Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. SATURDAY, JUNE 11, 1932. BRITAIN'S NAVAL POLICY.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 52, Issue 205, 11 June 1932, Page 4

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. SATURDAY, JUNE 11, 1932. BRITAIN'S NAVAL POLICY.

According to Earl Beatty there is no reason why the Singapore naval base should not be proceeded with when world conditions improve. He pointed out that of the total estimated cost at eleven millions sterling over half has already been expended. This pronouncement will be received with satisfaction in New Zealand, which by deciding, notwithstanding the severe financial strain, to continue its contributions toward the cost of the base has emphasised its recognition of the fact that Singapore is one of the most important outposts of the Empire. This Dominion does not regard the base as in any sense a menace or challenge to any other Power, but purely as a justifiable, necessary provision not only for the protection of Britain's trade, but also for the security of her important possessions in the Eastern Pacific. This question of naval strength must be considered in relation to the movement for reduction -A armaments.. The Imperial Conference of 1926 gave much attention to possible methods by which the defence arrangements of the several parts of the Empire could be most effectively co-ordinated, and the naval aspect Oi the matter was naturally of chief interest. Resolutions then passed put on record the common desire of the represented Governments to do their utmost to facilitate general disarmament, "so far as this is consistent with the safety and integrity of all parts of the Empire and its communications." In particular, there was emphasised by the representatives of 'Australia; New Zealand and India the vital necessity of developing the Singapore base, in order to serve the free movements of the Navy in protecting the worldwide trade routes upon whicn the safety and welfare of all parts ot the Empire depend. There has been since then a disappointing experience. The British Government's international "gestures" of disarmament have not been met with corresponding reductions by other naval Powers. ;' Especially in cruisers, of peculiar importance to the outlying portions of the Empire —and destined apparently to become the capital ship of the future -4here has continued a f disquieting reduction of British strength. The Board of Admiralty in 1923 recommended construction of eight cruisers a-year; the Labour Ministry of 1924 began actual construction at the rate of five cruisers a year; by 1925, in accordance with a programme, ot economy, this rate of construction was brought down to three a year; and in 1927, the year after the resolutions just mentioned, this was reduced to one cruiser a year, Even that unduly modest rate has since been slackened: in 1928, two cruisers were ordered but their construction was stopped in 1929,: and at the beginning of 1930 the total cruiser strength was below that fixed for 1925. The scrapping of obsolete vessels, it be noted, accounts for some halfdozen a year. The London Treaty did not improve the position so far as the Empire was concerned. Thus there is need for facilities by which the effectiveness of a smaller number of units may be maintained at the maximum. Such a facility is that projected in regard to Singapore.