Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1936. BRITAIN AND EGYPT.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 244, 28 July 1936, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1936. BRITAIN AND EGYPT.

The signing of the military clauses of the treaty between Britain and Egypt is of supreme importance to certain outlying portions of the Empire, including Australia and New Zealand. This importance lies in the fact that they concern a vital link in the chain of communications between the heart of the Empire and these lands in the South Seas. In the present disturbed state of the world the cardinal value of this link cannot with safety be forgotten. When British interests first declared a policy of influence in the control of Suez, there was chiefly thought of India and the Far East. That aspect remains as crucial as ever, but developments in the Pacific have added greatly to the value of this link. For many years negotiations for a treaty with Egypt have engaged the attention of British Governments. In 1922, after prolonged consideration, a long step was taken toward the granting of self-government. Egypt was conditionally declared independent; the protectorate was formally terminated, and Egypt became a constitutional monarchy, with a parliamentary system. So far a change in relations was irrevocably made. Hence the use of the term “treaty” in all further mutual discussion of the bond. But the conditions then attached to the undertaking were far from nominal, and the wisdom of imposing them has been amply demonstrated. Certain matters were reserved as in the discretion of the British Government. They were (1) the security in Egypt of the communications of the British Empire, (2) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect, (3) the protection of foreign residents in Egypt and of minorities there, and (4) the administration of the Sudan. The basis of the military clauses just signed is reported to be the transfer of British troops from Cairo to v the outlying desert near Ismalia and the gradual reduction of the army in Egypt, though not until the Egyptian forces are strengthened. There will be some criticism of the proposal to move the British garrison, on the ground, chiefly, that for the internal control of the country it is necessary that it should be in the cities, where the danger of disturbance lies. But it would appear that by undertaking the construction of strategic roads the Egyptian Government has conceded a point that will offset the disadvantages. The strengthening of the Royal Air Force will also be a compensating factor. The internal state of Egypt is an important factor in the measure of security of the Canal, but any weakening of control brought about by the withdrawal of British troops will be counterbalanced by the establishment of a naval base at Alexandria, practically at the entrance to the canal. On the face of it, the new treaty appears to have the effect of conceding the more insistent of the demands made by Egypt while giving Britain a naval strength that compensates for any relaxing of her military status. There is the further important aspect that while there is a limit beyond which, in the interests of the Empire* Britain cannot go, it is better to have a contented people than a nation awaiting only an embarrassing moment to press extravagant claims.