NAVAL BUILDING.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XLVI, Issue 10456, 24 July 1925, Page 5

NAVAL BUILDING.

BRITAIN'S PROGRAMME. FOUR CRUISERS IN FEW MONTHS. THREE ANNUALLY THEREAFTER. (Per Press Association—Copyright.) (Renter.) (Received This Day, 12.25 p.m ) LONDON, July 23. The Prime Minister, Mr Baldwin in making his eageriyHexpected statement on naval construction in the House of Commons, announced that two cruisers would be begun tin October, two> in February, and three yearly thereafter. The Government had also depided on the annual construction of nine destroyers and six submarines, together with certain auxiliary vessels, beginning with the financial year 1926-27. This would be continued during the normal life of the present Parliament. Some of the three cruisers would be of 10,000'tons ! and the remainder smaller and less expensive, approximately of 8000 tons. The Admiralty would meet the additional expense, £527,170, from sayings under other heads. The Government would ask Parliament to make additional provision this year in respect of the commencement of the new programme only if satisfied of the impossibility of making these sayings, but it was not proposed to allow the increased '*expense to constitute an addition to the total of the Naval Estimates.

SEVERE STRUGGLE £NDEB.. CABINET CRISIS AVERTED. , LONDON, July 23. It is understood-that Cabinet, on the divergences on the naval construction programme, agreed to a compromise whereby three, and possibly iani:, cruisers, will be begun not earlier than December and three in 1926.

The Admiralty demanded three in 1925 and four in 1926. Mr Churchill, the Treasury, and a majority of Cabinet were unwilling to agree beyond two in 1925 and three in 1926. The Treasury agreed to a compromise conditionally on the Admiralty substantially reducing its administrative expenses, notably in regard to suggested reorganisation of dockyards. The most reliable accounts of the -momentous two-hour Cabinet meeting agree that the cruiser crisis was ended and resignations averted by a decision to lay down seven ships in two years. There.is some divergence as to whether four will be laid this year and three next, 'or .vice versa, but it is believed the former prpportion was adopted. The' settlement was unquestionably due to tlie severe struggle between Mr Bridgeman, representing the full weight of Admiralty opinion, and Mr Churchill, representing his < own Budget aims and the economists. It was generally agreed that one of >the factors of settlement was the .necessity of avoiding a Cabinet split in .the fact of the coal crisis.

The Risks of Delay. The Parliamentary correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" says the Admiralty's contention has been- that if economies are to be enforced they can be achieved with less risk than that attending the postponement of replacement of essential ships. The .deficiencies in either respect can be met in times of emergency by improvising, but it is impossible to improvise ships. The "Daily News" says thatthe Admiralty won partly through the .active aid and countenance extended them in sympathetic high quarters, and partly owing to the fact that Mr Bridgeman was prepared to resign if the .demands were refused whereas Mr Churchill was not prepared to resign if they were granted, partly because a minority in the Cabinet, who had been resisting the Admiralty, are not really economists. The result is that a'race in armaments, so far as the sea is concerned, is now to begin again. The "Daily Express" says that Mr Bridgeman, in the course of the negotiations, actually resigned, and refused to reconsider his resignation until he had carried his point. He believed that the money required will be obtained >by scrapping the dockyards at Pembroke, Chatham, and Gibraltar.

The "Daily Express" says that the Admiralty pointed out tha* of vessels built to steam 30 knots and over, Britain has six, the United States ten, and Japan sixteen. Moreover, of SI British cruisers of war, and pre-war "design, only two have the necessary speed and sea-going qualities to protect trade from attacks by cruisers of post-war design. The "Westminster Ga<zette" remarks that the Admiralty view means, bluntly, that cevery friendly Power is to be treated henceforth as ai potential enemy. This .applies, at all events, to the cruiser competition, which is said to stand outside the one-power standard supposed to have been accepted for other ships. The "Morning Post" observes that the Admiralty is satisfied, and Mr Bridgeman remains on the bridge. Like Jutland,, it has been a close shave.

The Attack on the Chancellor. The "Post'* editorial proceeds to return to the attack on Mr Churchill, and says that Mr Churchill, following Radical precedent, attempted—and failed—to exercise his scheme of economy on the Navy. He has done his best to create disunity in the Cabinet, to compel the resignation of Mr Bridgeman, and even to embarrass the Prime Minister. For what purpose Mr Churchill chose a course of action so extraordinary, the public may decide. Had he succeeded, the result must have been disastrous to the Government.