NAVAL FORCES.

Auckland Star, Volume LXX, Issue 139, 15 June 1939, Page 14

NAVAL FORCES.

FUTURE IN PACIFIC

BRITAIN AND SINGAPORE.

NEED OF CAPITAL SHIPS.

(By a Correspondent. I To th'*<e who wall t lie significant, ■speech of Sir Samuel lloare. when he wa* Kir-it Lord i»f the Admiralty, that Hiitnin wnuld have to establish her tleet on a two-hemisphere ba-is, there will be nothing surprising in tlie recent London cablegrams forecasting such a move. What may be news is t'ie linking of it with the recent conrerer.ee held at Wellington on Pacific defence. However, it will \>e ■■eadilv understood that the question of naval power in the Pacific \v a - \ cry fully discussed at this conference. The Australians revealed themselves anxious to have a battle fleet stationed at Singapore at the earliest possible moment and are willing to accept even one or two battleships if they are unable to obtain any more, as it is pointed out that there were only two capital ships on the China Station in 1014. Also there is a sharp realisation, both in the Commonwealth and in this country, that our first line of defence is far overseas; that, in fact, with the threat of a strong tleet based on Singnpore on the flank, the (somewhat doubtful) attraction of a move to the southward in force is likely to appca' less compiling to the Far Kastcrn member of the anti-Communist pact. It must be obvious that the great base which Britain has built at Singapore, and to which Australia and New Zealand have contributed, will not remain without strong forces assigned to it. and it is possible that if British interests in China wane still further those forces will be stronger even than ap|>eurs likely to-day. The China Station. For despite the fact that there hip. been a very marked change in the political situation in the Pacific, the fleet which Britain maintained on the China station in l!)l 4 wan more powerful, if less diversified, than the ships there today. The China station is much the greatest in extent of the six stations of the British fleet; it extend* from the Arctic to 'below the equator, and from east to west it is about one-ijuartcr of the circumference of the globe. To police | it in 1!) 14 Britain had stationed there j two battleship*, four cruisers, eight i destroyers, four torpedo-boats, three submarines and 10 sloops aiul river gunboat*. The strength of the tleet on the | China station to-day is five cruisers, I eight destroyers, one aircraft carrier, five escort vessels. l.~> submarines, six i motor torpedo-i)«>ats aiul 17 river gunboats which are employed on the | Yangtze and Went Rivers. In 1 S> 14. also, j we enjoyed the advantage of the Anglo- j Japanese alliance which had been in existence since 11)02 and which gave us the support of the Japanese fleet, a fleet which proved itself capable of undertaking the work of providing naval defence throughout the Far East. 11l lOlf) this alliance was terminated, and to-day Japan's links are with the Fascist Powers. In 1014. also, there was a useful Australian fleet consisting of one battle-cruiser, four light cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines. To-day there is no capital ship on the Australian station, though Australia is anxious for one, w even considering providing a dock in Sydney Harbour capable of taking one, and is rawing her cruiser squadron to six. So it will be seen that in a strategical situation which has vastly altered the strength of the British Navy in the Far East and in the Pacific has not been rained in any way commensurate with the loss of strength resulting from the end of the* AngloJapanese pact. Reinforcements Expected. In these circumstances, and with the fears which have arisen in Australia in the last two rears it is inevitable that Britain should reinforce t'he Pacific Fleet.. The commonly expected move on her part will be the dispatch of the five Hoval Sovereign class battleships to Singa|>orc as soon as her new building programme is sufficiently advanced for this to Ih l done. But in addition 'the new cruiser* of the Southampton class (of 10,IMM> tons and mounting 12 six-inch guns) are already being ordered abroad for service. Some of them arc now on the East Indian station; as the new ships are built the sister ships will be sent to the Far East. The Edinburgh and the Belfast are expected to serve their maiden commissions in the Pacific. The D class destroyers which arc now on the China station will lie replaced by more modern ships as the J and K classes become available for use with the Home and Mediterranean fleets. To-ffay the main fleets of Britain are almost evenly divided between those two latter stations. The Home fleet consists of five battleships, five cruisers, two aircraft earners. 24 destroyers and five submarines. The Mediterranean fleet has a strength of five battleships one sircraft carrier, six cruisers. 24 destroyers, eight submarines and six motor torpedo boats. A primary aim is to maintain the status of those two fleets and to strengthen the othei stations, which are engaged in tht essential work of safeguarding Empire lines of communication, without altering the relationship now borne by th« Home and Mediterranean fleets tc neighbouring Powers. But it must b« realised than in any conflict Britain would almost certainly have the assistance of the French Navy, which would vastly strengthen her position in ,European waters *s far as capital ships and cruisers are concerned. In fact, apart from the shortage of the smaller ships to carry out the work of commerce protection, the position of Britain, supported by France, against a possible Herman-Italian coalition would be very strong and would give a preponderance in capital ships of 21 to 0. Battle Tleet Highly Mobile. That being the position, it is not as difficult for Britain to contemplate the establishinent of a two-hemisphere fleet, as may be thought. It is true that today, after a long period of naval restriction, she lacks the Second Fleet of 14 battleships and two cruiser squadrons and the Third (Reserve) Fleet of 14 battleships and five cruisers which she possessed 25 years ago. But the resulting position is not one which can be improved by regretting this fact. Xor, it must be emphasised, did Britain lose anything by the policy of naval limitation which the Powers adopted at Washington. *Nhe was faced loss of her naval supremacy to the 1 niteel States, anyhow, and at . ••■""Sjton she merely accepted this -„^ ,0n ° n the be * t term « for herself, the CO *J ,y * nd Us * le «» Mval nee, hive k22n n *. , rMny " hi »* would have been obsolete to-day fa, w and the alienation of the United States

by lack of pood sense. Xor, in the I light of the development of air power, is it clear just how useful a large number of old ships would be in a new war. In addition it must be realised that the Mediterranean and Home Fleets are regarded as reservoirs from which strength may be tapped to supply any threatened area in any ocean. Put in inmther way. a glance at the list of stations of the British Fleet will show that while it is part of naval policy to maintain a cruiser squadron, for the protection of commerce, in every ocean, the battle fleet is in conception, and in tact, a highly mobile force, able to go anywhere at a few hours' notice, and provided tlint bases are available, may iMM\e for months on end. In practice the stations of these battle fleets are dictated by the presence of foreign Meets, and any threat of an unfriendly battle fleet in the Far East would naturally bring battleships to the Pacific.