DRAMATIC DEBATE

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 56, Issue 60, 21 December 1935, Page 5

DRAMATIC DEBATE

COMMONS’ DECISION. SUPPORT OF FULL LEAGUE PLAN MR BALDWIN'S CONFESSION. AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT.

FRANK ACCEPTANCE OF BLAME

(United Press Association —Copyright) LONDON, December 19. ‘ In the House of Commons the Leader of the Opposition (Major C. R. Attlee) moved the Labour motion on the Paris proposals. He contended that the 1 01eign Secretary should not bo made a scapegoat for an action for which the Government had taken collective responsibility, and he asked where the Government as a whole stood. The Prime Minister (Mr Stanley Baldwin) followed. He said that so far as he was concerned, the Government stood where it always had stood. Mr Baldwin continued: “As to the Paris proposals themselves*, the Government is perfectly content to leave them entirely to the decision of the League.” For the rest the Government had played its part in setting the formidable machinery of the League to work. It had made preparations to fulfil in the letter and the spirit, whatever might be demanded of it under the Covenant in all and every circum“We have not been behindhand, and at this moment we are prepared collectively to fulfil our part in every way,” he declared. Mr Baldwin quoted from the Government’s election manifesto the statement that the League would remain the keystone of British foreign policy, and similar passages from his own SP Tho loss of Sir Samuel Hoare at the present time was a grave loss to the Government. It was perfectly o \ious now that the proposals were absolutely and completely dead, and the Government ivould not make any attempt to resurrect them. It stood ivheie 1 had always stood. Its policy was based on the League, but if hyadherenceto the League Britain found herself standinn- alone to do what ought to be done everybody, the country would say, “This is the last time we will allor a government to commit us to collecHe drfeaded the, refiction if the country had to take part m a unilateral war, even for a short while, before others could join.. The " ° * have to consider these things at the end of the Abyssinian war _ ■ Reverting to Sir Samuel Hoare siresignation, Mr Baldwin said: chief responsibility is mine. 1 demd I must support an absent collea o t • Whether that was wise or otherwise is another matter.” Not Sparing Himself. At the beginning of his speech, Mi Baldwin promised to describe Ins own part in the affair with perfect frankness—“no easy matter for a man when he does not feel complete satisfaction with it.”' . He not only kept his promise, but treated himself without mercy, deferring to his decision to support Sir Samuel Hoare in spite of dissatisfaction with the peace plan, lie said, i can quite see, looking back, -that i should have fetched Sir Samuel Hoaio back from Switzerland. You may say it was an act of weakness not to do so. It certain was an error of judgment. I think there is a lesson to be drawn. Largely owing to the League, the practice has grown up since the War for Ministers to have a discussion on the Continent and sometimes reach conclusions when there is a rea difficulty in maintaining that liaison which should be maintained with the Cabinet. Before this method became common we relied upon what is called diplomatic procedure. Tins resulted m a far more careful examination of details from the beginning of negotiations than has often been possible under the new system. Speed is often a matter of great danger, and it is quite conceivable in some similar situation that so font* as this practice of telegraphing from one capital to another, with the exception- of a reply the same night, exists, there may be some irremediable disaster. “I am determined that such a position shall be impossible again. The maintenance of liaison, even if that entails delays, is essential.” Dealing with the resentment the plan hacf evoked, he said that having himself felt that the proposals went too far, he was not surprised at the expressions of feeling. “Nevertheless, he said “I was not expecting that deeper feeling manifested by many ol my friends and in many parts ol the country on what I call the ground of conscience and honour. At the moment I am confronted with that. I know something has happened that has atfected the deepest feelings of our countrymen and that some note has been struck that brings back from them a response from the depths. If a storm arises when I know I am right I will let it break on me, and I will eithe. survive it or I will break. If I feel, after examination of myseli, that m that storm is something to show me I have done something that is not right, then I will bow to it.” Sir Austen Chamberlain said lie thought there was an admission by the Prime Minister that the Paris proposals were such as ought not to have been put forward by Britain. In saying that, he did not accept the idea that to negotiate for a settlement implied disloyalty to the League.' If peace could bo secured earlier by negotiation it was not merely permissible under the Covenant, it was their duty to pursue

negotiations. Ho believed that- in the present case a much heavier burden had been put upon Britain than was compatible with the successful working of collective security. lie regretted it, because it had given colour to the pernicious allegation in the Italian press that there was an issue between Great Britain and Italy. Britain was prepared to play its part as one of the instruments, but it must not be expected to take so prominent and so solitary a part as to make it appear that this was really its quarrel when in fact it was only discharging its covenanted obligation. The Prime Minister had given a pledge that the Government would go full lengths and take a full share in an effective system of collective security when others were prepared to take theit- proportionate part, and thus make not only judgments collective, but their execution equally so. Britain alone of the great Powers, with danger approaching, had taken any steps to meet it. That was not collective. Perhaps it might be well for the League in the end that the blunder which had been made had led to a question like that being clearly stated, and the limits of British action being clearly laid down. “All with all; nothing by ourselves,” said Sir Austen. “These are, I believe, true League lines. If others will be as faithful to these principles and work upon them as much as we have, the League will emerge strengthened, and aggression will he made more difficult for the future,”

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Conservative) said that when Major Attlee had pointed at Mr Baldwin and said, “It'is your honour that is at stake,” he had made it certain that not a ■ single supporter of the Government would abstain from, voting. “ Whatever the differences among us,” said Sir Austen, “this is a challenge every Nationalist will resist.” (Loud cheers.) Earl Winterton (Conservative), moving the amendment, said that public opinion in six months had driven two Foreign Secretaries from office. That showed the strength, but not necessarily the wisdom, of democracy. British people got themselves into an atmosphere of false perspective. Japan was moving in North China, Germany was rearming, Russia was perfecting her armaments, and the Balkan States made no secret that the moment thei c was war anywhere they would he over one another’s frontiers. Many people treated that situation with unbelievable levity. He challenged anybody in the House,to say he was piepared to advocate action . leading to military resistance of Italy. Sir Stafford. Cripps /(Labour) said that Earl Winterton wanted to be able to bark at Signor Mussolini, not fight him. Mr Baldwin’s reputation for blunt honesty had been completely shattered. He could not extricate himself by throwing Sir Samuel Hoare to the wolves. British foreign policy was imperialistic. The peace plan was imperialistic. There had never Leforo been such an episode of double-dealing and deceit in British foreign policy.. League Attacked. Mr James Maxton (Independent Labour Party) said- the, League was a fraud and an imposture. The only way to safety for- the working people was to overthrow the capitalist exploiters in their wn lands. Colonel W. G. Nicholson (Con.) said he did not think the proposals were terribly unreasonable, but the procedure'had given the impression that the Government was going behind the League in order to present it with an accomplished fact. ■, . Colonel J. C. Wedgwood (Labour) said any doubt about Britain keeping Alexandria was not due to fleets, but to the new air forces. Dr. Hugh Dalton, winding up tor the Opposition, said Italy had been left out in the distribution of war spoils, and would have a case in equity if it had kept peace, hut equity could not be claimed, when Mussolini was coming to court with his hands dripping with a mixture of Abyssinian blood and British oil. . Opposition cheers and Ministerial cries of “No.” , . . ■ Mr Neville Chamberlain, winding up for the Government, said: “We are asked why we tolerate the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare, and do not resign ourselves. Sir Samuel Hoare has given the answer when he said he lelt he could no longer exert influence and authority in the councils of the world. “It is unfair to suggest that the Government is trying to shelter behind him. The Premier has not attempted to deny that his-and our decision was a mistake. For myself, I cannot say that in similar circumstances I would not again commit that mistake.” Defence of Mr Baldwin. Mr Chamberlain, referring to the suggestion that Mr Baldwin gave an inaccurate account of the Paris talks, warmly replied: “It is no use any member of the Opposition trying to convince either the House or the country that the Premier deliberately attempted to deceive them. (Loud cheers.) The Cabinet naturally know of the experts’ discussions, but did not know the actual terms of the proposals until Monday. We could not have rejected the terms without the world knowing that we had thrown ever the Foreign Secretary.” • 5 Mr Chamberlain: “We did not ask all the Powers which are League members for support, but. from France and those we did ask we bad the most complete and n l st loyal assurance that they would come to o-ur aid if Italy attacked us in the Mediterranean, where lies the danger, if there is any, in oil sanctions. If the League decides in favour of the oil embargo, and we are satisfied that all the League members who matter are prepared to partake in meeting an attack which may be sudden and unexpected, then we are prepared to play our part and agree to the imposition of that embargo.” Mr Chamberlain concluded by recalling that Mr Attlee had said Britain would not get peace by running away. The corollary to that was that she must be ready to fight. (Loud Ministerial cheers.) . “Then where will Mr Attlee and his friends stand when we come to them?” asked Mr Chamberlain. “Now we ask the authority of the House to repair the gaps in our defences. (Cheers.) We can see where they stand. One says oil sanctions at whatever cost, and another says it is the Tories who want war, hut all join in saying no armaments.” (Cheers.) The division was then taken. The Labour motion of censure was defeated by 897 votes to 165, and Lord

Wintertcn’s amendment, as the motion, was carried bv 390 votes to 165.

The amendment was: “This House, bolding th.yt any terms for settling the Italo-Abyssinian dispute should be such as the League can accept, assures his Majesty’s Government of its full support in pursuing the foreign policy •outlined in the Government manifesto, and endorsed by the country at the general election.”