DEFENCE PLANS FOR N.Z.

Camp News, Volume 3, Issue 126, 12 June 1942, Page 7

DEFENCE PLANS FOR N.Z.

Outline By General Puttick BASIC PRINCIPLES Some important general principles regarding the defence of New Zealand are given by the General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Military Forces, Lieut.-General E. Puttick, D. 5.0., in the following article, which is the third of a series . prepared by him to inform the public, within the limits of security, about the New Zealand Army and the defence situation. The two previous articles dealt with manpower, equipment, and training. Lieut.-General Puttick states : — “There are general principles govern ing the defensive arrangements in any country which are well known to the general staff of enemy countries, but which may not be within the knowledge of the general public. A knowledge of these principles will enable the people to gain a better insight into the defensive arrangements that have been made in New Zealand, and to understand . the reasons for what may appear to be omissions or weaknesses in the defence system. “Before planning for the employment of the armed forces of a country can be undertaken, it is necessary to consider a great many factors, such as the geographical position of the country in relation to possible enemies, its shape, its topography, including the situation of harbours and other sheltered waters, the position of mountains and other country difficult to negotiate, communications, both road and rail, and, above all, an estimate of the scale of attack that it would be possible for an enemy to develop.

•’The geographical position of New Zealand . is • important in that it is situated a very considerable distance from the nearest land from which an attack could be made against it. This isolation means that an enemy force would have to make a considerable sea voyage before reaching New Zealand, thus presenting an opportunity to friendly naval forces to attack the expedition en route and so requiring that the enemy should provide a strong naval escort. The distance to be travelled also affects the time the escorting ships in particular could remain off the New Zealand coasts in support of the landing operations, unless they could readily secure adequate, sheltered waters in which to refuel, since refuelling at sea in these latitudes is a lengthy process and always liable, -to be interrupted by weather conditions, to say nothing of the exposure to attack during refuelling. “The isolated position of New Zealand also means that in the present development of aircraft the expedition could not be supported by shore-based aircraft, which has been so effective elsewhere, but must rely on carrierborne aircraft augmented by the aircraft carried on . warships to give the necessary air support, both at sea and subsequent to landing operations. The subsequent maintenance of the forces landed by the enemy in New Zealand is also rendered more hazardous by reason of the distances to be covered, and again more ships are required to be employed in its maintenance than would be the case if the distance were less. 7 . ■ Dependence on Bases. “This stresses the importance of the sheltered waters, since it would

obviously be a very great advantage if not an absolute necessity to the enemy to secure at the outset sheltered waters for a base for his subsequent operations. Not only is such a base necessary for refuelling, but it is also required for the landing of heavy stores and equipment, such as guns, ammunition, including aircraft bombs, armoured' fighting vehicles, heavy aircraft, and fuel both for aircraft and vehicles, as well as numerous other items. Given favourable weather, some of these items can be landed on an open beach, but' in the absence of good meteorological information (such as the Japanese undoubtedly possessed for the initial Malayan operations), the variable New Zealand weather makes such an operation hazardous. “In any event, except for comparatively small quantities, it is . a slow process,-? and unless sheltered waters are available to the enemy, an opportunity .is presented for concentrated

forces to attack the enemy before he is properly established on shore. Thus, areas where adequate sheltered waters are available are at once suspect as likely points of enemy attack. Their selection by the enemy would be influenced by various considerations, among which' are the nature of the country in the vicinity and the communication from it. “The enemy would like to secure a harbour which it would be easy for him to defend with limited forces, while his landing operations were in progress. He would also wish to have at least reasonable road communications from the area so as to facilitate the advance of his forces, on his next objective. - He would prefer that the route to that objective should not be through country so difficult that it would be easy to defend against him, or which would reduce the efficiency of, those arms of his force in which he might hope to have superiority over the defenders. “Thus a single line of road through hilly or mountainous country which could be easily blocked by demolitions and defended effectively by inferior forces would not be favourable to his purpose, since the delay that would occur in moving on his objective would, in all probability, give time for the concentration in strength of defending forces from far distant areas. . Landing Grounds' 1 Factor. “Anothei factor affecting the choice by the enemy of a landing point is the proximity of a suitable aerodrome or landing ground. It must be appre-

ciated • that aircraft from carriers or other ships must necessarily be rather, small;, that is to say, aircraft suitable for carrying parachutists such as those employed in Crete, cannot operate from a ship. So that except possibly in infinitesimal numbers parachutists could not be employed prior to the enemy establishing himself on land. Aircraft from ships could, of course, bomb and machinegun aerodromes and could land on them or on any stretch of suitable ground. But this would not enable the enemy to use shore-based aircraft from such landing grounds until he had established on them stocks of fuel and bombs and at least a minimum of workshop facilities, all of which would require the use of sheltered waters for the purpose of landing these items in any considerable quantity.’.’ The last of the present series of articles by Lieutenant-General Puttick will be published tomorrow and will be concerned with the same issues as dealt with in this article.