hemisphere. Allied sea powe will stop that. "On the military front the sole point of attack is on continental France. France is protected by very much more powerful fortifications and armies than in 1014. The French Army is the best in the world. "Germany has a population of about 80 million Germans from which to draw nuanpower. The Allied empires have about Jls million white population and :$0 million more of fighting races which they can draw from to protect France. And their jnyssessions contain another 450 million .people that can aid in food, mw material and munitions production. The Allies can put more men on the front and support them better than the

(icnnHiis. j Russ Potentialities. ( '"Tu view of events, Kusisia and Italy j must also be considered in this army picture. Wliilc tlie entry of Italy with a population of 41 million is highly 1 improbable, even in stieli event the ' Allied manpower on defence is still 1 superior. I do not indue Ru«*sian manpower, because I nm convinced that Russian tr<x>ps are most unlikely ever to reach the western fi'ont. I'bat is inhibited by transportation difficulties, shortages of materials, internal weakness, a lack of any national purpose for the Russians, together with the risks to the Germans of such a Those who think Ku»sia miyrht effectively invade India know little of that reality." "Conceding these facts, Mr. Hoover, what about Germany's sup])<>sed su|>eriority in tlie air as an offset to the Allied advantage on sea and land?" he was «*ked. "Xo doubt the most indeterminate phase of this war so far is the effect of the improved aircraft —the air front. If we assume the superiority of Germany, which is not certain, even supported by other air fleets, yet again in the defence there is the offset to superior numbers by the improved anti-aircraft guns and other ground protections. The Last War. "Sea power and ample man power to defend France would have won the World War without help from the United States if the Allies had not thrown their man power away in futile capture of trenches and in blundering military adventures. It is not to be expected that they will repeat these blunders." "Probably no man alive has had such experience in the economic pressures of war as you, Mr. Hoover. Germany surely must be prepared to eat, and to find materials, as well as to fight V" was a question asked by the interviewer. "The economic front is as vital in this war as in the last war. In foodstuffs Germany starts the war on bread cards. Xobody can store very much food for long. Germany can obtain some breadstuff's and some meat from Poland, Russia and Central European countries. Czechoslovakia and Austria add to her food problems rather than diminish them. Germany produces only about half her necessary fats. The blockade will greatly reduce the fat supply and will cut off most of her tea, coffee, cocoa, etc. The Germans can no doubt meagrely sustain public health, but at a long distance from the comfortable food standards of the Allied countries. The Allies' Pantry. "The French are practically self-sup-porting in food. The British Empire has enormously increased its" food production since the Great War. That enables England to obtain most of her

supplies from within her own Dominions. "(iernianv, except for coal, potash and nitrates, does not possess a full supply of any essential raw material for war. She has a partial supply of some things, hut of probably 20 essential raw materials she lias no production at all. It is impossible to store up such things for a Ion;* war. Her worst shortages are iron ore, rubber, oil, cotton, wool, copper, tin, nickel ancl hardening alloys. She has in her own synthetic or natural resources possibly one-third of her needs in rubber and oil. She cannot obtain outside rubber; she can conceivably secure oil from Russia and Rumania, but not enough to be wholly comfortable in war. In iron ores the Allies have already cut off 2o per cent 01' 30 per cent of her needs, and full war needs cannot be found in Russia or Central kurope. Kven with the amounts of raw materials Germany can command from Russia and Central Europe, there will still be large deficiencies in the other raw materials. The Allied blockade will in time reduce these supplies until it hurts. Allies' War Supplies. "The Allies, on the other hand, produce. in their own empires, 90 per cent of tile needed steel, all their coal and all the oil, copper, lead, zinc, tin, nickel 1 and alloys that they need. And besides 1 the seven seas are open to them for < everything else. ] "Germany's war equipment factories have expanded through occupation of 1 Czechoslovakia ami Poland, but these ' centres were also in control of the Central Powers in the last war. The industrial equipment of the Allies lias expanded greatly since the Great War. J* or instance, in the last war Great Britain started with a production of only .>.1,000 motor vehicles. They now produce 4">0,000. And in that war Germany held the great iron ore centre of Lorraine. France has it now within her fortification*. In that war Germany, bv the march through Belgium, at once occupied the great coal and industrial centres of Northern France, which. ' i ranee should lie able to hold. "Purchasing- power for supplier froi.i outside national borders is vital to belligerents in modern war. The Allies have large gold stocks. They have about 00 per cent of the world's gold production. They have several billions of reserve assets in the United States an.l other countries which can be turned purchases. The Allies can secure the great bulk of their supplies from their own empires and there they can arrange internal credits, (iernianv must buy her large deficiencies from other nations. She had no consequential amount <>f gold and her credit is not large. She must continue to keep people working on export goods with which to pay. That decreases available manpower. Allies Have Morale. "Morale is important. The Allied people are convinced they are lighting on moral foundations and for national existence. Th'ir people «ill be comfortably fed. They will have staying 1 power. . "The (iermaiis realise their extreme i danger from a long war. Thev may try I a quick, overwhelming attack. It may f mean bud days for the Allies. But there is little reason to believe it can succeed. And then the slow strangulation of sea power will h.ive its effect. i 'From all this 1 have no fears that l the Allies will he defeated. "We need to keep cool. After all. we . inui-t keep out ot thjs war. We would i i" be yielding the lar-t stand of democracy - if we go in, win or lose. We would have r to yield to dictatorship during the war, - and in a quarter of a century of improvement afterwards we would not r get out of dictatorship. We would be destroying the possibility of being of aid in reconstruction of a demoralised world after it was all over."