RUAPEHU CRASH

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 69, Issue 49, 7 December 1948, Page 4

RUAPEHU CRASH

BOARD OF INQUIRY Mass of Evidence to be Heard CP.A.) WELLINGTON, Dec. G. The inquiry into the crash of the Lockheed Elecira aircraft Kaka on Mount Ruapehu on October 23, with the loss of 13 , fives, was opened to-day. Most of to-day’s evidence concerned the arrival of* the aircraft at Palmerston North, its departure for Hamilton, and signals received from it while in flight. Deerstalkers who heard the aircraft over the slopes of Mount Ruapehu also gave evidence. The. members o£ the board are Sir Harold Johnstone, K.C. (chairman), Captain K. A. Brownjohn, of Tasman Empire Airways, and Wing Commander J. W. H. Bray, R.N.Z.A.F. Mr W. H. Cunningham is appearing for the Air Department and Mr D. W. Virtue for the Natio'hal Airways Corporation. Mr P. K. H. Smyth is appearing for the relatives of the second pilot, FirstOfficer *B. C. Russell, and Mr J. Metzer for the widow of F. J. Follas, a taxi-driver, of Wellington.

. Order of Reference

The terms of reference are: (1) What caused the accident? (2) Did any act or omission of the captain or pilot cause the accident? (3) Did any cause other than an act or omission contribute to or- cause the accident? (4) What steps, if any, should be taken to ensure that similar accidents are eliminated or minimised? The Kaka, which was due at Hamilton at 3 p.m., left Palmerston North at 1.16 p.m. Contact was established With Ohakea, and the last message Was received at Wanganui, when the aircraft was 140 miles from Hamilton, said Mr Cunningham. An emergency was declared at 3.32 p.m., but, in spite of 46 aircraft flying a total of 400 hours, it took six days to locate the Kaka. Snow .fell on Ruapehu for 24 hours after the crash. Mr Cunningham, detailing the circumstances of the Kaka’s fatal flight, said that at 1.38 p.m. it reported by radio telephone that it was at 4500 feet, and climbing’ to 6000. This message was received by Ohakea control, Which asked the aircraft to supply weather conditions, to which the Kaka replied that it was flying in rairi, and?; ten-tenths cloud. Ohakea then transmitted the altimeter setting, which was immediately acknowledged. That was the last message received from.the aircraft, which was then 140 milesYrom Hamilton. Five Miles East of Course Witnesses would be called who saw the Kaka shortly before it crashed, said Mr Cunningham. One of these witnesses would indicate that the plane was five miles east of its normal course. • All on board having been killed, there perished with them the only possible source of direct evidence as to the factors which may have caused the aircraft to strike the mountain. The board would therefore he faced with drawing such inferences from the facts adduced as it thought justified. •

Mr Cunningham said evidence would indicate that snow fell on Ruapehu for at least 24 hours after the accident, and that the base of the cloud on the mountain did not lift above 4000 feet until the fifth day after the accident. Had conditions been even less favourable, much more time might' have been ,taken before the wreckage was located. Photographs would be produced, taken on November J), when ‘the snow had melted appreciably and exposed the rocky outcrops. They would show the difficulty of picking up such objects as aluminium wreckage against a white background.

Evidence 'would include an analysis of the weather over the route on the daV. of the accident, the accounts of. pilots who flew over it at about the same time as the Kaka, and evidence of steps taken .to reach the wreckage. All Occupants Killed Instajitly. From investigations at the scene, and the salvage of essential documents and parts, it was certain that all the occupants were killed instantly by the tremendous impact when the plane struck the rock face at not •less than 150 miles an hour, Mr Cunningham said. Other evidence would deal with the qualifications of members of the aircrew, the condition of the aircraft and its instruments when a certificate of airworthiness was issued on October 22, a description of the navigational aids available, and the effect of weather conditions in relation to the aircraft’s instruments and navigational aids. The National Airways Corporation had its own operations manual, dealing with the operations of its services, and the decision as to whether any particular route should be operated in any given weather Avas a matter for the National Airways Corporation. The section of flight on which the aircraft was lost was floAvn under the instrumental flight rules, requiring an aircraft to report at the Wanganui homer and at New Plymouth East. Preparation of flight plans under the instrument flight rules Avas governed by the Air Navigation Regulations issued under the' authority of the Minister. Air Traffic Control required a flight plan to bo lodged, and a proper clearance for the flight to he obtained by the pilot in command before any flight could be undertaken under instrument flight rules. The pilot on this flight obtained his clearance through Palmerston North, and it was found in the aircraft. Collisions Chief Concern Mr Cunningham said that Air Traffic Control Avas chiefly concerned with the prevention of collisions in the air and controlled heights at which the aircraft were allowed to operate under the instrumental flight rules, but was not concerned to check the accuracy of calculations as to the courses intended to he Down, as submitted in the flight, plan. . The procedure laid down for pilots in command in lodging flight plans required them to consider reports of

prevailing and likely weather on the route. One copy, of the plan was lodged with aerodrome control, the pilot taking the other in the aircraft. Examination of the Avreckage indicated that the Kakn, was flying at its proper operational height, at its normal speed, that, the co-pilot was in the passenger cabin at the time of the accident, and that the aeroplane struck the mountain without warning. The weather over the route, Avhich would be described in detail, was not unsafe for flying, and the board Ayould chiefly be concerned with consideration of whether the proper navigational precautions Avere taken and whether there was adequate pre-plan-ing to ensure safety for this flight. The hoard’s attention Avould, during the evidence, be called to certain features in regard to aircraft maintenance procedure and practice, which Avere disclosed during the preliminary investigation into this accident. While they might not have any direct bearing ,on the cause of this particular accident, they were features which the board might consider should receive attention by responsible authorities, to ensure that maintenance procedure, as laid down, Avas adequate for maximum safety and that such procedure Avas strictly followed,