ASHMEAD BARTLETT.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XXXV, Issue 8305, 25 November 1915, Page 5

ASHMEAD BARTLETT.

CRITICISES CHURCHILL

THE ATTACK ON ADMIRAL

FISHER

(Received November 25, 8.15 a.m.)

LONDON, November 24

Mr Ashmead Bartlett publishes; in the " Times" a four-column analysis of Mr Winston Churchill's attack on Admiral Fisher and his statement regarding the naval operations, in the Dardanelles. He says the Admiralty commenced operations in the Dardanelles without reliable information. The essential facts arc that, .the Turkish' defences were merely trusted to the Queen Elizabeth's 15-iiicherß. The result of the operations to the ■forts' in March was to prove- that although reinforced earthworks could be smothered with, shell-fire and "the gunners driven; to. the bomb-proofs, ithe actual damage was not important uut less the direct hits. ; were -upon the guns. , Meanwhile the mine-sweepers made little or no progress, and it was impossible for the/ destroyers and trawlers to approach the minefields in the da.ylight owing to the fire of the forts and concealed batteries on the .coast. . ■„ ■/■■'''■ ••■■■■ ;

On the nights' of the 11 th, 12th, and 13th, there was a desperate experiment to allow the destroyers and trawlers to go above the minefields. They were swept down. with the cur-. rent and exposed to a terrific fire, but with little result. The enemy on tho 13th, actually allowed the destroyers and trawlers to get right into the centre of tho minefield before they turned on the searchlights. Then they opened up,such an awful fire that af general saiive gui petit ensued.

It was obvious .that the clearing of the minefield wns the first essential. No admiral: would take a fleet through three lines of mines under the fire of a hundred guns. Mr Churchill apparently succeeded in changing the opinion of the experts. Prudence was thrown overboard, and a decision was arrived" at to: rush the Dardanelles. Sir John ; Fisher, however, became sceptical of the whole enterprise, aiid directly he realised the inability of the fleet to clear the minefield and locate the other underwater defence, and its inability to knock out the mobile batteries on both sides of the Straits. These obstacles, however, reversed the effect,, but Mr Churchill nerved himself with greater determination to men affairs through, and this led to the attack on March 18.

The- public were led to .believe that this waa a deliberate attempt to force the Narrows and reach Constantinople. Thia was untrue, aa the fleet was only aiming at '^ilencing the forts on: the Narrows,' ut6^ enable thie destroyers and trawlers to sweep the minefield. It waa also untrue to say that but for the disastera-to the Bouvot, the Ocean, and the Irresistable the Straits would have been forced. When darkness tame the enemy's main minefields ,were untouched, and the operation only resulted in knocking out two guns at Chanak and killing 35 Turks. We attempted the most difficult operation, as usual, iinderestimating our op : ponents without adequate information on essential-points. We persisted in the effort and got a fair and square beating. ,

By preventing the renewal of the attack Admiral Fisher caved Britain from a disaster which would have transcended any other in our naval history. The Turkish forts arc practically intact and the minefield is untouched and we are minus fire capital ships. The Turks also fathomed.our plan and realised . that however terrible concentrated fire seems the , material resulas are relatively small. No British ship was nearer than 9000 ynrds of the Narrows.