FLEET AIR ARM.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 63, Issue 245, 27 July 1943, Page 6

FLEET AIR ARM.

ITS DEFICIENCIES VOICED. “ROB US OF OUR VICTORIES” LONDON. “Now, in the fourth year of the war, the Fleet Air Arm is so illequipped as to be robbing this country of great victorious strokes at sea while at the same time inflicting unnecessary perils on the pilots.” This indictment was levelled in the House of Lords by Lord Winster at those responsible for naval supply, writes H. R. S. Phillpott in the “Daily Mail.” After several squabbles he had succeeded in getting the equipment of the Fleet Air Arm discussed publicly instead of in secret session. He made damaging criticisms, but made them with a moderation and restraint which went to prove that these matters can be debated publicly without either helping the enemy or hindering our own war effort. Lord Beaverbrook, who was Minister of Aircraft Production during one of the periods that drew Lord Winster’s criticism, treated the peers to a good okl diehard Tory speech. At the outset of his speech Lord Winster recounted how the Fleet Air Arm was badly equipped when the War broke oue, and declared that it was insufficiently equipped to-day. He mentioned two factories for fleet aircraft at which', he said, men had been standing idle and refused permission to go to work elsewhere. Yet the navy urgently wanted the machines. The primary need of the Fleet Air Arm has always been the very fast fighter, but only now in the fourth year had the navy got the Seafire —a modified Spitfire, while the R.A.F. had the Spitfire before the war. Machine after machine supplied to the navy had been failures and hat! drawn adverse comments from the pilots who had to fly them. The torpedo-bomber was “a decisive weapon.” Why had its development been allowed to lag behind?. Transport planes had anything been done to develop them? Dive-bombers: An admiral had written to say that differences of opinion would be reduced if people knew the number of our battleships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers and destroyers sunk or damaged by dive-bombers and the number of German ships sunk or damaged by our bombers. “Melancholy Story.” “The story of the dive-bomber,” said Lord Winster, “is a very melancholy one.” Lord Beaverbrook refused to accept wliat lie called Lord Winster’s pessimistic view, and came down heavily on the side of the private firms’ designers of machines and engines. “If it is a good firm you get good aircraft,’ he said. It was a mistake to think the Ministry drew up the plans. As for production, Lord Beaverbrook relied on “plenty of drive and swift decision.” Lord Trenchard took the view that the Fleet Air Arm had been let down, and said the failure to provide the right type of aircraft was the Admiralty’s responsibility. He alleged that the object of Mr A. V. Alexander’s recent speech was to throw the blame either on the Air Ministry or on the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General, better known as Professor Lindemann, Mr Churchill’s special scientific adviser, replied for the Government. He said that machines ordered in 1939 were only just coming through. Aeroplane design was more of an art than a science. Lord Beaverbrook, interrupting: No. That is not the case at all. Lord Cherwell was continuing, but Lord Beaverbrook continued to call out “No!” and several peers shouted, “Order! Order!” “Order yourself!” Lord Beaverbrook retorted. “You keep order” Lord Cherwell denied that the priority of the Fleet Air Arm had ever been in question, and pleaded that the Government was anxious to give the navy as many of the best machines as possible. On this indeterminate note a disturbing debate ended.