SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 48, Issue 86, 21 January 1928, Page 5

SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE

BRITAIN'S VIEWPOINT. LOCAL GUARANTEES. BEFORE UNIVERSAL SCHEME. (Per Press Association—Copyright.) LONDON, aJnuary 20. The British memorandum; to the League of Nations dealing with arbitration treaties says that the lines along which progress seems possible towards a universal acceptance of unrestricted obligations to arbitration in justifiable disputes, even by States which cannot now accept .such obligations, are, firstly, by the inclusion in particular treaties of an undertaking to arbitrate in disputes arising out of their interpretations; and, secondly, by widening the scope of the agreements' deal'-, ing with justifiable disputes generally and pledging the parties in adavnce to submit such disputes to arbitration. In numerous cases Britain has already applied this procedure. The document says:—"lt may well be that the formula as to the vital interests of their States, which was first adopted in arbitration treaties a quarter of a cemtury ago, requires re-ex-amination. Whatever changes may be recommended, however, it is clear that some limitations in the scope of a treaty of this kind are essential. Disputes, legal in their nature, may arise between two States with regard to matters failing exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of one of them. No State can agree to submission to an international tribunal of matters falling exclusively within the range of its national sovereignty." The view is expressed that the method of signing a general undertaking, even when coupled with the power to make exceptions as to the categories of the disputes to be arbitrated, lacks the flexibility which the measure of obligation to be varied in the case of the particular State towards Which the obligation is being accepted. More progress is likely to- be achieved through bilateral agreements . than through general treaties. Non-justifiable disputes, says the document, are less suitable for submission to a tribunal with power to give a binding decision, and the procedure of conciliation, as provided under the League Covenant, is in such cases alone possible at Regarding security agreements, it is recalled that the Locarno Treaty was designed to meet a specific danger in a specific area and imposes on all the parties concerned an equal obligation to preserve its integrity and to execute the decisions of the Council. It is in this way far more efficacious than could be any more general system of guarantees under which the obligation would be spread oyer a much larger number of States, each of which would be included, quite naturally, to regard its individual obligation as being pro tanto reduced. The British Government is of the opinion that the Locarno Treaty, > by virtue of the extent to which it is devised to meet a specific danger and .by its character and ' clarity of definition, * constitutes the ideal type of securing agreement, yet 'notwithstanding the hope expressed by the League Assembly that the principles embodied in the treaties of Locarno "will be put into practice as soon as possible by all the States in "whose interests it is to contract such treaties," no further treaties on this model have been regis-; tered with the League. In the same connection the- League Council also placed in its offices at the disposal of all the States desirous of "concluding suitable agreements likely to establish confidence and security," but none have yet accepted the offer.

The British Government looks forward to a gradual growth of this system, convinced, as it is, that the easiest way of attaining a universal sense of security is for each State to provide the necessary guarantees in that quarter where its main interests, and consequently its principal danger, lie. If the system is gradually extended until it includes every State which feels that its security is not already amply safeguarded, there will eventually be woven a network of guarantees against a rupture of peace in any part of the world. Such local guarantees, directed to a specific danger and based on well-de-fined obligations, are infinitely more satisfactory than any comprehensive or universal scKenie, which must necessarily be drawn in vaguer and more rreneral terms, and of which, consequently, the modus operandi and probable, efficacy must remain to some extent a matter of speculation. If the States which, owing to any doubt or suspicion, hesitate to open negotiations were mutually to agree to place themselves in the hands of the League Council and to conduct their conversations under its auspices, the conclusion 'of further agreements on the lines recommended would be greatly facilitated.