The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1915. BULGARIA'S DECISION.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 146, 21 June 1915, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1915. BULGARIA'S DECISION.

For the cause that lacks at*i*t*M% For the vnxmg that needs retittottee, Fur the future in the distance, And the good that ice com 40.

The position in the Balkans i 3 still very seriously complicated by the vacillating attitude of Bulgaria and tbe unreliable character of her diplomacy. Like all the European neutrals, Bulgaria is prepared to come into the struggle as soon as she can be convinced that it will be to her awn interest to do so. But past experience of the wily Czar Ferdinand has convinced the Powers ■ and especially the Balkan States—that no reliance is to be placed upon Bulgarian assurances till they are backed by action. Naturally, the Powere of the Entente and the. Central Powers have been bidding against each other for Bulgaria's support, and Germany appears to 'have induced the Turkish Government to olTer a bribe that under

ordinary circumstances might be expected to bring Bulgaria to reason—a portion o f Thrace west of the Maritza, including part of Adrianople. This means that Bulgaria would regain a large fraction of what she lost- through ■her own treachery and folly in the second Balkan war; and no doubt it is from Ferdinand's point or view a great temptation. But self-interest is an extremely potent factor m Ferdinand's policy, and if Russia, France, and England can convince him that Germany and her allies are already doomed to destruction we can be sure that Bulgaria will make her decision accordingly.

Naturally, ithe Entente Powers have been following the tortuous course of Furdinand'e'. diplomacy .with great' care, and it appears that they kayc a,t least managed to preserve friendly relations with Bulgaria up to the present time. According to »ne report, Bulgaria has already given a w.ritten pledge that ehe will maintain neutrality if she docs not enter the war on the side of the Allies. If this ie true, it should make a considerable difference to the prospects of Rumania, which is naturally hesJtatini; to take tlio irrevocable st*p so long as ehe is doubtful t about Bulgaria's intentions. For though Rumania te probably in a. military sense the strongest of the Balkan States, Bulgaria's geographical position would enable her to strike in bettween Serbia ,md Buniamia, tlrue isolating fcherr forces, and 'taking them in the rear; while at tihc same time Bulgaria's intervention on the fiamc side as Turkey would probably keep Greece out of the war aitogcibhcr. The Greeks would have no chajico of co-operating with Serbia if Bulgaria took arms against thorn, and their position, assailed ait once by Albanians, Bulgarians and Turks would be positively desperate, unless the Allies could detach cnougii troops to assist Uicin. Another report alleges that Ru-m-ania lias come to come satisfactory arrangement with Bulgaria to cover all possible contingencies; but the recollection of Ferdinand's gross treachery to hie allie3 during ■the Balkan wars ie not likely' to encourage Rumania's confidence in his 'professions and protestations now.

According to the onOnary standards of international morality, Bulgaria is perfectly justified in holding out for terms that will enable her, as the cable message puts it, to 'realise her national aspirations, and carry out her national, programme. What then does Bulgaria want that either the Entente Powers or Germany and her allies can possibly give her? In the first place, it must not be fogotten that Bulgaria has a distinct grievance against Rumania, Serbia and Greece in regard to the Treaty of Bucharest, which closed the second Balkan War; and the fact that the war was duo solely to Bulgaria's unprincipled greed does not altogether justify the terms of the settlement. Rumania demanded as the price of her neutrality a strip of 'territory betwwn the Danube and the Black Sea. This district is inhabited, not by Rumanians,'but by Bivlgars, and asfhe cession was 'based purely on economic grounds, it could not be defended on nationalist principles. Serbia and Greece did not take from Bulgaria any territory that (had originally bedonged to aier, t>lll they divided between them the greater part of Alacedonia, which is chieily Bulgar in population and nationality. The coast of is largely Greek, ■while the hinterland is Bulgar; and after the first Balkan war, 11. Venizelos was quite prepared to hand over all Thrace east of the Ma-ri'tza to Blugaria, while securing for Greece the true Macedonian territory -west of the Maritza, including hinteriand as well as coast line. This did not satisfy Bulgaria, and she fought to gain or lose oil the objects of her ambitions at once. After the second Balkan ttot, Venizelos still nia-de a generous concession 'by leaving Bulgaria the coastline between the Meeta and Maritza rivers, though he secured for Greece a larger area of the hinterland than before. The difficulty is that Bulgaria, as matters now stand, has no satisfactory ou'Uet to the Mediterranean, and this she- claims on economic grounds just as Russia demands the opening of the Dardanelles.

Tt is quite possible that if Gtcccc can secure compensation in Epirus, in tho Aegean Islands, or on the mainland of Asia Minor, she will be ipropared to make duo allowance for Bulgaria's claims

in Macedonia. But the dispute between Bulgaria, and Serbia is more difficult to settle. For Serbia, after the second Balkan, war, insisted on carrying her borders southward down the valley of the Vardar, through districts that aje purely Bulgar in nationality and population. H«r object, again, was la-rgely economic—to prevent Bulgaria from cutting off her trade from access to Salonika on the Aegean, and from the Albanian ports on tile Adriatic. The question is: — Will Serbia, like Greece, aiter the war, be prepared to surrender to Bulgaria some of the territory she now holds, more especially if her borders are enlarged northward by the inclusion, of Bosnia and Herzegovina and portions of the Southern Slav states, now incorporated in Austria? As Serbia's interest in Mace-

donia is purely economic, it may fairly be assumed that she would be content if her commercial access to Salonika weTe permanently guaranteed; and in this context we may note that the proposal for a Balkan Zollverein or Customs Union is already being discussed in influential quarters, to obviate the dangers of commercial and political rivalry after the war is over. These facts may help to explain why Turkey's offer of a strip of Macedonia west of the llaritza must be peculiarly acceptable to to Bulgaria, The cabled reference to "portion of Adrianople" refers *o the fact that the main Turkish railway through Tltrace passes through the fortifications of Adrianoplc, and as this great fortress is still in Turkish hands, Bulgarian trade is practically cut off from Dedeagatoh , and 'the other ports she has secured on the Aegean. And though it is true that most of Thrace is G.Teek by nationality, it would be quite impossible to sort out and distribute the Bulgar and Greek elements separately between the two States. The final arrangement must be a choice between economic and nationalist claims, and though the Greeks may still Tcecnt the inewpora■tion of any of their kinsmen in a Greater Bulgaria, it ie probable that only in this way can a settlement be arranged tihat will secure reasonable prospects of permanent peace in the Near. East.