Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit THURSDAY, MAROH 6, 1902.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XXI, Issue 5613, 6 March 1902, Page 2

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit THURSDAY, MAROH 6, 1902.

It is impossible to read the detailed account of the disaster to Ton Donop's convoy without wonder and indignation. The convoy had only to travel a distance of some ten mil's from the camp to Klerksdorp, whioh is In the south east of the Transvaal, and not; more than 80 miles from Kroonatad> and 120 from Johannesburg. It is thus within the boundaries o! *n area whioh has been over run by the British troops j many times since the war began: Yet although the distance between a strong British force and Klerksdorp, a town in oar hands was only ten miles, the Boer leader, De La Rey, was able to ambnsh the convoy with soma 1500 raen. If anything were needed to explain the secret of the frequent successes achieved by the enemy, the disaster to Yon Donop's convoy supplies it. In the first place it emphasises the careless manner in which British columns move about in the country known to be hostile and infested by bodies of the enemy. One would imagine that, taught by ths severe lessons of the past, the British commanders would have taken such precautions that no considerable body of the enemy could be within ten miles of their camps without being discovered. Yet neither the garrison at Klerksdorp, nor the camp only ten miles away appear to have had the slightest idea that one of the most formidable of the Boer leaders was between them with a large force. Another point which this Yon Donop incident illustrates is that the enemy are closely and accurately njEormed of most of the movements and dispositions of the British troops. Without exact information as to the strength of the convoy and the time fixed for its departure, Be la Bey would not have been able to so rapidly concentrate such a large force on the line of march, and make such complete arrangements for its capture. Yet another cause of Boer successes in sudden coups and frequent escapes from tight corners is shown by the marvellous rapidity with which the leaders can concentrate and disperse their various commandos, Notwith- ' standing the experience which more than than two years of fighting against the South African Dutch mast have given to British officers they seem to fill victims jost as often to the tactics employed against them as they di 1 in the earlier stages of tho war, It is possible that our generals cannot iro» prove our ecout'ng trrangementß, cannot check the supplying of informtticn to the enemy, and cannot compete with him in swift concentration and rapidity of movement; bat to the lay mind these freqaoDt exhibitions of superior military Uctics on tho part of the burgher chic's, at the expense of British officers comI mandiag ihe finest jtroops in the world, »ro «8 inexplicable a* they aro bomiliitiog.