THE WAR IN ALSACE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 146, 21 June 1915, Page 4

THE WAR IN ALSACE.

One of the most interesting and significant of the many pha-ses of the great struggle along the western front is the forwaird movement of the French troops in Alsace, and near the frontier of Lorraiine. For Bcvcral montihs past the French arnjy in Upper Alsace has been slowly forcing its way along the ridges of" the Vosges; capturing many points 'of vantage, which enable it to command the Alsatian plain between "the mountains and the Rhine. This offensive movement has now been pushed as far north as Coltnar; and it must be remembered that as the plain "gf Alsace ds only from twelve to twenty milos broad, the French troops along the Vosges now practically command the crossings of the Rhine from the Swiss border up to -within a short distance of Straseburg. " The persistent efforts of the French armies in Alsace, and their recent steady progress, appear to indicate that General Joffre Iras some intention of undertaking decisive operations in this quarter. And it is clear from a glance at the map that, if once tfho French forcG3 could gain control of the Upper Rhine, there is nothing to prevent them from delivering a heavy blow at the Gorman loft wing, or even from threatening the whole of *he German communications with its western frontier.

A few daye ago we were informed 'by cable that" Joffre iwae testing the strength of the German lines west of Jletz. This is the point at which the Germans, by seizing St. Mihiel, at the Mouse crossing, have driven a salient into the French lines, and- here the .French have been slowly but steadily forcing their way through the hill country to the north and eoutk so as to isolate 6t. iMichiel, and open the road to Metz. When the St. Aliehiel salient is "flattened out" by the withdrawal of the German lines at this point, it "will be possible for a FTeneli offensive to strike straight at Jletz, wliile the advance through Southern Alsace is carried right up to Strassbuxg. It is not probaible that any systematic attempt would be made to besiege or invest these two great fortresses, which cover tho main approaches from the French frontier to the Rhine. But If the French have enough troops to "mask" Metz and Straseburg and "contain" their garrisons, it -will ' be uossible to make an advance north along the Rhine from Upper Alsace, while a vigorous attack is at the same moment directed eastward Metz through Lorraine. The object of these operations -vvould he, as we have indicated, to threaten the German lines of communication, and it is self-evident that if JofTre's plans worked out in this way tli6 Germans would be forced to withdraw from Northern France, and probably also from Belgium,-to save their armies from being dangerously outflanked, or even taken in the rear. Considering the enormous losses involved in direct frontal attacks on extended positions, it is thus very probable that as soon as the Allies are in a position to press home their offensive decisively, a turning movement through Alsace and Lorraine will prove to be one of the chief factors in the strategy that will secure the final expulsion of the invaders from France and Belgium.