ALLIED FRONT BENT, BUT DID NOT BREAK.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 128, 30 May 1918, Page 5

ALLIED FRONT BENT, BUT DID NOT BREAK.

NOT YET CERTAIN THAT MAIN ATTACK HAS BEEN LAUNCHED (Received SJSO ajn.) LONDON, May 29. British and French military circles take a calm view of the new battle. I hey express the opinion that General Foch will not be induced to weaken the forces at his command which must deal with the enemy's main attack. It is by no means certain that the real offensive has been launched on the Aisne. General Berthaut, in the "Petit Parisien/' however, is of opinion that this time, remembering that the German offensive operations are on a forty kilometres front, the attack cannot be regarded as a diversion. Nevertheless the enemy has enormous reserves, and his strategy may be planned on a huge scale. Other critics say that the first shock on the Aisne was extremely heavy. The Germans returned to the assault again and again, but the Allied front was still unbroken at the end of the day as sufficient reserves were present t.. hold the line.—(A. and N.Z. Cables General Foch has been compelled to use a portion of his reserve army to ci eck the German advance just as he was similarly compelled to throw in several ot his corps when the Amiens attack was in progress, but it is probable that ne will wait to see whether the enemy has another card up his berore he throws in the full weight he has at his disposal. Throughout the history ot war this principle stands out—that the successful general U he who best knows how to husband and employ his reserves. but "in eontemporarv warfare this is more true than ever. 'The commander-in-chief of aY army numbering over 1.000.000 combatants can do very little to influence results '•vhen once hi? forces are involved in the battle." His influence lias already been exerted in the choice of generals and executive staff, in the organisation and location of his troops, but especially of his so-called strategic reserve, i.e., the reserves retained under the orders of G.H.Q., as distinguTshe.-J from' the' local reserves of subordinate generals. If the commanding generals have been badly chosen, if the staffs are inspired by a wrong theory of contemporary war. then disaster is the result. And if the strategic reserves cannot reach the critical scene of action in time to counter-attack successfully, then such battles as the German victory over the Russians on the River Dunajec on May l 1915, and over the Italians on the Isonzo on October 20 last are the result. The strategic reserve at the disposal of Foch has no doubt already l""n drawn upon, but large forces still remain intact. These forces constitute a standing menace to the flank of the German attack, and while they are under the general's hand they are ready to repel a greater attack should it be attempted ebewhere. The generalissimo is therefore faced with the task of holding his line intact with the fewest troops possible until he has compelled his opponent to put all his cards on the table. When lie has attained this object he can make the best use of his available resources, either in a purely defensive manner, or by counter-attack in centre or on flank. The most dangerous military asset possessed by the Herman lea-ier* con-i=t= in t.-e efficiency and simplicity of their administration. In all their arrangements there is marvellously little waste of power. Also in the skill and mutual confidence of the general staff and subordinate commanders. The 'i-erman foot-soldier has not the lust for close fighting which distinguishes the French and British infantry; he prefers missile lighting at a distance, but he does not Sinch from making determined onslaughts when put to it. The iron iivipline of the German system, confidence in the leadership, and hope of repeating the decisive victories of Russian and Italian fronts in France, so as to end the war triumphantly, induce the German rank and file to carry out the offensive plans of the High Command with energy, and their recent onslaughts, though begun in the face of decimating fire, show that in the mass at least they are ready to take their chance of getting through. But the unification of the Allied Command and the concentration of their reserves makes their task one of much greater difficulty than was implied when the independent system was in force, and the announcement of the Allied expectation tnat the rush will be stopped within -IS hours must be considered very satisfactory.