SANCTIONS.

Auckland Star, Volume LXVI, Issue 238, 8 October 1935, Page 10

SANCTIONS.

DIFFICULT TO APPLY.

EXPERT COMMITTEE'S REPORT FINANCIAL EMBARGO FEASIBLE. now could the League of Nations apply sanctions? The question is more easily asked than answered, according to the report of an expert sub-committee which was set up in July by the Committee of Thirteen at Geneva, to examine the technical aspects of various economic measures which might meet both the practical and the humanitarian objectives to tho full application of economic sanctions. Tho question studied by the sub-committee and a summary of its answers, are given below:— 1. The first question concerned the withholding from the country repudiating its League obligations of supplies of a limited number of key products required for the production of arms and warlike preparations. The sub-committee divided these supplies into three categories: (i.) arms and ammunition; (ii.) key products required for the manufacture of armaments but not in ordinary use; (iii.) products used in the armament industry but also widely employed in j ordinary industrial life. The sub-com-mittee pointed out that it was fairly easy to draw up the first two lists and indeed that such lists had already been compiled, but that the third list would bo difficult to compile in advance of a war, since it would be hard to distinguish the ultimate use of the prohibited product.-'. 2. The withholding of other special cloig&ca of supplies (other than food supplies essential for the subsistence of the, civilian population). The sub-committees observed briefly that this ftuggestion was a contradiction in terms so far as achieving an effect calculated to deter a country from war is concerned. For if tho supplies are not essential to civilian life they can easily be dispensed with and an embargo on them will have no deterrent result. .Cutting Off Export Trade. 3. The interruption of the export trade of the repudiating country or any special part of it. The sub-committee stated that the three advantages of this proposal were that it could be applied widely by the participating countries, that its economic burden would be distributed evenly between them, and that it would be applied with varying degrees of comprehensiveness. On tho other hand, eince exports pay for imports, was not the cutting off of exports equivalent to the cutting off of essential imports, which, on the humanitarian basis, was the object that above all must be avoided? Again, such a system must fall inequitably on the participators. 4. Measures of financial pressure such as the withholding of credit facilities. The sub-committee observed that financial prohibitions were perfectly feasible, whether as applied to Government credits, loans or short-term credits, but the obvious danger was that unscrupulous intermediaries could act as the gobetweens for the repudiating country. But that objection might to some extent be offset by the participating countries insisting that all public loan issues must have a Government authorisation. Crux of the Problem. 5. What will bo the means (administrative and legislative) to be used by participating States in carrying out each measure? This question (says the "Manchester Guardian," from which this summary is taken) is really tho crux of the whole problem. If all the nations in the world except the repudiating States are prepared to enforce sanctions the administrative methods are not hard to find. Trade in the prohibited products would have to be licensed alike in relation to exporters, merchants and shipowners. League supervision would be essential. But where nil nations do not participate in tho prohibition the matter is far more complex. If non-participating countries can supply all tho needs of the repudiating country for a particular product the prohibition becomes useless. But if the participating countries are the sole or main producers of the prohibited product some success is possible, provided that measures are taken to prevent prohibited products being re-exported from nonparticipating Countries. The sub-com-mittee saw grave difficulties in the administration of each of the various proposals, but thought that they would be sensibly diminished if the prohibited commodities were limited to munitions.

6. To what extent and in what conditions ca.n the requisite deterrent effect he obtained hy arrangements of a regional character requiring the action of only a. limited number of States? The sub-committee repeated that the non-participation of a single important producer would be sufficient to stultify measures for limiting exports to the repudiating country. Legal Objections. 7. The relation of existing trade treaties to the partial sanctions proposed. The sub-committee pointed out that many commercial treaties contain a clausc forbidding one-sided prohibitions affecting the products of another country. This clause might bo got over so far as the participating nations were concerned if in all cases re-exports were prohibited, but it would not get over the legal rights of the repudiating country. Both in its general conclusions and in its final remarks the sub-committee was extremely discouraging about the administrative difficulties of the proposed sanctions, and did not fail to point out that their use might be almost as damaging to the economic life of the participating countries, as to that of the repudiating country. But the sub-committee safeguarded itself by saying that it considered as outside its scopc political and legal objections, and that it had faced its task purely as a technical body.