'TRAGIC MISTAKE’

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 71, Issue 6, 18 October 1950, Page 5

'TRAGIC MISTAKE’

CASSINO BATTLE RECALLED

BOMBING OF THE MONASTERY ‘N.Z.P. A.—Copyright) (Rec. 9.20.) NEW YORK, Oct 17. Blame for what he termed the “tragic mistake” —the destruction by bombing of the historic Monte Cassino Monastery in February, 1944—was placed by the United States General Mark Clark on the commander of the New Zealand troops, Lieut-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, now New Zealand’s Governor-General.

General Mark Clark gave Iris version of the course of events leading to the bombing against his own wishes in his book about the: Allied invasion of Italy, 1 “Calculated . Risk.” being pub* lished ‘ to-morrow. 1 General Clark led the United States sth Army in Italy under General Alexander, who said General Clark secret ly moved the New Zealand Corps from the British Bth Army front to the sth Army' front. The corps, which was specially formed for the Cassino battle, comprised the 2nd New Zealand, 78th British and 4th Indian Divisions. General, Clarke said that when the corps began to relieve the Americans before Cassino, General Freyberg and several of his staff officers expressed apprehension abqut the German use of the monastery buildings. General Freyberg said the buildings should be “knocked down by artillery or aerial bombardment if necessary.” General Clark commented: “I did not feel it necessary, nor did my staff or the generals who preceded General Freyberg in command at Cassino.” Direction to Indians General Clark said that on General Alexander’s orders he directed the Indians to clear high ground west ot Cassino as quickly as possible, but the plan was delayed by the weather. General Freyberg telephoned MajorGeneral Alfred Gruenther, General Clark’s chief of staff, and asked that the designate targets named the “Convent” mean the Monastery, which General Gruenther told him was not on the list of targets prepared at Army headquarters, primarily on Gen-

eral Freyberg’s recommendations. General Freyberg insisted that the monastery should be bombed as a “vital target.” General Gruenther told General Freyberg that because the target was a historical and religious structure, he would have to check -with General Clark before doing anything further. General Clark, then at Anzio, was informed by radiotelephone, and said General Freyberg’s “strong viewpoint” was putting him in a difficult position, particularly in view of the British desire to handle the New Zealanders With great dipolmaey and tact.” The Americans frantically tried to

change General Freyberg’s mind. They argued that the monastery ih rubble would provide better defensive positions for the Germans than the monastery as it stood, and its bombardment would endanger 2000 civ.lian refugees •in it. Finally, General Alexander's chief of staff told General Gruenther that General Alexander had decided that the monas-

tery should he bombed if General Freyberg considered it a military re* cessity. General .Alexander regretted that the building should be destroyed, but said he had faith in General Freyberg's judgment ,and if there was any reasonable probability of tve building being used militarily, he believed destruction warranted. General Clark maintained that there was no military necessity, but failed to move General Freyberg, who, according to a note by General Gruenther, said: “Any higher commander who refused to authorise the bombing would have to be prepared to take the responsibility for the failure of the attack.” /.. * ' . ,

-Attack Fails in the End

General Clark, following another assurance that General Freyberg considered the bombing a military necessity, authorised the bombing. "I; was never able to discover on what he based his opinion,” General Clark said. On February 2, 255 bombers dropped 576 tons of bombs and Ihen the area was heavily shelled, General Clark said. The monastery’s destruction did not help the attack, which failed after costly losses “in the end.” General Clark added: “General Freyberg became convinced that an attack strong enough to succeed was not practicable through the mountains." General Clark said he found later that 100 to 300 civilian refugees were buried' in the ruins. The Abbot Bishop of Monte Cassino signed a statement that there were never any German soldiers inside the monastery. General Clark called the bombing a “tragic, mistake” psychologically and militarily—and I say that with a full knowledge of the controversy ’hat raged round this episode.” He added: “I say now that there was irrefutable evidence that no German soldier except emissaries was ever inside the monastery for purposes other than to-take care of the sick or to sight-see.” • . > ■