Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1935. THE SINGAPORE BASE.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 55, Issue 136, 21 March 1935, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1935. THE SINGAPORE BASE.

The statement in the House of Commons that the total expenditure on the Singapore Base wiil be almost fifteen millions sterling recalls the attack oh the undertaking made a fewweeks ago by Mr Ward Price, who condemned the base as a white elephant, impotent to parry a thrust from the north-east against Australia and, inferentially, New Zealand. Instead he recommended that reliance for defence be placed upon an air force "capable of destroying hostile warships and transports five hundred miles from the coast." He asserted that such an air force could be provided for a fraction of the cost of Singapore, the latter (according to Mr Price) being about ten millions sterling. New Zealand, as a substantial contributor to Singapore, should be interested in such a contention, if it can be cogently upheld. But what size of air force would Australia and New Zealand require to defend their long coastlines, and those of their island dependencies, at five hundred miles' distance without peradventure of mistake; and what would it cost, with personnel, aircraft and ground organisation? Certainly a grea 1 deal more than a fraction of ten millions sterling. Presumably, also, with Singapore abandoned, the aircraft would be the Dominions' first and perhaps chief line of defence. A hostile naval force would be permitted to traverse thousands of miles of sea without let or hindrance, with no threat from front, flank or rear, until it came within range of the Dominions' all-destroying air forces. Air forces might conceivably deter an enemy from coastal landings. They could not, however, protect the trade routes upon which the economic life of the Dominions depends. "The sea is our life." Neither could they, while based for the defence of the Dominions themselves, prevent an enemy from capturing in detail such island possessions as New Guinea, Samoa and Fiji. These are British outposts at present but, with sea power abdicated, might become enemy outposts. Similarly, air forces in Australia and New Zealand would be no protection for, say, the oil deposits of Borneo and Sumatra, the riches of the Dutch East Indies, or the greater wealth of India. Singapore lies on the flank of any advance from the North to the' South Pacific. A possible enemy would have his communications strung across thousands of miles of ocean, passing through the world's greatest archipelago, and would be always vulnerable from light, mobile naval forces —to rule out the capital ships—so long as they had a base from which to operate. Thus any such distant campaign would become impossible, or at least so hazardous as to deter any nation except it could subdue Singapore. If that were a feasible operation conducted, as it would have to be, thousands of miles from an enemy base, it would take time, advertise the enemy's intention, and offer the chancel of organising formidable defence. Singapore is essential to British naval defence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. When air force can reliably be substituted lor and discharge the functions ot the Navy, it will be time to consider abandoning Singapore as a naval base, but not before.