URGED TO REFLECT

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 59, Issue 275, 2 September 1939, Page 6

URGED TO REFLECT

LETTER SENT TO HITLER. CONFLICT WOULD BE CALAMITY. BRITAIN RESOLVED TO ACT. (United Press Association—Copyright.) (Received This Day, 12.45 p.m.) LONDON, September 1. ; Communications recently exchanged between the British and German Gov- , ernments are published ns a White 3 Paper. 1 The correspondence begins with a - letter addressed by the Prime Minister 3 on behalf of the British Government 1 to Herr Hitler on August 22. He Open--1 ed with a reference to the precaution- > ai ; y measures which Britain had started * to take, and said: “These steps, in the opinion of the British Government, | have been rendered necessary by military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of the German-Soviet agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate the intervention by Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. “No greater mistake could be made; Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Britain’s obligation to Poland, which the British Government hat stated ‘ in public, repeatedly and plain ly, and which it is determined to fulfil. ’ ” Emphasising the British Government’s intention that there should be no possibility of a misunderstanding ol its attitude, as it had sometimes been alleged there had been in 1914, -Mr Chamberlain made a striking affirmation, which he cited in the House of Commons on August 24, that if the case should arise, it “is resolved and prepared to employ, without delay, all the forces at its command,” adding, “and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once they are engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that if war once starts it will come to an early end, even if success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.” The letter then proceeds as follows, to its end: “Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur.

Desired by None. “I am certain it is desired neither by my own people nor yours, and ] cannot see there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not, and should not,' be resolved without the use ol force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to bo carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails today. We have been, and at all times will bo ready, to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently! to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you. Difficulties in the way of any peaceful!

discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer the tension is maintained the harder will it be for reason to prevail. “The difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not removed, provided there could, for fyi initial period, he a truce, on both sides, and indeed, on all sides, to press polemics and to all incitement. If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps could bo takein to examine and deal with complaints made by either side, as to treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them —with, the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that would he helpful. “But I. am bound to say that there would be a slender hope of bringing such negotiations to a successful issue unless it were understood before hand that any settlement reached 1 would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers.

“The British Government would be ready, if desired, to make such contribution as they could to the effective operation of such' guarantee.. “At this moment I confess I. can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe! in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity which may follow 7 from tire action of their Rulers,.l your excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation, the considerations I have put before you.”—British. Official Wireless. Threat Made by Hitler. •In reply, Herr Hitler made a long communication, dated August 23, and supplemented it with verbal observations to Sir Nevile Henderson on Aug2, which are recorded in the White Paper. The tenor of these communications was to stress the. desirability of improving Anglo-German, relations amd, regarding relations with Poland, to insist on the German claims, while pretending that it urns the AngloFrench guarantee’ to Poland which was preventing the latter power from gotihting on the German terms, which were represented as the height of magnanimity. With refer oil re. to the precautionary measures taken in Britain, and France, Herr Hitler intimated at this stage that “in the event of these military movements being carried into effect, I shall order the immediate mobilisation of the German forces.” Maintaining that Polish provocations had become intolerable, Hitler announced his determination. “to abolish these Macedonian conditions.” He was, however, prepayed and determined, after the solution of this problem, to approach England once more with a large comprehensive offer.

The record of the interview with Sir Nevile Henderson, in the form of a Gorman, “verbal communication,” continues: “He- is a man of great decisions and in this case, also, lie would lie capable of being great in his action. He accepts the British Empire and is

ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the. German Reich at its disposal if —” There followed the conditions, including limited colonial demands and leading up to a suggestion for a limitation of arms. He recurred twice to the point “that war between England and! Germany could at best bring some profit to Germany, but none at all to Poland.” The reply of tlie British Government sent on August 28, is the key document in. the series. It was, before delivery, communicated to both the French and Polish Governments. After reaffirming their desire for. an Anglo-German understanding, the British Government pointed out in this communication that Hitler’s message had dealt with two groups of questions —those in dispute between Germany and Poland, and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Britain.