SOVIET INTRIGUE

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XLVII, Issue 10927, 27 May 1927, Page 5

SOVIET INTRIGUE

ADDRESSES GIVEN.

THREE HEW ZEALANDERS.

WORLD-WIDE CORRESPONDENCE. (Received This Day, 9.45 a.m.) LONDON, May 26. A White Paper gives the following addresses found in possession of Muller, mentioned in the House of Commons on Tuesday:— It. Donford, 519 King Street, Newi'i town, Sydney. I 0. Lane, Gowanbrae, Bunnerong Road, South Kensington, .Sydney. (Lane is marked “secret.”) G. G. Kilpatrick, general secretary of the New Zealand Communist : Party, 204 Vivian Street, Wellington. ' J. Basham, 164 Hobson Street, Auckland. K. Baxter, 81 Harrow Street, Dunedin. There is also a group of secretaries and officials of the i Australian Communist Party. . „ The White Paper fully gives the lb documents summarised in Mr Baldwin s speech on Tuesday, also a list of addresses throughout the world, including a press cutting giving 13 names or the Australian group secretaries, mostly in New South Wales, also the workers’ weekly newspaper, T.he Communist.” A separate panel is given to Jack Garden. ! , , Many South Americana are marked ■“illegal addresses.” The documents include a telegram dated May 18, after the Arcos premises were raided, from M. Rosengoltz to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at Moscow: “Among the number of Tumours of the nature of the missing documents there is the supposition that it relates to the aerial bombardment you publish as a rumour the statement that it refers to the aerial bombardment of a certain European capital.

* A SOVIET REPLY. NO EVIDENCE OF ESPIONAGE. LONDON, May 25. M. Rosengoltz (Russian Charge d’Affaires), in a statement on behalf of the Soviet, declares. that Britain’s decision to sever relations with the Soviet “ concerns the whole world, therefore we cannot but express amazement and deep regret that such an important decision should be rejich«d on such a flimsy pretence, and that snch doubtful arguments should be used to justify the action.” Two definite conclusions are to be drawn from Mr Baldwin’s statement: First, that not a particle of evidence that the mysterious document allegedly lost ever found its way into the Soviet House, or was handled by any employee of the Trade ’Delegation. Secondly, there was not a particle of evidence that the Delegation, Arcos, or the employees were engaged in military espionage, or similar work. Whatever Mr Baldwin said thereon was nothing but unfounded allegation. “Mr Baldwin’s reference to the sub- > terranean room,” says M. Rosengoltz, quite accords with cinematographic requirements, but the room in itself had. no criminal intentions. Such arrangements mow exist in most large commercial undertakings, where they were utilised for commercial purposes, such as Arcos. Likewise, the story of Muller burning paper belongs to the same category. The sensational declarations were intended to strike public imagination. There was nothing mysterious or criminal in Muller’s action, because according to a well-established practice, by the cipher department, it was merely burning copies of deciphered telegrams. On this occasion he was burning Khinchuk’s cipher prior to admitting the police. “No paper fell from Muller’s pocket. What Mr Baldwin described as a struggle was really an attack by four or five police on Muller, who, questioned by us. denies that he possessed a list of secret addresses. Evidently Mr Baldwin, in this respect, was mis- ' led by the inventor of stories, or mistook a list of branches of the Soviet ’• Trade Delegation for secret addresses. Such a list was in the room, but was neither illegal nor criminal. ■ “Mr Baldwin’s description of Jilmsky was evidently derived frSin the , information of employees discharged ■ from Arcos, who gave it to the police because Jilinsky, as manager of the staff, was connected with their dismissals, which probably accounts for the mysterious and lying denunciations concerning him. Those dismissed l included one Dangston, recently in charge of the photographic apparatus. Mr Baldwin abstained, for obvious reasons, from quoting a sentence from Jilinsky’s recommendation of Koling, in which he stated that Koling. in 1926, was dismissed from the Blyth branch of the British Communist Party owing to Soviet citizenship. The Trade Delegation had no knowledge of a letter describing the training of Communist agitators on ships belonging to Arcos. “The circumstances of the search render it impossible to determine whether the letter was taken from Koling’s pockets or whether the police took possession of it on some other occasion. Anyway, such documents are the private affair of Koling, over which the delegation has no control. 1 Possibly Koling acted contrary to the Soviet’s strict rule that employees shall not engage in political activities, hut the 1 trage agreement contains no clause making the Delegation responsible for the contents of employees’ pockets.” Rosengoltz denied that he himself or anyone of the staff of the Embassy received or sent such telegrams as Mr Baldwin quoted. He added: “The British Government, abrogating to itself the role of prosecutor, judge, and jury, demonstrates to the world the weakness of its case and its unwillingness to place the dispute with the Soviet before an impartial judgment of world and public opinion.”

LITVINOFF ATTACKS BRITAIN.

MOSCOW, May 25

“The British decision was no casual. •"nexpected event in connection with the raid on Arcos.” says M. Litvinoff. “hut the logical and final issue of. Le-vanti-fioviet policv. The Conservatives, since they pained power, have forged documents with a programme of ruth-

lesd struggle against British workers and the enslavement of China, India., and Egypt. The Government could not become reconciled to the existence of a Workers’ and Peasants’ Government sympathising with the proletariat class and with the struggle of oppressed peoples. The British Government is seeking at all costs to bring down the Soviet. It only delayed a rupture, hoping to find that the Allies would jointly attack the Soviet. When the hope failed to materialise, the Government made an attaiak alone, trusting that it would be a signal for action by other States.”

LABOUR’S PROTEST

CLYNES’ STATEMENT OF CASE. FOREIGN SECRETARY IN REPLY. (A.P.A. and “Sun” Cables). (Received This Day, 10.30 a.m.) LONDON, May 26. In the House of Commons, Mr Baldwin, in answer to a question, said the Government was in possession of a long list of Soviet trading organisations in Britain, but no useful purpose would be served by publishing it. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs . (Sir William Joynson-Hicks) was considering which of these should be allowed to remain after abrogation of the True Agreement. The British representatives in Leningrad and Vladivostok would he withdrawal simultaneously with the British mission to Moscow. The Government would not allow a free vote on the Russian debate. Miss Wilkinson (Labour) inquired whether other Powers than Russia were known to have secret services in Britain. Sir Austen Chamberlain (Foreign Secretary) said he must, decline Hr answer, as it would not be in the public interest to give such information. Mr J. R. Clynes (Labour) in moving the resolution condemning the Ministry’s precipitancy and demanding .a judicial inquiry before the rupture, said that Sir Austen Chamberlain’s last address on foreign relations pointed out that the severance of relations with Russia would be harmful not only to our internal interests but to the future peace of Europe. Earl Balfour in the House of Lords had committed the Government to the same views. The Opposition therefore was entitled to ask how these would be affected by reversal of the policy. He understood that the Government view was that Russia was in the dock. Labour accepted that position, but demanded that Russia should not be condemned without trial. Therefore it suggested that there should be adequate inquiry. Mr Clynes declared: “The truth will not be found by means of wall and safe breaking implements which were .used to a futile end in the Arcos building.” Mr Clynes continued that the Labour Party long repudiated Communist purpovses and methods and had not partisan motives in its present course. “We do not excuse wrong doing but demand, on part of both Governments, that the pledges binding them be honourhbly served,” he said. The motion was submitted because Labour was honestly convinced that the allegations should be tested and the truth revealed. The Government’s methods were the closest imitation of those of the Communists. They were giving the Communists the finest wo rid advertisement,! which strengethened Communist propaganda. Referring to the effect of the decision upon trade, Mr Clynes said the Midland Bank had almost completed arrangements to lend Russia £10,000,000 to be spent in Britain on electrical equipment, mining machinery and machines and tools. Our industrial position was such that we could not afford to drive back potential customers and remove further away the immense market of 100,000,000 people. The new policy was the firdt fruits of the long campaigning begun in 1917. It was complained that Russia interfered with our affairs. We had first interfered with Russia, with an invading army.

Government’s Action Defended. Sir Austen Chamberlain replied immediately. He sand that Mr Clynes had found it necessary to walk gently but had committed himself to condemnation of the Government’s policy without an idea of the grounds on which action had been taken. Trade did not depend on trade agreement or diplomatic represenation. America traded freely, yet hgd not recognised the Soviet, and did not admit as Trade Delegation. The Government was not prepared to accept a select committee. He asked the House for a clear expression of confidence. He deemed it unnecessary and undesirable to produce further information than was contained in the White Paper, but plenty of other evidence of the (Soviet activities was offering. The Zinovieff letter was not the only or the last document. The Trade Agreement had been systematically and continually broken and the privilege abused. The Soviet House was the seat of political propaganda and anti-British action. Chesham House similarly had also abused its diplomatic privileges. These activities were proceeding under the orders of a Government which was pursuing a hostile policy while professing friendly relations throughout the world. The Government could no longer take, the responsibility for maintaining diplomatic relations so conducted and so abused. They were not the instrument of peace but a fresh continual source of irritation and danger. If the Government had considered only its own interests it should have acted long ago. For two and a-half year’si it had pleaded for peace between the two countries and urged the Soviet to mend its way. Further patience would be weakness.

Mr Lloyd George’s Criticism. Mr Lloyd George said he was afraid that the Cabinet had not fully considered whether there was sufficient, evidence to justify a bre#k, and whether a breach was desirable at this stage. He frankly admitted that the Soviet had not kept faith, but personally he favoured making suitable allowance for the difficulties of a revolutionary Government. His own view was that the Soviet had clumsily attempted to reconcile a genuine desire for all the advantages of peace with the greatest Emnire of the world, with an equally genuine desire to witness its overthrow. Whatever his own view of the Government’s action t he would not vote for any resolution which did not express unmistakable reprobation of the. continual breaches of the Anglo-Bussjan agreement. He was afraid the raid on the Arcos premises had forced the hands of the Government and of Sir Austen Chamberlain. Sir Austen certainly had not

spoken with the same fervour to-day as when he was defending the policy of Locarno. He did not believe Sir Austen Chamberlain had decided upon a rupture before Sir William JoynsonHicks acted. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s hands had clearly been forced by his hot-headed colleague, Sir William Joynson-Hicks. It was unfortunate that the most important diplomatic act since the war should have been dictated from the Home Office. He admitted; that the Government was bound to take some action, but it need not have gone to the extreme limit. It might, as a protest against the breaches of the agreement, have, withdrawn the Trade Delegation’s special privileges, deported the officials guilty of breaches, and prosecuted those Siilty of espionage. All ,these steps ould have been, taken "before the gravest step short of war in rupturing relations with a (Power of the population of 100,000,000. It was one of the most hazardous decisions any Government had ever taken.

CANADA DECIDES ON BREAK. OTTAWA, May 25. Cabinet had decided that Canada shall terminate the trade agreement with Russia immediately. In the course of a speech, the Prime Minister (Mr Mackenzie King) declared that Mr Baldwin’s statement in the House of Commons left no doubt that propaganda against the institutions of the Empire, and contrary to the agreement between Russia and Canada, had been conducted “at the instance, aind with the full knowledge of the Soviet Government.”

Mr King emphasised that the termination of relations! did not mean a discontinuance of trade. The evidence he possessed did not disclose espionage or subversive propaganda involving the headquarters, of the Russian Trade Commission in Canada.

CANCELLATION OF ORDERS.

4000 CANADIAN HORSES.

/Received This Day, 10.5 a\.m.) OTTAWA, May 26

M. L. F. Geras (Russia’s representative here) declares that Russia’s purchase of 4000 Canadian horses will be cancelled in consequence of the cancellation of the Trade Agreement. This announcement followed a conference between M. Geras and the Prime Minister. Three dollars worth of Russian purchases here from October 1 will be completed and paid for. M. Geras intimated that Russia thereafter would buy from Germany.

NO EVIDENCE OF ESPIONAGE.

GUILTY OF PROPAGANDA. This Day, 9.45' a.m.) OTTAWA,/ May 26. The names of Canadians mentioned in the White Paper issued in London in connection with the Soviet raid are those of prominent members of the Communist Party in Canada. It is not known whether the authorities will move to deport them. Mr Mackenzie King declares that Canada decided on her own initiative to cancel the Soviet Trade Agreement. There is no evidence of espionage in Canada, but Cabinet is satisfied that the Russian Trade Delegation was guilty of propaganda against the Empire. This violates the Canada-Soviet P3 Mr Mackenzie King emphasised that Canada, while breaking off the Trade Agreement, wais continuing trade relations. “We will simply be m the position as before the agreement was concluded in 1921,” he daid. , ... , A Toronto message says that the addresses of Canadians discovered in London are those of Maurice Spicier (chairman) and Miss Skene (active official) of the Communist headquarters here.

COMMUNIST DENIAL. NO PROPAGANDIST WORK. PURELY ECONOMIC RELATIONS. AUCKLAND, This Day. Mr Myer Robinson (Auckland Secretary of the World Communists) says: “All uor contact with Arcos, Ltd., was simply as subscribers to the Trade Journal. We never had anything but trade and economic information. The addresses cabled are apparently two years old. Baxter has been out of New Zealand about two years. Basham has been away from the address given over 18 months. It is ridiculous to suggest that any Communist in New Zealand is receiving money from Arcos, the Soviet or the Third International. That they were spies was simply ridiculous. Basham, who is a waterside worker, says he is simply a member of the Communist party, and holds no official position. He never had been in communication with Arcos or the Trade Delegation. Auckland Communists had no communications with them. They were only a working class political party, "basing tliei ractivities on the struggle of the classes. There was nothing secret and nothing sinister about their activities.

The Auckland police state there is nothing dangerous about these men. They are simply “limelighters” and agitators, and are

THE DUNEDIN ADDRESSEE. DEPORTED FROM DOMINION

DIJNEDIN, This Day.

Baxter mentioned in the London cablegram as Soviet agent, was deported after Police Court proceedings against him here for having in his possession Communistic literature. He was one of eight local members of the New Zealand Labour Party expelled in 1925.